Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." Mr Speaker, Sir, the Constitution (Amendment) Bill now before the House seeks to introduce certain changes in the Constitution. The first of these is the provision of a new Article 1A empowering this House to elect a Vice-President of the Republic of Singapore. The need for the creation of a Vice-Presidency has been felt for some time now - in fact, ever since Singapore became an independent Republic. Consequential upon Singapore becoming an independent Republic, the duties that have devolved upon the President as Head of State have increased, as hon. Members know full well. The occasions which have necessitated the actual participation of the President himself in purely ceremonial functions have also increased. Furthermore, each time the President leaves the Republic, an Acting Head of State has to he appointed in order to carry on his duties. The Government has for some time in the past considered this matter and has reached the conclusion that it would be advantageous that a Vice-President be appointed who could not only assist the President but also act as Head of State during his absence. As with the Head of State, so also in regard to the Vice-President, the proper method of appointment should be by election in this Chamber, so that Parliament may exercise its choice in regard to whoever may be so appointed to perform the functions of the President of the Republic. Hence this new Article which will enable the House to elect such a person. Mr Speaker, Sir, the Vice-President, as hon. Members will see in the Bill, must first possess certain qualifications in order to be eligible for election. In this regard, his qualifications are to be similar to those conditions set out in the Constitution regarding the office of President. The term of office for the Vice-President, however, would only be for a maximum of three years. He may, of course, as in the case of the President, resign his office and there is a further provision in the Bill for the removal of the Vice-President from office by Parliament. The Vice-President is also enabled by this new amendment in the Constitution to exercise all such duties and functions as may be delegated to him by the President, who, of course, would be required to act in accordance with the wishes of the Government of the day. The Vice-President would further assist the President in the exercise of such duties and functions as any constitutional Head of State in a modern democracy would be required to perform. One important provision which I would like to emphasise is that this Bill would also enable the Cabinet to empower the Vice-President to exercise all the functions of the President, as an alternative to appointing a person to exercise such functions of the President and thus act as Head of State. I hope that hon. Members will agree with me when I say that the need for the creation of the office of Vice-President is obvious enough, if only to relieve the President of some of his manifold duties. The Vice-President, under the provisions of the Constitution, need not necessarily be appointed full-time, although there is no prohibition for a full-time appointment to be made. The Government, however, envisages the situation where whoever is appointed Vice-President should also be allowed to carry on whatever functions or work he may have been performing before his appointment as such. Another amendment to the Constitution, purely a financial one, seeks to amend Article 86 of the Constitution which, as it now stands, requires the Government to introduce a Supply or a Supplementary Supply Bill in Parliament before appropriating funds from the Consolidated Fund, save in regard to such sums as are by law already charged to the Consolidated Fund. Furthermore, under the present constitutional provisions relating to financial expenditure, as it now stands, the Minister for Finance would be required to authorise, subject to the prior approval of the Cabinet, expenditure from the Consolidated Fund or other Government funds as he may consider essential for the continuance of the public services. There is also a further limitation on the expenditure so authorised for any service to the effect that the expenditure so authorised must not exceed one-quarter of the amount voted for that particular service in the Supply law for the preceding year. Hon. Members will agree that such restrictions may at times prove too restrictive and indeed work to the disadvantage of the Government of the day in certain circumstances, as, for example, where an unusual emergency arises which necessitates spending of an exceptionally large amount of money. In order therefore to remove these fetters, the Government now seeks the approval of the House to this proposed amendment to Article 86. I would like to point out that the proposed amendment is not an exceptional provision as it follows the financial practice in many countries, the United Kingdom and India amongst them. Further, it is purely to enable the Government a freer hand in authorising expenditure - expenditure that can be regarded as required for unusual circumstances and to meet exigencies that we may be faced with during the crucial years ahead of us and which may be in excess of the annual Supply law - that it has been thought necessary to introduce this amendment. These enlarged powers would only be used on the occasions which require the appropriation of amounts over and above normal expenditure that are sometimes of such magnitude or of such indefinite character as would be extremely complex and therefore difficult to explain without technical knowledge and which may at any rate prove undesirable in the public interest to disclose in detail. Nevertheless, as it is and has always been the law that expenditure should be approved by Parliament, the amendment would still require the Government of the day to authorise such expenditure. While clause (6) of Article 86 of the Constitution removes such fetters as may appear superfluous in such exigencies as I have referred to, the canons of prudence and careful husbandry will not be abandoned as the normal procedures will still have to be observed. Lastly, Sir, clause 4 of this Bill seeks to amend the definition of the term "office of profit", as defined in Article 91 (1) of the Constitution. This article has again been found to be restrictive to such an extent as to prohibit one who is employed in the public service full-time, from holding appointment at any of the Missions Singapore maintains in countries abroad. It is to enable persons who would now by reason of this technical definition "office of profit" to be appointed to public offices abroad at the country's various Missions, that it has been decided to bring about this change with the introduction of this amendment to Article 91. Persons who would otherwise be debarred from such appointments abroad would thus be enabled to serve the public and the nation both within the Republic and elsewhere. Article 91 of the Constitution, when drafted, did not have in mind the status of Singapore as an independent nation, but rather as a component State within the Federation of Malaysia. One can really say, therefore, that the present amendment to Article 91 is necessary as a natural consequence of Singapore having become an independent Republic. Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move the Second Reading of this Bill. Question proposed. 3.56 p.m.