Mr Deputy Speaker, it is not apparent to me what specifically Mr Jeyaretnam had in mind when he moved this motion. Allow me therefore to begin with some general observations on the motion before dealing with the specifics of what I have just heard him and the Minister of State for Law, Assoc. Prof. Ho, say. I think it is apparent to all of us that Singapore has a written Constitution that sets out the respective roles of three main and equal institutions - Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary. It is also very clear that the Constitution gives judicial power to the Judges. "Judicial power", what does it mean? I tend to agree with the NCMP that it is to interpret the law. But then, I think, in principle, any first-year law student would agree with the same. The question then becomes: in practice, has this Executive government observed that rule of law? The allegation, first, must be taken seriously. Because, if it is true, then there are very serious consequences. Many states in history have let slip the rule of law and there have been tales in which judges, after giving a decision against the Executive, had found themselves removed or, worse, confronted by armed men and tanks. I am glad to know that we have a trained defence force in Singapore and mobilisation exercises. I believe none of us, including the NCMP, would want to see that kind of mobilisation exercise carried out. So it is a serious matter and political, social and economic consequences would be very high for Singapore. What then must be done, Mr Deputy Speaker, to prevent the possibility of force overwhelming the rule of law or subtler means in which the rule of the Judiciary might be usurped? One thing that has not been said in Parliament today is that our Constitution provides that the Judges of our Supreme Court have security of tenure in office. With very narrow exceptions such as unsoundness of mind, body or misbehaviour, the Judges of our Supreme Court cannot be summarily dismissed nor can their salaries or powers be reduced. This is important. This is an important protection against improper influence and fear from the Executive or from others. The courts also have the powers to punish people who speak or act in contempt of court. And so in this way, the Singapore system gives Judges as much protection as the law can give. Is there more that can be done? Sir, I wish to speak on one general principle that I wish to introduce to this House before turning to specifics that Mr Jeyaretnam has raised. The first step, I believe, to make the situation even better is that all Singaporeans must recognise and respect that the Judiciary can, and often will, review and strike down laws passed by this House or actions taken by the Executive. In Singapore's legal history, though brief, there have been cases in which the court has disagreed with Government agencies and statutory bodies such as the Housing and Development Board and the Registry of Companies. These are not small and petty bureaucracies. These were serious decisions taken by the court in favour of individual Singaporeans against powerful Government bodies. In this past year itself, we have seen the courts significantly reduce the amount of damages sought by Government leaders in their personal capacities against their political opponents for defamation. In two major cases, the courts have ruled against the Executive. First, in the decision of PP v Bridges, the courts held that the courts should be the final arbiter of what is or what is not a secret under the Official Secrets Act, not the Executive. Second, and even more recently, in the case of former GIC manager, Eddie Taw, the court refused to uphold his conviction on charges of corruption. According to newspaper reports, the Judge held that part of the Prevention of Corruption Act is unconstitutional insofar as it provides an unequal burden on Singaporeans. I am not dealing with the substance of these cases, but I think the principle must be clear to everyone that our courts are independent and these examples that I illustrate are not to shore up our bureaucracy or Executive but to show that, when necessary, our courts are strong and bold enough to put right what they see as wrong. I think the Executive has demonstrated in these cases that they have followed the decisions. Sir, I think sometimes we in Singapore tend to view disagreement as something to be avoided; something distasteful or inefficient or even "unAsian". But when we consider the role of the Judiciary, an equal role, we must give allowance for such disagreement between the Judiciary and the Executive, or the Judiciary and this House. The authority of the courts to administer justice to the ordinary citizen is built on the authority of the courts to do so with all, even if it means being in disagreement with the highest office in the land. When we recognise this, we can recognise the power that the Judiciary wields in the name of justice. Only with such knowledge, will the confidence in our judicial system increase. Only this will send the message that our courts have acted and will act independently of the Government. Then all Singaporeans can join in refuting the scandalous claims others have put forward that our Judiciary is somehow compliant. This brings me to the second step that I think is needed to safeguard the Constitutional position and the public standing that our Judiciary already enjoys. This is that the House and the Executive should best serve the Constitution and this country by conducting ourselves in ways that give due recognition to the Judiciary's role. Specifically, I caution against amendments to the law designed to override interpretations and decisions given by the judges. This House makes the law. But the Judiciary interprets it. There may therefore be occasion on which we pass the law thinking it will have this meaning and this effect, only to have the judges tell us that it does not, it has a different effect, or that it cannot be given effect. When that happens, the temptation will be to amend the laws, or even the Constitution, abruptly. This has happened before. There have been notable amendments to the Internal Security Act in the late 1980s. This followed the Judiciary's decision in the landmark case of Chng Suan Tze, that decisions taken by the Executive should be subject to judicial review on substantive grounds. This House reacted then by amending the law and the Constitution to remove substantive judicial review and limit the courts to the review of procedure only. The amendments removed the ISA from full judicial scrutiny. It made the Executive the arbiter over the substance of ISA cases. But even as we recognise that fact, we must also recognise that this is a very narrow exception. For the vast majority of laws, which Singaporeans live under every day, the Judiciary remains the final arbiter, not the Executive. What then must be done is to restrict the exception, and not to allow it ever to become the rule. It of course remains the right of the Executive to appeal the decision of a judge to a higher court. It is also within the power of this House to amend the laws, and given the large majority enjoyed by the party in power, the Constitution as well. But I, as an NMP, hope that this power to make and amend laws in the face of Judicial decisions will be exercised sparingly. The process of making and amending laws needs a sea change, I believe. This House should override judicial decisions by amending laws or making new ones only with compelling reasons and after a thorough discussion, both in this Chamber, and by such means as Select Committees. This hope extends to the recent instances I have mentioned in which courts have given decisions that the Executive may disagree with. I humbly submit in that sense, that the question facing us in this House in such situations is not: Can this House amend the laws? Of course, we can. The question is not: Will the Executive be able to act more efficiently if we change the law and exclude judicial review? It almost certainly will be. The question should be: Has the court acted within its powers? If it has, this House should recognise this is the constitutional scheme of things and give serious pause before overriding that decision by amendment of new laws and limiting judicial review. There is no doubt in my mind that Singapore has enjoyed good Government, and benefited from an Executive and bureaucracy that has been largely efficient, non-corrupt, effective and lawful. Singaporeans recognise this. We must also recognise that our nation would also benefit from a Judiciary that is given and continues to be given its full constitutional measure of power and responsibility. The exception that I have mentioned, as regards the ISA, must be just that - an exception. In the vast majority of laws in Singapore, the Judiciary is the final arbiter, not the Executive nor this House. Let it remain so. The Executive and this House must be encouraged to ensure it remains so. On these grounds, I regret that I cannot support the present motion. As regards the specifics that Mr Jeyaretnam has brought up, I will confine my comments to basically his contention as regards Article 144 of the Constitution and the role of the Executive as regards seeking the concurrence of Parliament and the Presidency. I think there has been some public talk, coffee shop talk, if you will, that if the President is to be the second key to our reserves, where was the second key in this instance? But I think the clarifications that the Government has brought up upon questions in Parliament have assuaged people. The question of reserves has been emphasized, as Article 148G rather than Article 144. I have not had the time to peruse the detailed opinion given by the Attorney-General, but I believe this, and I agree with the Minister of State on this point: the Government cannot doubt itself. It has an opinion from its Legal Counsel. There is an urgent situation. There is a need, therefore, to move forward. No government ever in the world, when faced with such exigencies, will give pause and say, "Well, even though I think, and my legal advisers think we should move on, perhaps for safety's sake, we should hold a constitutional conference or referendum." These situations take a lot of time and I think in this case, everyone can see that time was of the essence to restore confidence to Indonesia and the region and for our foreign relations. What then has happened now, and this is an important step for Singapore, is that there will be full transparency and discussion of both the substance of the decision and the process of decision. I think finally we must come to this point. That Article 100 of the Constitution, which is created by the Executive, was to give the right to refer matters on Constitutional questions to one person - the President, not to me, not to Mr Jeyaretnam, not to any Member of this House. Article 100 says the President has the power to refer the matter to a Constitutional Tribunal. And the President has chosen, in this case, to remain, to allow it, at least, by silence. I think I should stop here because my understanding of Standing Order No. 48(8) is that the conduct of the President shall not be open to discussion in this House.