High Court · Decided 20 June 2025
[2025] SGHCR 18
Feedback & support[2025] SGHCR 18 · Case no. Bill of Costs No 171 of 2024
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] Armira Capital Limited (the “applicant”) is a regulated financial advisory services company based in the United Kingdom (“UK”) that provides various services including advising on investments and arranging for custody services. It is a member of the London Stock Exchange and is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) of the UK. The applicant has no presence in Singapore.
- [2]
[2] Three Orders of Court (“Orders”) were made in Originating Claim No 36 of 2023 (“OC 36”) in favour of the applicant. These were:
Facts
- [4]
[4] Ji, Fan and Euro Credit Holdings 1 Limited (“Euro 1”) entered into Securities Debt Agreements (the “SDAs”). Pursuant to the SDAs, Euro 1 agreed to lend US$25m each to Ji and to Fan (the “Loans”). Ji and Fan agreed to pledge shares in a company, The Place Holdings Limited, as collateral for the Loans (the “Pledged Shares”).
- [5]
[5] Euro 1 and OSF III (the holder of the Pledged Shares and guarantor for the Loans) entered into Addendums to the SDAs (the “ASDAs”) for, amongst other things, OSF III to guarantee Ji and Fan’s performance of the SDAs. OSF III, Euro 1 and the applicant entered into a Custodian Management Agreement (the “CMA”). The applicant’s role was to arrange for custody of the Pledged Shares. The applicant had an account with CACEIS Bank Spain SAU (“CACEIS”) and arranged for the Pledged Shares to be held by CACEIS. CACEIS in turn arranged for the Pledged Shares to be held by sub-custodians in Singapore. Euro 1 was entitled to rehypothecate the Pledged Shares and, pursuant to the CMA, the applicant was obliged to adhere to the instructions of Euro 1 in respect of the Pledged Shares.
- [12]
[12] On 18 May 2023, judgment for the prayers sought in OC 36 was issued by an Assistant Registrar against the OC 36 defendants in the OC 36 defendants’ absence. On 6 June 2023, judgment for the prayers sought in OC 36 was issued by a Judge of the High Court against the OC 36 defendants in their absence (collectively, the “Default Judgments”).
- [14]
[14] On 29 December 2023, the court made the following orders in respect of SUM 1915 and SUM 1916:
(a) On SUM 1915:
(i) the Default Judgments are set aside;
(iii) costs for SUM 1915 are to be paid by the respondents to the applicant on an indemnity basis to be taxed if not agreed.
(b) On SUM 1916:
(i) the Default Judgment entered against Euro and Euro 1 on 6 June 2023 is set aside; and
(ii) the costs for SUM 1916 are to be paid by the respondents to Euro and Euro 1 on an indemnity basis and taxed if not agreed (these costs were later agreed at S$18,000 (all-in)).
- [15]
[15] On 16 February 2024, the respondents’ then-solicitors ceased to act for them in OC 36. The respondents did not attend the case conferences for OC 36 on 16 February 2024 and 1 March 2024.
(a) unless the respondents or their solicitors attend the case conference on 10 May 2024, the respondents’ claims shall be struck out and the Injunctions shall be set aside; and
(b) the respondents shall pay costs in OC 36 to the OC 36 defendants on an indemnity basis to be taxed if not agreed.
- [18]
[18] On 9 May 2024, the respondents appointed their present solicitors to act for them in OC 36 and they attended the case conference on 10 May 2024. As such, the respondents’ claims were not struck out at the case conference.
(b) the Injunctions to be set aside in so far as they related to the applicant; and
(c) the respondents to pay costs to the applicant on an indemnity basis to be taxed if not agreed.
Issues to be determined
- [21]
[21] The issues before me were:
(a) What was the approach to be taken in the assessment of costs on an indemnity basis under Section 1 of BC 171 (“Issue 1”)?
(b) What was the appropriate award for Section 1 of BC 171 (“Issue 2”)?
(c) What was the appropriate award for Section 2 of BC 171 (“Issue 3”)?
(d) What was the appropriate award for the disbursements claimed in Section 3 of BC 171 (“Issue 4”)?
(e) What was the appropriate award for the fees claimed by the foreign lawyers under Section 3 of BC 171 (“Issue 5”)?
(f) What was the impact of a contractual indemnity for costs which the applicant had received from another party (“Issue 6”)?
Issue 1: What was the approach to be taken in the assessment of costs on an indemnity basis under Section 1 of BC 171?
- [27]
[27] I did not entirely agree with either the applicant’s primary position or with the position put forward by the respondents.
- [43]
[43] The Court of Appeal said at [78] of Lin Jian Wei:
Issue 2: What was the appropriate award for Section 1 of BC 171?
(2) In exercising its power to fix or assess costs, the Court must have regard to all relevant circumstances, including —
- [48]
[48] I did not find the applicant’s conduct in filing BC 171 prior to the respondents having responded substantively to have been unreasonable. For completeness, the respondents’ request for more time to respond was also not unreasonable and in any event it was fair to say that the parties were simply so far apart in principle that any amicable resolution was unlikely.
- [49]
[49] Factor (b) (the complexity of the case and the difficulty or novelty of the questions involved) and factor (c) (the skill, specialised knowledge and responsibility required of, and the time and labour expended by, the solicitor) were considered together.
- [50]
[50] I accepted the respondents’ point that the number of issues or sub-issues listed by the applicant was not necessarily indicative of complexity and that sometimes issues were over-spliced . So I did not approach this as a numbers game. The court would have to have regard to the nature of the interlocutory applications themselves.
- [51]
[51] The legal and factual issues the applicant would have had to contend with in the interlocutory applications included Singapore being the forum conveniens for OC 36, serious issues to be tried on the merits of the respondents’ claims against the applicant in OC 36, the applicant’s prima facie defence to the claims in OC 36 and the governing law and applicable jurisdiction clause for the disputes in OC 36. Foreign law (the TOB was governed by English law and the SDAs and ASDAs were governed by Belgian law, all with different dispute resolution clauses) was material to the issue of Singapore being the forum conveniens for OC 36. Three foreign law expert opinions on English and Belgian law would have had to be considered. Whilst it is true that the actual opinions were issued by the foreign lawyers, it was equally necessary for the Singapore lawyers to understand the foreign law positions and how they impacted on the applications which the Singapore lawyers had to argue. This would be necessary in preparing their written and oral submissions for the interlocutory applications.
- [52]
[52] It was important to bear in mind that these issues arose against the backdrop that in OC 36, the respondents had pleaded serious and extensive claims against the applicant including fraudulent misrepresentation, dishonest assistance, conspiracy and breach of trust.
- [53]
[53] More particularly, the respondents had asserted the wrongful rehypothecation of the Pledged Shares which were transferred to up to 21 entities who were not parties to OC 36. The respondents did not disagree that this assertion required the applicant to conduct an extensive tracing exercise of the Pledged Shares to show that any transfers of the Pledged Shares which the applicant had carried out were legitimate and justified.
- [54]
[54] Issues concerning service of the cause papers in OC 36 on the applicant in the UK under English law also arose.
- [55]
[55] The respondents disputed that the three interlocutory applications had been complex or involved any difficult or novel questions. The respondents argued that in determining the three applications, the court only had to decide the key issue(s) sufficient to dispose of the applications. The respondents said that by way of example, in SUM 1463 (see [19] above), the court decided that there was a valid and binding exclusive jurisdiction clause (the “EJC”) which should be upheld, and that alone was sufficient to grant the reliefs sought, and the Court did not make findings on other alleged issues such as forum conveniens, applicable governing law, or serious issues to be tried .
- [57]
[57] The applicant also argued that it was necessary to the proper conduct of at least SUM 1915 and SUM 1463 for the applicant to review the pleadings in OC 36, the applications for the Injunctions, the application for Service Out, the applications to enter the Default Judgments and the affidavits filed in relation to those applications. In addition, since SUM 1915 and SUM 1463 were heard with SUM 1916 and SUM 1554 (being the similar applications brought by Euro and Euro 1) respectively, they had to consider those applications and even make submissions where those applications interacted and/or overlapped with the applicant’s own applications. For completeness, the same would apply to SUM 653, which was heard with Euro and Euro 1’s similar application in SUM 776, but to a much lesser extent given the nature of SUM 653 and SUM 776 (which sought unless orders due to the applicant’s repeated failure to attend case conferences).
- [58]
[58] The respondents on the other hand submitted that the grounds for SUM 1915 and SUM 1463 were distinct and unrelated to the grounds for SUM 1916 and SUM 1554. For example, the applicant relied on the EJC in its TOB whereas Euro and Euro 1 relied on an arbitration clause in the SDAs. The respondents therefore argued that the applicant’s applications in SUM 1915 and SUM 1463 were for the most part unaffected by the positions taken by Euro and Euro 1 in SUM 1916 and SUM 1554.
- [59]
[59] I accepted that it was not unreasonable for the applicant to want to come to grips with the papers in OC 36 including the pleadings, the various applications and their respective supporting affidavits. I also thought it was not unreasonable that the applicant would need to know what was being put forward by Euro and Euro 1 and to be ready to address any impact on its own position. I was mindful that part of the respondents’ case in OC 36 was that the OC 36 defendants had engaged in a conspiracy.
- [60]
[60] The applicant pointed out that the Common Bundle of Documents (“CBOD”) for the hearing of SUM 1463 comprised eight volumes totalling 4,405 pages. The respondents rebutted this by saying that it was the applicant who had proposed to compile the CBOD and included the entire set of cause papers, yet the applicant’s written submissions for SUM 1463 primarily referred to only six affidavits. In other words, the respondents said that the vast majority of the CBOD documents were neither relevant nor necessary for SUM 1463. In response, the applicant reiterated that it was a common bundle and noted that when the CBOD was prepared, the respondents had agreed to the proposed contents without asking for any documents to be taken out because of irrelevance or lack of necessity.
- [61]
[61] If documents needed to be reviewed, the work done for that review should be compensated unless it can be said that the party should not even have reviewed the documents. Whether the documents reviewed were all then referenced in the party’s submissions to the court did not necessarily mean that it was unreasonable for the party to have reviewed the documents in the first place. It was unfair to judge the necessity for the contents of the CBOD by reference only to which key documents the parties referred to in submission. The question should be whether it was unreasonable for the applicant to have compiled the CBOD as it did, after obtaining the respondents’ consent to the contents, and to spend time familiarising itself with the documents in preparation for a contested hearing and in anticipation of being ready to address any questions from the court. In my view, it was not unreasonable.
- [62]
[62] The three applications took, in total, ten hours of hearing time and SUM 653 was decided without an oral hearing.
- [63]
[63] A total of 674.31 hours were spent by the applicant on getting up. The amount of time spent, in percentage terms, was 23.49% for Senior Counsel, 18.48% for junior counsel, and 58.03% for the most junior counsel. In some cases, I would expect to see a more pyramidal presentation, ie, that Senior Counsel would spend the least time, with junior counsel spending more time, and the most junior counsel putting in the most time. However, that was simply a rule of thumb which was by no means cast in stone. In this case, the delta between Senior Counsel and junior counsel was not excessively large, and certainly the most junior counsel put in almost two-thirds of the time on the matter overall. I did not find any unreasonableness in this regard.
- [64]
[64] Taking into account the issues, the number of documents, the extent of the tracing exercise for the Pledged Shares, the elements of foreign law and the interaction between the applicant’s position and that of the other OC 36 defendants, it was certainly the case that there was some degree of complexity that would call for the exercise of the requisite skill and responsibility of counsel and warrant the reasonableness of the hours spent by counsel in getting up.
- [65]
[65] The applicant submitted that factor (d) (the urgency and importance of the action to the parties) was well made out in favour of the applicant because of its status as an entity regulated by the FCA of the UK. In addition to the applicant’s reporting obligations which kicked in once OC 36 was filed, the serious claims that were pleaded in OC 36 against the applicant including fraudulent misrepresentation, dishonest assistance, conspiracy and breach of trust would have been of significant concern to an entity in its line of business. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the allegations struck at the heart of the applicant’s commercial credibility since they impugned the conduct of its business of arranging custodial services and activities.
- [66]
[66] In response, the respondents said that reporting obligations were a neutral factor or else all disputes involving a listed company would automatically become complex . I did not agree with the respondents; they were conflating factor (b) (the complexity of the case and the difficulty or novelty of the questions involved) with factor (d) (the urgency and importance of the action to the parties) whereas the applicant was making this point in connection with factor (d). The respondents did not actually dispute that it was urgent and important for the applicant to succeed in the three interlocutory applications, for the reasons it had explained.
- [67]
[67] In relation to factor (e) (the number of solicitors involved in the case for each party), the respondents did not argue that the applicant having a team of three lawyers assigned to the matter was unreasonable and neither did they say that the combination of the lawyers involved was unreasonable. The applicant engaged Senior Counsel and the respondents did not argue that the engagement of Senior Counsel was unnecessary or unreasonable in the circumstances. The team comprised Senior Counsel of 38 years’ standing, junior counsel of 15 years’ standing and the most junior counsel of four years' standing. I agreed that both the size and the composition of the team were not unreasonable.
- [68]
[68] As for factor (f) (the conduct of the parties), OC 36 had been wrongly commenced by the respondents in Singapore. There was an EJC and the respondents did not comply with it. Then, for a period of almost three months from 16 February 2024 to 9 May 2024, despite being the claimants in OC 36 on whom carriage of the action lay, the respondents did not attend, and did not appoint counsel to attend, four case conferences in the Singapore court. Instead, the respondents appointed counsel on the eve of the fifth case conference and only upon the threat of the action in OC 36 being struck out (see [18] above).
The conduct of a party who deliberately ignores an arbitration or a jurisdiction clause so as to derive from its own breach of contract an unjustifiable procedural advantage is in substance acting in a manner which not only constitutes a breach of contract but which misuses the judicial facilities offered by the English courts or a foreign court. In the ordinary way it can therefore normally be characterised as so serious a departure from ‘the norm’ as to require judicial discouragement ...
- [71]
[71] Factor (g) (the principle of proportionality) could be tested by reference to the amount at stake in the matter as a whole – in OC 36, the value of the Pledged Shares which the respondents were claiming was said to be about US$100m. Seen in that light, the amount claimed in Section 1 was not at all unreasonable.
(a) Under the first way: standard costs are S$15,000 and indemnity costs are S$20,000 [15,000 + (15,000 / 3 = 5,000) = S$20,000].
(b) Under the second way: standard costs are S$15,000 and indemnity costs are S$22,500 [15,000 / 2 x 3 = S$22,500].
Application
Item in Appendix G
Costs range in Appendix G
The amount on an indemnity basis, assuming the costs range in Appendix G is increased by 1/3^ (ie. the first way in [75] above)
The amount on an indemnity basis, assuming the costs range in Appendix G is 2/3 of the indemnity amount (ie. the second way in [75] above)
The respondents’ proposed award*
SUM 1915
II.B.10. Setting aside of judgment
S$2,000 to S$19,000
S$2,660 to S$25,270
S$3,000 to S$28,500
Standard award of S$15,000 uplifted by one-third to S$19,950
SUM 653
S$2,000 to S$10,000
S$2,660 to S$13,300
S$3,000 to S$15,000
Standard award of S$7,000 uplifted by one-third to S$9,310
SUM 1463
II.A.2. Complex or lengthy application fixed for special hearing (duration of 3hrs)
III.A.(ii)(3) & (4)
Party - and -Party Costs for matters which are settled before trial - Torts / Commercial - Pleadings
S$9,000 to S$22,000
S$5,000 to S$14,000
S$11,970 to S$29,260
S$6,650 to S$18,620
S$13,500 to S$33,000
S$7,500 to S$21,000
Standard award of S$22,000 uplifted by one-third to S$29,260
Standard award of S$5,000 uplifted by one-third to S$6,650
Total
S$18,000 to S$65,000
S$23,940 to S$86,450
S$27,000 to S$97,500
Standard award of S$49,000 uplifted by one-third to S$65,170
^using a multiplier of 1.33 for consistency with the respondents’ multiplier
*the respondents used a multiplier of 1.33
- [77]
[77] Factor (h) (the stage at which the proceedings were concluded) was in favour of the respondents as the three applications had been dealt with at an early stage of OC 36.
The effect of Appendix G means that, even catering for the specificities of individual cases, the level of recoverable costs will generally remain within the ranges set out therein, which represent the level of fees which members of the public and the legal profession would generally accept as reasonable. It is consistent with access to justice considerations that costs are assessed by reference to these generally accepted levels and, again, are not dependent on subjective factors such as how much the individual litigant might have been willing to spend.
That being said, BC 171 did not involve a subjective litigant who was unreasonably willing to spend huge amounts of money on legal fees such that those fees would operate oppressively on his opponent and carry with them the risk of a denial of justice. It was the respondents who had brought OC 36 and the applicant was an unwilling party who sought to extricate itself from the proceedings.
- [80]
[80] The court went on to say at [156]:
the ultimate policy of the indemnity principle is rooted not in compensation but in enhancing access to justice. The indemnity principle facilitates a meritorious litigant’s pursuit of justice by ensuring retrospectively that he attains justice at his opponent’s expense rather than his own. As the Court of Appeal said in Ng Eng Ghee (Costs) at [1]:
In adjudicating on costs, the court also has to bear in mind that unmerited barriers in the path of recovering reasonably incurred costs might well have the chilling effect of deterring parties, in future, from legitimately pursuing or defending their rights.
- [85]
[85] As mentioned at [24] above, the applicant’s lawyers had rendered their invoices in 2023 and in 2024, with GST at 8% for work done in 2023 and at 9% for work done in 2024. Three of the invoices were for work done in 2023 and totalled S$268,200 whereas the remaining three invoices were for work done in 2024 and totalled S$209,500. The award of S$250,000 for Section 1 should be apportioned in the same proportions between 2023 and 2024 and GST should be applied at 8% and at 9% accordingly. On that basis, I awarded GST at S$21,096.40.
Issue 3: What was the appropriate award for Section 2?
- [87]
[87] The respondents did not object to these figures except for arguing that the English lawyers should only be allowed £2,500 under Section 2.
Issue 4: What was the appropriate award for the disbursements claimed in Section 3 of BC 171?
- [89]
[89] The applicant sought S$10,058.87 for the disbursements incurred by the applicant’s Singapore lawyers.
- [90]
[90] Out of the S$10,058.87 for the applicant’s Singapore lawyers’ disbursements, the respondents accepted S$8,925.77 but queried the balance of S$1,133.10. The applicant explained that the balance of S$1,133.10 was the total amount levied on all the law firm’s invoices as a notional amount to cover disbursements not otherwise captured in the invoices.
- [92]
[92] I awarded disbursements of S$10,058.87 under Section 3 in respect of the applicant’s Singapore lawyers’ disbursements.
Issue 5: What was the appropriate award for the fees claimed by the foreign lawyers under Section 3 of BC 171?
- [93]
[93] The applicant engaged UK lawyers, Fieldfisher LLP (“Fieldfisher”), when it discovered that the Default Judgments had been entered against it in OC 36. Fieldfisher then instructed the applicant’s Singapore lawyers to act for the applicant in OC 36. The applicant did not immediately and directly engage a Singapore law firm to advise it on OC 36. The applicant had no presence of any sort in Singapore. The CMA was discussed, negotiated and signed by the applicant in the UK and was not preceded by any visit to Singapore or other business activity in Singapore. The applicant was established, regulated and operated in the UK. The regulated activity of arranging custody for the Pledged Shares took place in the UK and the applicant was conscious of the EJC and the governing law being English law. In these circumstances, the applicant’s response to the Default Judgments entered against it in OC 36 was to instruct UK lawyers . The respondents did not argue that it was unreasonable for the applicant to have done so.
- [94]
[94] Upon being engaged, Fieldfisher carried out work for the applicant and rendered its invoices to the applicant accordingly, which amounted to £337,971.55. The applicant explained that in BC 171 it claimed only that part of Fieldfisher’s invoiced fees which were associated with the Singapore action (ie. OC 36) and this amounted to £200,315.81. The amount of £200,315.81 comprised £117,729.38 for work done in 2023 and up to 15 January 2024, £35,742.50 for work done for 22 January 2024 onwards, £13,457.96 for disbursements, and value added tax (“VAT”) at 20% on the fees and disbursements amounting to £33,385.97.
- [95]
[95] The respondents asserted that Fieldfisher’s invoices should have been claimed as legal fees and not “masqueraded as disbursements” . I found this language to be unnecessarily offensive and I also disagreed with the point being made by the respondents. Claiming foreign lawyers’ fees, where applicable, under Section 3 is quite normal (see, McCullie v Butler [1961] 2 WLR 1011 at p 1014). Indeed, it was my view that they could not be claimed under Section 1 but were correctly claimed under Section 3 much as one would claim, for example, the fees paid to a medical expert. The assistance a foreign lawyer provided to the Singapore court (leaving aside cases where they might have a right of audience) was that of an expert like any other expert. Even where the fees of an expert were claimed under Section 3, the court still exercised oversight of such fees. Naturally, the nature and extent of the oversight would depend on what kind of expert had been engaged, whether there were professional fee guidelines issued by the expert’s industry, etc. But in any event claiming such foreign lawyer’s fees under Section 3 did not mean that they would escape the court’s scrutiny and I did not think that was the applicant’s intention in doing so.
- [97]
[97] Both experts referred to the UK Civil Procedure Rules (the “CPR”). Specifically, Rule 44.5 of the CPR states:
(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), where the court assesses (whether by summary or detailed assessment) costs which are payable by the paying party to the receiving party under the terms of a contract, the costs payable under those terms are, unless the contract expressly provides otherwise, to be presumed to be costs which —
(a) have been reasonably incurred; and
(b) are reasonable in amount,
and the court will assess them accordingly.
(3) Paragraph (1) does not apply where the contract is between a solicitor and client.
- [99]
[99] Rule 44.4(3) of the CPR further says that the court will also have regard to:
(a) the conduct of all the parties, including in particular —
(i) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings; and
(b) the amount or value of any money or property involved;
(c) the importance of the matter to all the parties;
(d) the particular complexity of the matter or the difficulty or novelty of the questions raised;
(e) the skill, effort, specialised knowledge and responsibility involved;
(f) the time spent on the case;
(g) the place where and the circumstances in which work or any part of it was done; and
(h) the receiving party's last approved or agreed budget.
- [100]
[100] I agreed with Mr Daval-Bowden that there are significant similarities between the test of reasonableness as applied in Singapore and as applied in the UK . However, the experts disagreed on two points which affected the determination of the amount to be allowed under Section 3 of BC 171 for Fieldfisher’s fees.
- [102]
[102] Second, Mr Daval-Bowden said that Appendix G ought also to be considered when deciding on the quantum of fees for Fieldfisher whereas Mr Mason disagreed .
- [104]
[104] I did not agree with Mr Daval-Bowden on the second point. The work done by Fieldfisher was not necessarily directly for the purposes of the three applications and this was evident from the affidavit filed by the applicant . I will say more later about the work done by Fieldfisher. For present purposes I need only say that I did not consider Appendix G when assessing how much to award for Fieldfisher’s fees.
Work agreed to be reasonable
- [105]
[105] Both experts agreed that certain aspects of the work done by Fieldfisher, as well as the time spent on such work, were reasonable. These included work done to compile a chronology and legal points in relation to material provided to Fieldfisher by the applicant, work done in relation to the requirements for service of Singapore court documents in the UK under relevant treaties and service conventions, input on the affidavit/s to be filed by the applicant in the Singapore proceedings, and input on the Belgian law advice. I accepted that all of that work, and the time spent, should be allowed and I will summarise at [124(a)] below how much was awarded for this item.
Work agreed to be unreasonable
Work described as work for instructing counsel or ‘solicitor and client’ work or duplicated work
- [107]
[107] The applicant said that it was the respondents' decision to commence proceedings in the wrong jurisdiction (ie. Singapore) that required the applicant to utilise the services of two law firms, whereas the applicant would only have needed to engage Fieldfisher if the proceedings had been brought in the UK . Whilst this was true, it did not meet the respondents’ point that the applicant should have instructed the Singapore lawyers directly for the conduct of OC 36 rather than rely on Fieldfisher to do so, in which case there would only have been one law firm involved.
- [109]
[109] In response, the applicant explained that Fieldfisher performed work that the Singapore lawyers could not, such as advising on English law . Fieldfisher also:
(a) took instructions from the applicant, including compiling factual material, and then instructed the applicant’s Singapore lawyers;
(b) reviewed draft correspondence, submissions and affidavits and provided input from an English law/litigation perspective;
(c) advised on litigation strategy from an English law perspective .
- [111]
[111] According to the applicant, because of the EJC, proceedings might in the future be commenced in the UK. Any submissions and arguments made in OC 36 could affect the applicant’s position in any future UK proceedings. Submissions and arguments made in the course of OC 36 could also affect the applicant’s rights and obligations under the CMA and the applicable regulatory requirements. It was therefore necessary for Fieldfisher to be involved and provide input throughout OC 36 .
- [112]
[112] The applicant said that there was no duplication of work in the sense of both Fieldfisher and the Singapore lawyers performing the exact same tasks. Whilst, for instance, the same affidavit would have been reviewed by both Fieldfisher and the Singapore lawyers, for the reasons already explained, both sets of lawyers were each looking out for different things .
- [113]
[113] Mr Mason said that certain aspects of the work done by Fieldfisher, as well as the time spent on such work, were reasonable. These included work done on the draft defence in the Singapore proceedings, input on and review of the written submissions for the Singapore proceedings, providing instructions to the Singapore lawyers, seeking documents and instructions from the applicant as requested by the Singapore lawyers, input on the affidavit/s for the Singapore proceedings, and input on issues of the collateral management fee and custody fees.
- [114]
[114] As noted at [93] above, the respondents did not take the position that it was unreasonable for the applicant to have engaged Fieldfisher, instead of engaging Singapore lawyers directly, at the inception of the matter. The question therefore became whether, having already engaged Fieldfisher, it was unreasonable for the applicant not to disengage from Fieldfisher and deal directly with the Singapore lawyers .
- [115]
[115] It appeared to me that the applicant’s first port of call had been Fieldfisher for the reasons set out at [93] above and the applicant used Singapore lawyers because Fieldfisher could not undertake all the work that was necessary to defend the applicant and protect its rights in OC 36. I came to the view that it would not be unfair to also say that the applicant relied on Fieldfisher to ensure that nothing that happened in OC 36 would prejudice the applicant in any way, whether then or in the future, in the UK .
- [116]
[116] I broadly accepted the applicant’s explanations for, and Mr Mason’s analysis of, the distinct functions discharged by Fieldfisher and the Singapore lawyers and the work done by each of them respectively. I also agreed that in all the circumstances it was not unreasonable that the applicant declined to disengage Fieldfisher.
- [117]
[117] That being said, the applicant’s need for Fieldfisher to be on board throughout the Singapore litigation was, to a not insignificant extent, also for its own comfort level and reassurance. I was of the view that it was unreasonable to make the respondents bear all the fees for such work. Accordingly, I applied a discount of 25% and allowed this work at 75%. I will summarise at [124(b)] below how much was awarded for this item.
Affidavit and exhibits
- [118]
[118] The applicant had sought fees for Fieldfisher’s time spent on finalising a draft affidavit and exhibits to be filed in the Singapore proceedings. Mr Daval-Bowden accepted that these were reasonable but Mr Mason did not. I accepted Mr Mason’s opinion and disallowed the fees of Fieldfisher; for completeness, this amounted to £1,850 whether the hourly rates used by Mr Mason or by Mr Daval-Bowden were applied.
Inter-firm correspondence and interactions with the applicant
- [119]
[119] Fieldfisher had also spent time liaising between the Singapore lawyers and the applicant. Mr Daval-Bowden was of the view that the work done and time spent by Fieldfisher were unreasonable, but Mr Mason said that they should be allowed at 85%. Having accepted that it was not unreasonable for the applicant to continue using Fieldfisher as well as the Singapore lawyers, I allowed 85% of this item and I will summarise at [124(c)] below the amount that was awarded for this item.
Research and internal preparation
- [120]
[120] Finally there was a category of work done which Mr Daval-Bowden was of the view were reasonable, but Mr Mason was of the view should be allowed at 85%. This included research and work done within the team at Fieldfisher. I allowed this item at 85% and the amount I awarded is summarised at [124(d)] below.
Hourly rates
- [121]
[121] Having dealt in principle with the various categories of work as analysed by the respective experts, it was also necessary to consider the hourly rates to be applied for the work that was allowed in principle. Mr Mason explained that in his view, it was reasonable for the applicant to have instructed a London firm such as Fieldfisher. As for the hourly rates, Mr Mason said that the starting point should be the Guideline Hourly Rates (the “GHR”) used in the UK, and specifically referred to the highest band of the GHR (“London Band 1”) plus an uplift for most of the lawyers assigned to the matter .
- [122]
[122] Mr Daval-Bowden disagreed; he pointed out that London Band 1 rates were for very heavy commercial and corporate work by centrally based London firms whereas London Band 2 was for less complex matters where the solicitors were based in the City of London and Central London. Mr Daval-Bowden noted that the hourly rates initially claimed by Fieldfisher for most of the lawyers assigned to the matter were higher than even the London Band 1 rates. He suggested that the appropriate rates would be a mid-point between London Band 1 and London Band 2 plus an uplift .
- [123]
[123] I agreed with Mr Daval-Bowden. The work done by Fieldfisher that was allowed for the purposes of the Singapore proceedings should necessarily be work that was supportive of the Singapore proceedings and I did not agree that the rates Mr Mason recommended should apply. Or, if a great deal of expertise was brought to bear because it was important to the applicant that the applicant’s interests in the UK should be protected, then, similar to my point at [117] above about the applicant’s comfort level and reassurance, that work should not be charged at the GHR recommended by Mr Mason.
- [124]
[124] I summarise below the categories and amounts I awarded for Fieldfisher’s work, using the rates put forward by Mr Daval-Bowden:
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