Magistrate's Court · Decided 24 April 2026
Wen Hanrong v Huationg Contractor Pte Ltd and another
Feedback & support[2026] SGMC 52 · Case no. Magistrate’s Court Suit No 10455 of 2020 · 30 paragraphs
✱ What happened, in plain English
There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.
Ask about this judgment →Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
Introduction
- [1]
[1] On 5 January 2026, I delivered my judgment as regards the assessment of damages of this action: Wen Hanrong v Huationg Contractor Pte Ltd and another [2026] SGMC 3 (“the Judgment”). I will continue to adopt the same abbreviations as used in the Judgment and this decision should be read in conjunction with the Judgment.
- [3]
[3] On 19 January 2026, the Plaintiff filed an appeal against the entirety of my decision. Subsequently, on 11 March 2026, the appeal was dismissed by the learned District Judge (“the DJ”) in its entirety.
Background facts
- [5]
[5] The facts and findings of this case are fully set out in the Judgment, and I do not propose to repeat them here. In brief, this was a personal injury claim which arose following a road traffic accident on 13 October 2017, where the Plaintiff was struck by a cement truck whilst crossing a pedestrian crossing on his bicycle, driven by the Second Defendant, a worker under the employment of the First Defendant. The action was commenced by the Plaintiff on 2 October 2020.
- [6]
[6] On 30 April 2021, interlocutory judgment was entered by consent in favour of the Plaintiff on a 100% liability basis against the Defendants. The assessment of damages proceedings occurred on 10 April, 19 May, 5 June and 21 August 2025. On 5 January 2026, I delivered the Judgment and awarded general damages in the sum of $9,800 and special damages in the sum of $3353.71 with the usual consequential orders. I awarded pre-judgment interest for general damages at 5.33% and special damages at 2.67% but excluded the specific periods from the computation of interest owing to the Plaintiff’s dilatory conduct in the prosecution of his claim (see Judgment at [138]).
- [8]
[8] On 19 January 2026, the Plaintiff filed the following Notice of Appeal vide MC/RA 3/2026 (“RA 3”):
Effectively, this was an appeal against the entirety of my decision in the Judgment. In light of the appeal, I directed that the question of costs be held in abeyance pending the resolution of the appeal.
- [9]
[9] RA 3 was heard by the DJ on 25 February 2026 and dismissed in its entirety on 11 March 2026: see Brief Oral Grounds of Decision dated 11 March 2026 (“Oral Grounds”). At the hearing on 11 March 2026, after the DJ had rendered her Oral Grounds, Ms Lee immediately sought leave to appeal against the DJ’s dismissal to the General Division of the High Court (“High Court”) even though Ms Lee stated she had “yet to take instructions”. The DJ directed her to file a formal application with a supporting affidavit.
- [10]
[10] Subsequently, on 17 March 2026, the Plaintiff filed MC/SUM 1189/2026 (“SUM 1189”) seeking leave for a further appeal to the High Court. SUM 1189 is presently pending.
Parties’ submissions
The Plaintiff
- [12]
[12] According to the Plaintiff, he and his solicitors have spent a “substantial amount of time and effort in doing [a] substantial amount of work in the matter from 2020 to 2026”. The Plaintiff highlights an offer to settle dated 13 November 2024, where he accepted the Defendants’ offer to settle general damages at $17,000 and had counter-offered that the Defendants pay him the sum of $3,550 for special damages (“Plaintiff’s 13 November 2024 OTS”). The Defendants did not accept the counteroffer of $3,550 for special damages but had instead offered a sum of $3,000 in their offer to settle dated 30 October 2024.
(a) conveying Ms Wen’s request for Ms Wen to assist the court’s Mandarin interpreter in interpreting Hakka during the first tranche of the assessment of damages hearing to me;
(b) informing the Plaintiff of various medical information prior to the first Assessment of Damages Court Dispute Resolution Conference (“ADCDR Conference”) fixed on 25 April 2022 that Ms Lee had gleaned from her research;
(c) requesting the first ADCDR Conference to be refixed to a later date pending the Plaintiff’s medical examination by a cardiologist;
(d) advising the Plaintiff and Ms Wen in June 2022 that the Plaintiff should undergo a repeat CT scan of the thorax; and
(e) suggesting that the parties undergo mediation with a view to settling the matter amicably but “the Defendants were not interested in settling the matter herein amicably”.
The Defendants
- [24]
[24] Turning to disbursements, given the above, the Defendants contend that the Plaintiff is only entitled to disbursements up to the day of the Defendants’ OTS, save that the Plaintiff is not entitled to claim disbursements relating to Dr Ong and Dr Tan considering the following order by DR Toh in SUM 1951:
- [25]
[25] The Defendants further contend that the disbursements incurred by them following the date of the Defendants’ OTS should be paid by the Plaintiff. In this regard, the Defendants have tendered a list of disbursements totalling $1,023.42.
Costs in the proceedings
The applicable principles
- [28]
[28] Order 22A r 9 of the ROC reads:
The appropriate costs orders
- [38]
[38] A total of nine pre-trial conferences called pursuant to O 34A of the Rules of Court (“O 34A PTCs”) had to be convened before an assessment of damages could proceed (in the State Courts, these PTCs are only called when there is no progress in an action for six months). This was due to the troubling pattern of the Plaintiff continually seeking adjournments to consult yet another medical specialist or to obtain yet another clarificatory report at the pre-trial stage (Judgment at [129]). Significantly, the action was filed in October 2020 with no trial on liability, but the assessment of damages was only heard in April 2025.
- [40]
[40] Even at the assessment of damages stage of the proceedings, the Plaintiff sought to introduce fresh medical evidence (see Judgment at [36]), which took the Defendants by surprise, for which they had to expend time and effort to respond to at the next tranche. I have also found that the assessment of damages could well have concluded on the first day of the hearing (ie, 10 April 2025) with judgment rendered on that very day but for Ms Lee’s poor conduct of the assessment of damages proceedings, including a blatant disregard for the basic rules of litigation and her insistence to call Dr Ong to the stand which served no purpose at all (Judgment at [135] and [149]–[153]). Accordingly, the Defendants had to go through four tranches during the assessment of damages hearing and to prepare to cross-examine Dr Ong.
Personal costs
The applicable law
(a) first, whether the advocate and solicitor acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently;
(b) second, if so, whether the conduct had caused the other party to incur unnecessary costs; and
(c) third, if so, whether it is in all the circumstances just to order the advocate and solicitor to bear costs personally.
- [46]
[46] In relation to the first limb of the test, the Court of Appeal in Tang Liang Hong at [71] similarly endorsed the following exposition given by the court in Ridehalgh (at 232 –233):
- [47]
[47] However, as observed by the Court of Appeal in Tan King Hiang v United Engineers (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2005] 3 SLR(R) 529 at [19], the terms “improper”, “unreasonable” and “negligent” are not meant to be mutually exclusive. This is unsurprising, given the myriad of circumstances when counsel might be said to be acting improperly, unreasonably or negligently. Much will depend on the particular facts of the case and the conduct of the counsel in question: Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin and others v Attorney-General [2022] 5 SLR 93 at [4].
Whether Ms Lee had acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently
- [49]
[49] In my judgment, Ms Lee had acted improperly, unreasonably and negligently in three key respects.
- [50]
[50] The first concerns the seeking of multiple clarificatory medical reports and Ms Lee’s treatment of objective medical evidence. Ms Lee’s main defence is that she had carried out her duty as the Plaintiff’s solicitor in asking for the various clarificatory medical reports from the various doctors as the prior reports were deficient and did not address the issues raised in her letters to the doctors (see [15] above).
- [51]
[51] I reject Ms Lee’s argument. As I have found (at [39] above), Ms Lee had sent a multitude of lengthy letters to the various doctors which included numerous references to online medical literature. While it is open for solicitors to seek clarificatory questions, Ms Lee’s conduct went beyond what is permissible. Ms Lee had embarked on her own medical research and formed views on the medical issues, which she attempted to put to the doctors but which they rejected. Despite being rejected by the doctors, she persisted in posing further clarificatory letters to them and even sought to make submissions on medical issues based on her own views on the medical evidence which were squarely contradicted by the Plaintiff’s own doctors (Judgment at [156]). Moreover, having perused the reports, the initial reports were objectively clear. It is because of Ms Lee’s dissatisfaction with the conclusions set out in the reports that she proceeded to procure further clarificatory reports.
- [53]
[53] The second is Ms Lee’s failure to conduct the proceedings properly at the pre-assessment stage. This relates to the above, as the delay was caused in large part by the introduction of fresh medical evidence and Ms Lee’s repeated requests for clarificatory reports. I found in the Judgment (at [19] and [128]) that the Plaintiff misrepresented to the court that he was ready to proceed to an ADCDR Conference when he was manifestly not, and filed a Supplementary List of Documents on 30 March 2023 for the sole improper purpose to prevent the automatic discontinuance of the action. In my judgment, these procedural steps are attributable to Ms Lee as the Plaintiff is not a sophisticated litigant. Nothing in Ms Wen’s affidavit has stated that the Plaintiff was responsible for these specific actions. As I have found, the excessive adjournments and dilatory conduct were driven more by counsel’s strategy than any fault on the part of the Plaintiff (Judgment at [143]).
- [54]
[54] I highlighted my concerns (at [148] of the Judgment) regarding Ms Lee’s conduct during the third and fifth O 34A PTCs where it appeared that Ms Lee had made a misrepresentation to DR Toh during the fifth O 34A PTC that she had sought certain clarifications from the Plaintiff’s cardiologist, Dr Tan and had previously told the court about this, but there appeared to be no record of such a statement having been made. Further, Ms Lee’s conduct in seeking further reports after the third O 34A PTC on 19 December 2023 was inconsistent with her express confirmation to Senior Deputy Registrar Chiah Kok Khun (“SDR Chiah”) during the third O 34A PTC that all that was remaining was Dr Ong’s respiratory report.
- [56]
[56] The final main instance of Ms Lee having acted improperly and unreasonably was her clear disregard for the most fundamental rules of civil procedure. Ms Wen has averred that Ms Lee was conveying Ms Wen’s request for her to assist the court’s Mandarin interpreter in interpreting Hakka during the assessment of damages hearing to me during the first tranche of the assessment hearing (see [15(c)] above). However, this does not absolve Ms Lee of her responsibility. In fact, by going along with Ms Wen’s suggestion, Ms Lee has demonstrated that she does not appreciate the role of interpreters and the imperative for them to be independent (see also the Judgment at [150]). In attempting to show cause, Ms Lee has also completely failed to account for the other examples that I had raised in the Judgment which showcase her clear indifference to basic procedure. These include:
(a) her inclusion of improper documents in the Plaintiff’s Second Bundle of Documents that was dated and filed on 16 May 2025 (“the 16 May 2BOD”) which was filed in the middle of the assessment proceedings without leave of Court (and later expunged), including a document whose main purpose was to shore up deficiencies in the Plaintiff’s case as revealed during cross-examination (Judgment at [34]–[41] and [151]);
(b) her examination of the witnesses in a wholly improper manner as Ms Lee possessed no real appreciation of the differences between a cross-examination and re-examination, nor the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (Judgment at [42]–[48] and [152]);
(c) her failure to adequately prepare for the re-examination of the Plaintiff despite specifically being given additional time to prepare (Judgment at [46] and [153]); and
(d) her insistence to conduct an oral examination-in-chief of the cardiothoracic surgeon, Dr Ong, without the requisite leave of Court even though Dr Ong’s medical reports stood in lieu of an AEIC (Judgment at [51] and [154]).
- [57]
[57] By the above, I must conclude that Ms Lee’s conduct was improper, unreasonable and negligent within the meanings set out in Ridehalgh.
Whether Ms Lee’s wrongdoings caused the Defendants to incur costs
- [59]
[59] Ms Lee’s intransigence in conducting the examination of witnesses in an improper manner had also caused the assessment of damages proceedings to unnecessarily drag on for four tranches. As I have noted in the Judgment at [52], during the last tranche of the assessment, Ms Lee even refused to heed her assisting counsel, Mr Manicka’s advice that her approach was improper, even though Mr Manicka, an advocate and solicitor senior to Ms Lee, was specifically brought in following Ms Lee’s performance at the earlier hearings.
Whether it is in all the circumstances just to order Ms Lee to bear costs personally
- [61]
[61] An advocate and solicitor owes a paramount duty to the court which overrides his or her duties to the client (see Bachoo Mohan Singh v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2010] 4 SLR 137 (“Bachoo Mohan Singh”) at [113]; Law Society of Singapore v Seah Zhen Wei Paul and another matter [2024] 5 SLR 915 (“LSS v Paul Seah”) at [62]–[69]). There are many facets to a solicitor’s duty to the court: Bachoo Mohan Singh at [114]. I will discuss three.
- [62]
[62] The first is that “counsel are not the mere ‘mouthpieces’ of their clients. They are not mere automatons, executing every instruction of the client”: BOI v BOJ [2018] 2 SLR 1156 at [3] and [139]. As I have alluded to (at [146] of the Judgment), “[e]ven if the Plaintiff himself had insisted on undergoing further medical examinations, thereby unnecessarily prolonging the proceedings, and made submissions that were not supported by the objective medical evidence, this does not absolve Ms Lee of responsibility for her approach.” It is also no answer for Ms Lee to rely on the Plaintiff’s countenance by way of Ms Wen’s affidavit to seek to excuse her unprofessional conduct.
- [63]
[63] Another facet of a solicitor’s duty to the court lies in “assisting the court to reach a proper resolution of the dispute in a prompt and efficient manner”; “[i]t is incumbent upon solicitors to assist the court in the efficient utilisation of is limited resources”: LSS v Paul Seah at [64]. It is evident that Ms Lee conducted these proceedings in a manner that was the very antithesis of this duty.
- [64]
[64] Yet another aspect of a solicitor’s duty to the court, which has been described as “the bare minimum required of a solicitor” (LSS v Paul Seah at [67]), is the duty not to mislead the court. The significance of this duty, otherwise known as a solicitor’s duty of candour, cannot be understated. The Court of Three Supreme Court Judges (“C3J”) in LSS v Paul Seah at [66] cited the following passages in Law Society of Singapore v Ravindra Samuel [1999] 1 SLR(R) 266 in explaining the significance of a solicitor’s duty of candour:
- [65]
[65] The C3J in LSS v Paul Seah also cited [30] of the High Court’s decision in Public Trustee and another v By Products Traders Pte Ltd and others [2005] 3 SLR(R) 449 with approval:
- [67]
[67] Ms Lee also exhibited misleading conduct during the assessment proceedings. She attempted to furnish an advertisement containing the properties and uses of a traditional Chinese medication (“Tian Qi powder”) even though by that point, the Plaintiff had already completed his cross-examination and in particular had been cross-examined as to the uses of the Tian Qi powder. Her conduct was rather misleading as the advertisement was simply exhibited in the 16 May 2BOD three days before the second tranche of the proceedings. Notably, the 16 May 2BOD was filed without leave of Court and the inclusion of the advertisement was clearly to shore up deficiencies in the Plaintiff’s case as revealed during cross-examination. It was counsel for the Defendants who discovered the advertisement and drew my attention to it, before objecting to the admissibility of the 16 May 2BOD altogether which I had sustained (Judgment at [37]).
The appropriate quantum of personal costs
- [73]
[73] In my judgment, in light of Ms Lee’s clear lack of remorse and ethical insight into her wrongdoing, and the fact that this was a repeat pattern of behaviour before our courts (see Judgment at [145]), a significant degree of specific deterrence is warranted. General deterrence is also relevant, in order to signal to the profession at large, particularly advocates and solicitors handling such personal injury claims before the State Courts, that similar conduct may attract appropriate sanctions.
Conclusion
(a) the Defendants are to pay the Plaintiff costs fixed at $3,000 (all-in) for work done prior to the Defendants’ OTS on a standard basis;
(b) the Plaintiff is to pay the Defendants costs fixed at $24,000 (all-in) on an indemnity basis for the costs incurred by the Defendants following the Defendants’ OTS;
(c) the costs in favour of the Defendants in the preceding paragraph shall be wholly borne by Ms Lee personally; and
(d) the solicitor-and-client costs between the Plaintiff and Ms Lee shall be limited to $5,000 (all-in).