Wen Hanrong v Huationg Contractor Pte Ltd and another [2026] SGMC 52

Costs

I awarded general damages in the sum of $9,800 and special damages in the sum of $3353.71 to the Plaintiff but excluded various periods for the purposes of pre-judgment interest. I also ordered the Plaintiff’s advocate and solicitor, Ms Alyssa Lee (“Ms Lee”) of Alyssa Lee & Co, to show cause why she should not be personally liable for costs under O 59 r 8 of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”).

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I now deal with the question of costs, including whether Ms Lee has successfully shown cause as to her personal liability for costs.

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I also observed that Ms Lee’s conduct as an advocate and solicitor in the conduct of the proceedings was less than desirable and by her conduct, the proceedings became unnecessarily complex and prolonged. I therefore directed her to show cause why she should not be personally liable for costs (Judgment at [160]).

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The Plaintiff submits that he is entitled to costs in the proceedings as he has succeeded in his claim for damages. He also highlights that the consent interlocutory judgment that was previously entered against both Defendants for damages to be assessed was on a 100% liability basis.

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However, in the Judgment, I awarded the Plaintiff the sum of $3,352.71 for special damages, which sum is more than the $3,000 for special damages offered by the Defendants in their offer to settle dated 30 October 2024. Accordingly, insofar as special damages are concerned, the Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to costs on the standard basis to 13 November 2024 (the date of the Plaintiff’s offer to settle), and costs on the indemnity basis thereafter.

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Accordingly, based on O 59, Appendix 2 Part IV of the ROC, the Plaintiff seeks costs of $6,000 (excluding disbursements), which falls at the highest range for cases where the sum awarded is up to $20,000.

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As for personal costs, Ms Lee argues in her written submissions that she should not be ordered to pay costs. Ms Lee had carried out her duty as the Plaintiff’s solicitor in asking for the various clarificatory medical reports by the various doctors as their medical reports did not address the various issues raised in her letters to the doctors. An affidavit has been tendered by the Plaintiff’s daughter, Ms Wen Lanfen (“Ms Wen”), averring that both she and the Plaintiff believed that Ms Lee had performed her duties correctly by:

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In her written submissions for costs, Ms Lee further referred to: (a) paras 80–93 of the Plaintiff’s submissions in RA 3 (“RA 3 Submissions”); (b) “the matters stated in the letter from the Plaintiff’s Solicitors to the Court dated 5 March 2026” (“5 March 2026 Letter”); and (c) “the facts/submissions stated in Ms Lee’s Affidavit filed herein on 20 March 2026 in support of the Plaintiff’s Summons application for leave to appeal to the High Court” (“Ms Lee’s 20 March 2026 Affidavit”).

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I observe that the practice of wholesale incorporation by reference to other filed documents is both undesirable and problematic. First, paras 80–93 of the RA 3 Submissions advance arguments against my decision in the Judgment but these arguments have already been dismissed by the DJ. Moreover, those paragraphs contain extensive cross-references to other parts of the RA 3 Submissions, rendering it unclear whether, and to what extent, those referenced materials are intended to be relied upon. In my view, the relevance of paras 80–93 of the RA 3 Submissions for the question of costs is that it reinforces Ms Lee’s arguments that are already set out at [15] above.

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Second, as regards the 5 March 2026 Letter, this is essentially a letter to the DJ containing further arguments, after the DJ had reserved her decision on RA 3, concerning (a) objections raised by the Defendants’ counsel during the assessment of damages hearing; and (b) Ms Lee’s contention that I was wrong in finding (at [153] of the Judgment) that she had not fully prepared her questions for the 5 June 2025 hearing. In my view, the 5 March 2026 Letter is plainly irrelevant, especially in light of the DJ’s finding that “there is sufficient evidence suggesting that costs have been wasted by a failure to conduct proceedings with reasonable competence” (Oral Grounds at [70]).

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Third, as regards Ms Lee’s 20 March 2026 Affidavit, this was filed in support of SUM 1189 which is the Plaintiff’s application for leave for a further appeal to the High Court. The affidavit reads like a set of written submissions. It contains various grounds of alleged prima facie errors made by the DJ in dismissing RA 3 and includes the repetition of various arguments on the merits of the Plaintiff’s claim for damages which were rejected by me at first instance and the DJ on appeal. I shall have no regard for it in determining the issue of costs as it is wholly irrelevant.

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The Defendants seek three sets of costs orders for the entire action. They rely on an offer to settle dated 25 November 2021 issued pursuant to O 22A of the ROC (“Defendants’ OTS”) which offered the Plaintiff the total sum of $15,000 for damages, interest, and costs (including disbursements). However, the Plaintiff did not accept the Defendants’ OTS.

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The first set of costs pertains to costs to the Plaintiff from the commencement of the action to the date of the Defendants’ OTS, on a standard basis. This is because the final award is less favourable than the terms of the OTS. Moreover, it is “abundantly clear … that the Plaintiff’s conduct of this action is unreasonable” as he had persisted in pursuing claims that were not substantiated by objective medical evidence. As to the quantum, the Defendants propose the sum of $3,000.

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The second set pertains to the Defendants’ costs payable by the Plaintiff on an indemnity basis from the date of the OTS to the date of the Judgment, namely, 5 January 2026. The Defendants argue that they had incurred significant costs to defend an unnecessarily complex and prolonged action in light of the Plaintiff’s unreasonable conduct. The Defendants submit that, in light of the significant work they had done, $17,500 in costs on the standard basis would be appropriate. However, as the Defendants are entitled to costs on an indemnity basis under O 22A r 9 of the ROC, the conventional uplift of one-third is warranted, bringing the quantum to $23,000.

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The third set pertains to costs of MC/SUM 1951/2024 (“SUM 1951”), which was reserved by Deputy Registrar Jonathan Toh (“DR Toh”), who heard SUM 1951, to me. This summons concerned the Plaintiff’s appointment of the additional medical experts, cardiothoracic surgeon, Dr Ong Boon Hean (“Dr Ong”), and cardiologist, Dr Tan Wei Chieh Jack (“Dr Tan”). Since the Plaintiff’s alleged heart and lung conditions had nothing to do with the accident, the Defendants are entitled to the costs of SUM 1951, which they submit should be fixed at $1,000 on an indemnity basis.

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Lastly, the Defendants made no submissions on the issue of personal costs, likely because the show cause order was made by my own initiative and not on application by the Defendants.

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A key element affecting the costs in the proceedings is the Defendants’ OTS dated 25 November 2021 which was served on the Plaintiff pursuant to O 22A of the ROC.

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It is also to be noted that a court is not obliged to award indemnity costs simply because the O 22A r 9 offer to settle made by one party is more favourable than what the opposing party eventually obtained: Man B&W Diesel S E Asia Pte Ltd v PT Bumi International Tankers [2004] 3 SLR(R) 267 (“Man B&W Diesel”) at [7]. The offer to settle should be “a serious and genuine offer and not just to entail the payment of costs on an indemnity basis” and should contain “an element which would induce or facilitate settlement”: Man B&W Diesel at [8], citing Singapore Airlines Ltd v Fujitsu Microelectronics (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2001] 1 SLR(R) 38 at [10]. Although what constitutes a serious and genuine offer depends on the circumstances, the key question to ask is whether the offeror is effectively expecting the other party to capitulate: Man B&W Diesel at [14]; Lim Geok Lin Andy v Yap Jin Meng Bryan and another appeal [2017] 2 SLR 760 at [69].

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As to the quantum of indemnity costs, the Court of Appeal in Lin Jian Wei and another v Lim Eng Hock Peter [2011] 3 SLR 1052 has clarified at [56]–[58] that considerations of proportionality should apply even if costs are to be assessed on an indemnity basis. This is because costs that are plainly disproportionate to, inter alia, the value of the claim cannot be said to have been reasonably incurred.

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Having perused the document, I am satisfied that the Defendants’ OTS dated 25 November 2021 is a valid O 22A offer, which was not accepted by the Plaintiff. I note that the Plaintiff does not contend otherwise. The Plaintiff submits that he should be entitled to indemnity costs from his 13 November 2024 OTS, insofar as the claim for special damages is concerned, because the quantum of special damages I awarded, $3353.71, was lower than the Plaintiff’s offer of special damages, $3,550.00.

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It is absurd that the Plaintiff is seeking indemnity costs against the Defendants despite my many adverse findings (which have been fully upheld on appeal) against him in the manner in which he had prosecuted his claim. To split the offer between general and special damages is highly artificial and illogical, and I know of no rule of law or procedure which allows for such an approach under O 22A of the ROC. It is clear from the Defendants’ OTS that they had offered a sum of $15,000 for all damages incurred by the Plaintiff to settle the claim, which is a sum greater than the global amount of damages I have assessed (ie, $13153.71). It is also curious that the Plaintiff has failed to address the Defendants’ OTS at all.

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I am satisfied that the Defendants’ OTS was a serious and genuine offer and see no reason at all to displace the prima facie consequences that should follow as set out in O 22A r 9 of the ROC. In the premises, I order that the Plaintiff is entitled to costs till the date of the Defendants’ OTS (ie, 25 November 2021) on a standard basis. To be clear, I disagree with the Defendants that costs should be assessed from the commencement of the action (ie, 2 October 2020). It is evident that the requisite work had been undertaken prior to the commencement of the action, and O 22A r 9(3) of the ROC contains no such limitation. Consequently, the Defendants are entitled to costs, on an indemnity basis, from the Plaintiff that they had incurred from 26 November 2021.

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As to the quantum of costs in favour of the Plaintiff, as I have noted in the Judgment at [15], on 30 April 2021, interlocutory judgment was entered by consent on a 100% liability basis against both Defendants for damages to be assessed. On 31 August 2021, the Plaintiff filed a statement of special damages and a supplementary list of documents. The next event was on 30 December 2021, where the Plaintiff filed a summons for directions vide MC/SUM 6118/2021.

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In my judgment, the work done by Ms Lee up to 25 November 2021 for the Plaintiff was not significant. Indeed, the major work done (which was mostly unnecessary), including the seeking of numerous adjournments at the pre-trial stage and various medical examinations and follow-up questions to the doctors by Ms Lee occurred after that time. Accordingly, considering O 59, Appendix 2 Part IV of the ROC which provides for a range of $3,000 to $6,000 for such actions that are settled or disposed of following an assessment, I fix costs in favour of the Plaintiff at $3,000 (all-in).

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I now turn to the Defendants’ costs. In the opening paragraph of the Judgment, I noted that “[w]hat should have been a straightforward personal injury claim has instead become a protracted and unnecessarily complex proceeding, marked by significant and unjustifiable delays and the Plaintiff’s persistence in pursuing claims that were not substantiated by objective medical evidence”. In my view, the costs incurred by the Defendants are significant as the Defendants had to deal with the Plaintiff’s very unreasonable conduct. As I have found in the Judgment, the Plaintiff’s conduct, which resulted in the Defendants’ incurrence of unnecessary costs, includes the following.

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To begin, even before the ADCDR Conferences, the Plaintiff made a false representation to the court that he was ready to proceed to an ADCDR Conference when he was clearly not, resulting in the striking off of the first Notice of Appointment for Assessment of Damages filed on 31 March 2022 (Judgment at [128]). This wasted the Defendants’ time and costs.

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Relatedly, the Plaintiff failed to instruct Dr Ong in the first instance, necessitating further correspondence and delay (with the attendant incurrence of costs by the Defendants) and unreasonably appointed Dr Tan and Dr Ong as additional medical experts (Judgment at [130]), which resulted in many more medical reports. More than ten substantive medical reports were tendered (Judgment at [64]–[65]) along with a multitude of letters from Ms Lee to the various doctors which ultimately had to be dealt with by the Defendants and their solicitors. These letters were substantive and included numerous references to online medical literature.

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I agree with the Defendants that the costs guidelines for a Magistrate’s Court claim based on O 59, Appendix 2 Part IV of the ROC should be disapplied in light of the significant amount of work done by the Defendant, which is not representative of the complexity of cases (and amount of work required to be done) in the Magistrate’s Court. Indeed, for a personal injury claim in the Magistrate’s Court, there is typically only one single joint expert but here the Plaintiff appointed two additional medical experts and even sought to disavow the evidence of the SJE that he had appointed (Judgment at [65]). Further, the examination of the witnesses by Ms Lee took much longer than the prescribed time limits under O 108 r 5(5) of the ROC. I shall therefore have regard to the costs guidelines applicable to the District Court, which provide for a range of $6,000–$20,000 (excluding disbursements) for pre-assessment of damages work in personal injury claims and a daily tariff of $2,500–$6,000 during the assessment hearing.

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Given the significant amount of work done by the Defendants’ solicitors from 26 November 2021, including their attendance for four tranches of assessment, I fix costs of $24,000 (all-in) in favour of the Defendants on an indemnity basis. I should add that whilst I had in mind the Plaintiff’s poor conduct in determining the quantum of costs, the focus was on how his conduct following the Defendants’ OTS had caused the Defendants to incur reasonable costs unnecessarily. For completeness, the quantum above includes the costs of SUM 1951 which must be in the Defendants’ favour given: (a) it was filed by the Plaintiff following the Defendants’ OTS; and (b) my finding that the Plaintiff’s appointment of Dr Ong and Dr Tan as additional medical experts was wholly unwarranted (Judgment at [130] and [135]).

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I turn now to whether Ms Lee has shown cause why she should not bear personal responsibility for costs.

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The relevant provision for personal costs is O 59 r 8 of the ROC, which provides:

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The exercise of the court’s powers with regard to the imposition of personal costs orders is guided by the three-stage test articulated in the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 (“Ridehalgh”) at 231 as endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew [1997] 3 SLR(R) 576 (“Tang Liang Hong”) at [71]:

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It must also be stressed that the advocate and solicitor is not obliged to prove that a personal costs order should not be made. However, where the advocate and solicitor has been made to show cause, as is the case here, the evidential burden is shifted to him or her: Ridehalgh at 239; Tang Liang Hong at [72].

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I accept Ms Wen’s evidence in that the Plaintiff had countenanced Ms Lee’s conduct in seeking further clarifications. However, at the highest, this meant that Ms Lee did not pressure or coerce the Plaintiff to seek further clarificatory reports from the various doctors and undergo further medical consultations with Dr Ong and Dr Tan. It does not absolve Ms Lee of her conduct which displayed a clear disregard for the medical evidence and an attempt to advance claims without foundation (Judgment at [156]). By persisting in advancing submissions which completely flew in the face of objective medical evidence by the Plaintiff’s own doctors, Ms Lee had also breached her paramount duty to the court. I shall return to the issue of a solicitor’s duty to the court below. Insofar as whether Ms Lee had acted improperly, unreasonably and negligently, one situation where a personal costs order might be appropriate is “where the solicitor advances a wholly disingenuous case or files utterly ill-conceived applications even though the solicitor ought to have known better” (Bintai Kindenko Pte Ltd v Samsung C&T Corp [2018] 2 SLR 532 at [67]). Accordingly, I am of the view that Ms Lee had acted improperly and unreasonably by seeking multiple clarificatory medical reports and making submissions at the close of the assessment of damages hearing which were completely unsustainable by objective medical evidence.

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Despite the fact that Ms Lee has been fully capable of making her submissions on costs, including the references to a considerable volume of irrelevant material (see [17]–[19] above), she has utterly failed to account, in her submissions, for my concern that she had made material misrepresentations to the court. The irresistible inference is, therefore, that Ms Lee had knowingly misrepresented matters to the court.

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Turning to the second limb of the Ridehalgh test, it is evident that Ms Lee’s conduct had caused the Defendants to incur additional costs. As I have mentioned above, the Defendants were put through a seriously protracted proceeding due to the various clarificatory reports and the appointment of additional medical experts, in which significant costs were also incurred by them to deal with the many improper letters and weblinks that Ms Lee had posed to the medical experts.

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In determining whether it is all in the circumstances just and appropriate to impose a personal costs order, it is appropriate to discuss a solicitor’s paramount duty to the court.

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As I have found at [54]–[55] above, Ms Lee misled the court by expressly confirming to SDR Chiah during the third O 34A PTC on 19 December 2023 that all that was remaining was Dr Ong’s respiratory report but sought to introduce many other reports thereafter. Furthermore, in seeking a further adjournment, Ms Lee misrepresented to DR Toh during the fifth O 34A PTC that she had previously told the Court that she had sought certain clarifications from the Plaintiff’s cardiologist, Dr Tan. These misrepresentations are particularly serious as they go to the root of the delays and the unnecessary complexity that came to characterise these proceedings, which in turn resulted in unnecessary costs.

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In light of Ms Lee’s breaches of multiple facets of a solicitor’s paramount duty to the court, and the consequences that her conduct has caused, including the incurrence of significant costs on the part of the Defendants and the waste of judicial time and resources, a personal costs order is unavoidable.

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In fact, the relevance of deterrence and punishment fortifies the conclusion that a personal costs order should be made. As explained by the English Court of Appeal in Ridehalgh at 227 (cited with approval by the High Court in Tan Hai Peng Micheal and another (as the executors of the estate of Tan Thuan Teck, deceased) v Tan Cheong Joo and another and other matters [2026] SGHC 49 (“Tan Hai Peng Micheal”) at [64]), personal costs orders serve both compensatory and punitive purposes. The punitive component “brings into sharp focus the imperative of deterring improper conduct and upholding the standards of the legal profession”: Tan Hai Peng Micheal at [64].

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Ms Lee does not appear to appreciate the implications of her conduct. In her submissions on why personal costs should not be ordered, Ms Lee made extensive references to other material, including her 20 March 2026 Affidavit, which contains various grounds of alleged prima facie errors made by the DJ in dismissing RA 3. Ms Lee repeated various arguments on the merits of the Plaintiff’s claim for damages to explain away her conduct, but these arguments were already rejected by me at first instance and the DJ on appeal. This suggests to me that Ms Lee continues to lack ethical insight into her responsibility for what had occurred.

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Accordingly, I am fully convinced that it is just and appropriate to impose a personal costs order on Ms Lee.

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I turn now to consider the appropriate quantum of the personal costs order. The High Court in Tan Hai Peng Micheal at [64] had cited [79] of the High Court Registry’s decision of Tajudin bin Gulam Rasul and another v Suriaya bte Haja Mohideen [2025] SGHCR 33, which emphasises the principle of deterrence, with approval:

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Whilst it is not the case that Ms Lee’s conduct had caused the Defendants to incur all the $24,000 of costs (all-in) which I have awarded the Defendants on an indemnity basis (see [42] above), I remain of the view that most were attributable to Ms Lee’s conduct. Further, the High Court in Tan Hai Peng Micheal at [64] explained that the determination of the quantum of personal costs is not a mathematical exercise but is instead grounded in considerations including the egregiousness of the conduct. This is because, as mentioned above, personal costs orders serve both compensatory and punitive purposes.

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In my judgment, Ms Lee’s conduct was plainly serious. I, therefore, order that the costs of $24,000 (all-in) payable by the Plaintiff to the Defendants shall be borne fully by Ms Lee. If the costs awarded to the Defendants were considerably lower, I would have enhanced the quantum of personal costs to give effect to the punitive element of the costs order. However, in my view, $24,000 is sufficient to serve both the compensatory and punitive elements of the personal costs order.

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In addition to an order “directing the solicitor to repay to his client costs which the client has been ordered to pay to other parties to the proceedings” (O 51 r 8(a)(b) of the ROC), which is the net effect of the order in the preceding paragraph, O 51 r 8(1)(a) of the ROC allows the court to make an order “disallowing the costs as between the solicitor and his client”. In Singapore Shooting Association and others v Singapore Rifle Association [2020] 1 SLR 395, the Court of Appeal was inclined to disallow or limit the recovery of the costs between the respondent and its solicitors “because of the grossly disproportionate and ill-advised manner” in which the court considered the litigation to have been conducted both on appeal and at first instance (at [186]). The Court of Appeal therefore directed the respondent’s solicitors to show cause why such an order under r 8(1)(a) should not be made.

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Although the Plaintiff may have approved of Ms Lee’s conduct in seeking the further medical reports, since the Plaintiff is not particularly sophisticated, and that Ms Lee’s conduct of the proceedings was disproportionate and ill-advised, I shall make an order limiting solicitor and client costs to no more than $5,000 (all-in). This amount represents a reasonable estimate of the amount of solicitor-and-client costs that ought to be incurred for such matters had Ms Lee conducted herself to the standards of a reasonable advocate and solicitor. I have given a conservative estimate in light of Ms Lee’s conduct.

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In summary, I make the following costs orders:

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In making the above costs orders, I had regard not only to the significant and unnecessary costs incurred by the Defendants and Ms Lee’s conduct, but also to the interests of the Plaintiff, Mr Wen Hanrong. The Plaintiff, an elderly man from the PRC, was the victim of an unfortunate road traffic accident in 2017. Although the matter was by all appearances a typical and straightforward personal injury claim, he was subjected to unnecessary medical examinations and protracted proceedings for many years. A court of law has a duty to protect lay litigants from improper conduct by solicitors, in furtherance of access to justice and the just and expeditious disposal of proceedings in which all litigants expect from our justice system. While I am mindful that the personal costs order imposed on Ms Lee is not insubstantial, any lesser order would have the effect of shifting a significant financial burden onto the Plaintiff. That would be unjust.