Mr Speaker, Sir, while I rise to support the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Bill, I must say that I have certain reservations about it. In so far as it confers increased benefits on workers who may have been incapacitated in one way or another as a result of accidents arising out of or in the course of their employment, the provisions of the Bill are, of course, to be welcomed. As I see it, the amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act as proposed by the Bill can be divided into three main categories 1. Raising of the salary ceiling for non-manual workers to come within the ambit of the Act. 2. Tripling the maximum amount of compensation payable under the Act. 3. Compulsory insurance by employers against liabilities under the Act unless it is waived by the Minister. The first principal category of amendments is presumably to bring the Workmen's Compensation Act into line with the Employment Act (Chapter 123 of 1970 Edition) and the other associated legislation. I, however, must comment that the raising of the salary ceiling for non-manual workers is more apparent than real. It should be noted that the class of non-manual workers who earn a salary of $400 at the time when the Workmen's Compensation Act was first brought into operation in 1954 may possibly correspond to a class of non-manual workers earning a salary higher than $750 per month at present in view of the rise in the general wage level and the decrease in the real value or purchasing power of money during the intervening period. As regards the proposals relating to the triple increase in the rates of monetary compensation under the Act, I wholeheartedly agree that such increase is timely if not long overdue. The principal Act, however, contains certain anomalies which, far from being dealt with, are being propagated without the slightest alteration or rectification under the proposed Bill. I shall be touching on this point in greater detail later on in my speech. As regards the question of compulsory insurance by employers against their liabilities under the Act, it makes a welcome change from the prevailing provision. Under the prevailing provisions of the Act, it is not obligatory for any employer to insure himself against his liabilities under the Act. Under the Bill, it is proposed that an employer should be compelled to insure himself unless he is exempted by the Minister. Presumably the Government will exempt itself. While I shall be touching more on this point later on, for the present I wish to comment that it would be desirable if the Bill indicates, at least generally, the basis on which the Minister may exempt an employer from the requirements of compulsory insurance under the Bill. Coming to the specific provisions of the Bill, I wish to direct the attention of Members of this House to clause 4 which seeks to amend section 4 of the Act by deleting section 5 thereof and replacing it with a new provision. On the face of it, the amendment does not seem to involve any fundamental principle and appears to be of little practical significance. But there are two points which should be considered by this House before approving the amendment now under reference. One point is that while the amendment seeks to reduce the period under which no compensation is payable under the Act from four consecutive days to three consecutive days, the amendment also abolishes the saving clause in relation to such period. Under the prevailing provision of the Act, the period of four days for which no compensation is payable is clarified by the condition whether the total period of incapacity exceeds 14 days or not. But under the proposed amendment the period of three days is an absolute period for which no compensation is payable. In other words, a worker would not be entitled to any compensation for the first three days of his incapacity, irrespective of whether he may be ultimately incapacitated for a period of 14 days or more. I have always been under the impression that the intention of including the provision of an initial period for which no compensation is payable, together with a saving clause, is apparently to prevent any possible abuse of the provision. The proposed amendment, by excluding the qualifying condition, takes on a punitive character in relation to workers. The Government may have strong reasons for putting forward such an amendment. It may well be that by reason of the provision for compulsory insurance it may not be administratively convenient or practical to include the first few days of any period of incapacity for the purpose of paying compensation under the Act. In proposing the amendment, it may be also possible that the Government is influenced by the consideration that it may be more practical for workers as well as their respective employers to treat the initial first few days of any incapacity as sick leave under the Employment Act. This leads me to the other point which I wish to bring to the attention of Members of this House. There are two main considerations to note in respect of the understanding that workers can utilise their sick leave benefit in relation to the first few days of any period of incapacity. One consideration is that unless a collective agreement expressly provides for such period of incapacity to be treated as sick leave, an employer may raise difficulty when a worker wishes to claim such period as sick leave. Even if such a defect in a collective agreement can be remedied in respect of all organised workers, the fact remains that the vast majority of workers are not organised and, therefore, cannot claim to have the benefit of any collective agreement. The net result is that it is more likely that workers may have to bear the full cost of the first few days of incapacity rather than the employers by reason of such a provision as proposed under the Bill. I, therefore, suggest that if the Government considers it necessary to have such an amendment to subsection (5) of section 4 of the Act, then it is only fair and reasonable that the initial first few days of any incapacity should be treated as sick leave under the provisions of the Employment Act. Clause 6 of the Bill, by amending section 8 of the Act and thereby trebling the maximum amount of compensation payable thereunder, has attracted the most comments from the public. The comments of workers on the proposed amendment are favourable and so are `the comments of most employers, apart from the few die-hard exceptions. I do not believe that any sane person, whether inside or outside this House, would grudge the increase in the amount of compensation to be paid to a workman or his dependant's in the event of his death or incapacity within the ambit of the Act. Under the proposed subsection (2) of section 8, the amount of maximum benefit payable to the dependants of a workman who died is $21,600 as compared to the existing maximum of $7,200. In subsection (3), the amount of compensation payable to a workman who suffers permanent total incapacity is a maximum of $28,800 or, if he is incapable as well of performing the essential actions of life by himself, a maximum of $36,000. I am concerned, however, that the basis of computing compensation under the proposed section 8 may give rise to anomalies which may in turn result in the dependants of the deceased workman being better off than those of a permanently and totally incapacitated workman. Comparing, for instance, the compensation payable under the proposed subsection (2) (a) (i) with that payable under the proposed subsection (3) (a), on the basis of the stipulated minimum wage of $120 per month for a worker who is 18 years of age and above, it would appear that the compensation payable under the proposed subsection (2) (a) (i) would amount to 72 x 120 or $8,640, and that the compensation payable under subsection (3) (a) would equal to 60 x 120 or $7,200. It has been the practice for any court of law to award higher damages to a workman incapacitated by injury resulting from an accident than to the dependants of a deceased person. The basis for such practice is that the person who is injured but survives would logically have greater suffering and would be likely to incur more expenses by way of his own maintenance than the person who died as the result of the accident. Such practice seems to have been adopted by the Government because the maximum benefit payable on the death of a worker is $21,600 as stated in subsection (2), and the maximum compensation payable to an injured worker is $28,800 as stated in subsection (3). On the basis of a workman earning the minimum wage of $120 a month, the dependants of an injured workman who is unable to perform the essential actions of life without the constant attention of another person, however, the total compensation payable on the basis of 60 months' earnings will amount to 75 x 120 or $9,000, which is barely $500 more than the sum awarded to the dependants of a deceased workman. Insufficient consideration seems to have been given to the fact that a permanently and totally incapacitated worker, though able to perform the essential actions of life without the constant attention of another person, poses a continuing and additional burden upon his dependants, which would not have been the case if he had died instead of being permanently and totally incapacitated. Such calculation may be branded as being callous and unduly cynical, but the fact is that we are a pragmatic people living in a pragmatic society. To my mind, the persons responsible for drafting the proposed amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act seem to have contented themselves with merely trebling the various amounts of compensation payable under the Act and leaving the infrastructure of the Act untouched. For instance, under the proposed subsection (3), a necessary distinction seems to have been made as to whether a worker is over or under the age of 16 or 18 years. The fact that such distinction is contained in the present Act is not sufficient justification for its reproduction in the Bill. I would have thought that a proper distinction should have been made as to whether the incapacitated worker has any dependants or not. 1 would therefore suggest that subsection (3) of section 8 of the Act should be amended to provide for the payment of compensation to a workman who is incapacitated but who has no dependants a sum of $28,800 or equal to 108 months' earnings, whichever is the less, and the payment of compensation to a workman who is incapacitated and who has dependants `a sum of $36,000 or equal to 135 `months' earnings, whichever is the less. The provision of clause 15 of the Bill amending section 26 of the Act to provide for compulsory insurance by an employer of his liability under the Act is in the general interest of the worker for whose protection such a provision is intended. While I appreciate the move by the `Government in this direction, I am of the view that it is not sufficiently effective. For instance, the proposed subsection (2) and `subsection (3) of section 26 contain provisions prohibiting any avoidance or evasion by an employer of his liability under the Act. The Act is not sufficiently comprehensive. The whole provision of subsection (2) of section 26 as stated in the Bill revolves around the word "deduction" in relation to the earnings of a worker. But to my mind if an unscrupulous employer desires to evade `this particular provision, he would not have been so foolish as to deduct from `the wages of his workers the premium payable under an insurance cover in respect of his liability under the Act. With his absolute prerogative to hire and fire under the Industrial Relations Act, it would have been a relatively simple matter for an employer to dismiss his workers and offer them re-employment with slightly lower salaries. It should be noted that most manual workers in the construction industry, which often hits the headlines with fatal accidents, are employed or paid on a daily-rated basis. It would be perfectly legitimate for an employer to pay a wage of $10 a day before the introduction of compulsory insurance under the Workmen's Compensation Act and to offer a wage of $9 a day to a worker under a new contract the day after `the introduction of such provision for compulsory insurance. Even if it is possible `for the Government to succeed in its prosecution of such an employer under `the proposed section 26 as presently worded, it would be scant consolation to a worker who has been previously dismissed for objecting to an attempt by his employer to so avoid his liabilities under the Act, that such employer is convicted for so contravening the Act. I suggest the phrase "or any reduction off" should be included after the phrase "any reduction from". As it is, the proposed provision contains a sufficiently large enough loophole for a bulldozer to plough through. Clause 17 of the Bill gives effect to a long overdue amendment of the First Schedule to the Act. The proposed First Schedule is generally more comprehensive than the existing Schedule. I feel, however, that in making such an amendment the Government has not gone as far as it should have in revising the scope of the First Schedule. Not sufficient consideration seems to have been given to the circumstance that a person ordinarily makes greater use of one hand than the other. In the proposed Schedule as well as in the existing Schedule, the computation of loss of earning capacity is based on the assumption that every person is ambidextrous, that is, has equal facility or agility in the use of either hand or arm. I am of the view that in all cases of permanent incapacity involving the loss of an arm or a hand, a distinction should be made whether it is an arm or a hand that i's habitually used or otherwise. Under the proposed Schedule the quantum of incapacity in relation to the loss of a hand or an arm appears to be determined by the degree of reduction in earning capacity in every employment which the injured worker was able to undertake at the time of the accident and which requires the indiscriminate use of both arms and hands. Where the range of employment open to the injured worker at `the time of accident is such as to enable him to use one hand or arm more than the other or in preference to the other, the reduction in earning capacity ought to depend on whether the hand or arm lost is habitually used or not. Moreover, the older the injured worker the harder it would be for him to adjust to the loss of an arm or hand habitually used whether for the purpose of working or performing the essential actions of life. On the basis of my comment, I suggest that items No. 8 to 20 in the proposed Schedule relating to the computation of loss of earning capacity in respect of an arm or a hand should be amended to take into consideration whether such arm or hand lost is one which is habitually used by the worker affected. A further comment I wish to make iii regard to the First Schedule to the Workmen's Compensation Act is that the injuries which are deemed to result in permanent incapacity as listed therein seem to be of a purely physical character without any exception. The Bill itself does not envisage any change in the nature of the contents of such First Schedule, apart from the revision of the percentage of loss of earning capacity in relation to the listed injuries. In fact, the basic assumption runs throughout the Act that any injury resulting in permanent Or temporary incapacity must be of a physical nature. Yet increasing cognisance has been taken in certain parts of the world of the possibility of a worker sustaining mental illness or injury in the course of his employment resulting in permanent or temporary incapacity. The main difficulty of or objection to including mental illness within the scope of any workmen's compensation legislation lies in the fact `that, with our present level of knowledge, the etiology of any mental illness may give rise to a controversy which cannot be satisfactorily resolved. One way of cutting the Gordian knot of mental illness is to adopt the ratio decidendi of the United States Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia which has ruled that the onus is for an employer to disprove, rather than for an employee to prove, a causal connection between employment and disability in the case of mental illness related to the job. If such a basis for bringing mental illness within the ambit of workmen's compensation legislation is accepted in Singapore, it would mean that a worker need only prove that his mental illness is caused by work to collect whatever benefits are payable under the Act. Some Members in this House may be of the view that such sophisticated development of the concept and practice of workmen's compensation is a luxury which Singapore cannot afford in the present stage of its industrial development. While it is true that the inclusion of injuries of a mental character for the purpose of determining incapacity under the Act may introduce a whole wide range of complexities with their accompanying confusion, I am of the view that this House should take note of the need to bring mental illness within the ambit of the Act some time in the not too distant future. It is already `the prevalent view of a section of the medical profession in Singapore that the gathering momentum of economic development has brought about with it an increasing tempo of life and a heightening of social tension. I am hardly qualified or in any position to comment any further on the various medical aspects of the problem of relating mental illness to the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But I sincerely think that it is a matter that the Government should look into, not merely for the sake of the workers but also on account of the possible repercussion of `the problem of mental illness on the further development of Singapore. Perhaps the proposed Board for occupational illnesses and diseases may be directed to look into this problem. I have so far dealt with the specific provisions of the Bill amending the Workmen's Compensation Act. While the Bill is most commendable in its intention and attempt to revise the Act and bring it up to date, it is to be regretted that no attempt has been made to revise the basis or scope of the Act. The term "compensation" seems to have given rise to the impression that whatever compensation or benefit that is to be conferred under the Act must necessarily be monetary. I am inclined to the view that the purpose of any such Act is not merely to provide for the payment of monetary compensation to workers who have suffered injury or accident arising out of or in the course of their employment, but also to compensate in any manner for the loss of or reduction in the working capacity of such injured person. The emphasis of the Act is actually directed at the loss of working capacity, whether totally or partially, and whether permanently or temporarily. And such loss of working capacity is related to the range of employment open to the injured worker at the time of the accident. The payment of monetary compensation is only one of the means, granted a convenient and practical method of helping the injured worker to adjust to the loss of or reduction in his working capacity. While such payment undoubtedly serves to compensate the injured worker and his depend-ants for the loss of wages, it does not in any way prevent or minimise the loss to society of skilled manpower through industrial accidents or even the demoralising effect of enforced idleness upon the injured workers themselves. The recent publicity given to the need for providing sufficient employment opportunities for persons suffering from various physical disabilities serves to underline the fact that disabled persons can perform useful and constructive functions in the `society in which they live, provided they are given the opportunities compatible with their physical condition. What has prevented such disabled persons from obtaining gainful employment in the past, and even today, is not the fear of the potential employer that the disabled persons are not able to justify whatever salaries or wages are paid to them but the irrational prejudice of employers to equate any physical disability with the total loss of earning capacity. If it is accepted that disabled persons who have no previous experience of gainful employment deserve reasonable opportunities of gainful employment, then it should be beyond any question of doubt that an incapacitated worker who has not only previous experience of gainful employment but also varying degrees of skill or experience in a specific field of employment, should be accorded a reasonable opportunity of continuing any gainful employment. I would therefore suggest that the compensation for the loss of earning or working capacity through industrial accidents should be made on the basis of the rehabilitation of the injured workers as well as `the payment of monetary benefit to such workers and their dependants. Similarly, provisions should be included in the Act, as far as it is consistent with the scope of the Act, to prevent or minimise the loss of working capacity through industrial accidents. Under the Act as it stands at present, medical examination is prescribed only after the workers have suffered injuries. I am of the view that, taking into consideration the provision for compulsory insurance under the Act and the nature of the occupational diseases or injuries as set out in the Second Schedule thereto, it may be desirable that a provision be included for the yearly or periodical medical examination of workers at the expense of their employers for the purpose of preventing unnecessary injury and facilitating the determination of the nature of the degree of the injury in the event of an accident occurring. It may also be desirable, in conjunction with any scheme for compulsory and regular medical examination of workers at the expense of their employers, to require any employer to provide workers who are found unfit for regular employment as a result of such medical examination with lighter or alternative duties within the means and capability of the employer. Otherwise such a scheme for compulsory and regular medical examination of workers would turn out to be more of a curse than a blessing, as some employers may prefer to take the easy way out by callously dismissing workers who are found to be medically unfit for their usual employment. 4.36 p.m.