Hansard, 1998-11-26

Under the provisions of clause 2(d) of Article 46 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, the following Members have been granted permission to be or to remain absent from sittings of Parliament (or any Committee of Parliament to which they have been appointed) for the periods stated: NameNameFrom (1998)(1998) Mr Lee Kuan Yew 26 Nov26 Nov Mr K. Shanmugam 26 Nov26 Nov Mr Choo Wee Khiang26 Nov28 Nov Assoc Prof Chin Tet Yung27 Nov30 Nov 8 Dec17 Dec Mr Chew Heng Ching30 Nov2 Dec 4 Dec15 Dec Mr Kenneth Chen Koon Lap30 Nov3 Dec Mr R Sinnakaruppan1 Dec2 Dec NameNameFrom (1998)(1998) Mrs Yu-Foo Yee Shoon3 Dec6 Dec BG Lee Hsien Loong18 Dec26 Dec TAN SOO KHOON Speaker Parliament of Singapore

Order for Second Reading read.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." Sir, the Bill seeks to amend the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap. 322) (SCJA) for two purposes: (a) Firstly, to raise the claim threshold under which leave to appeal is required: (i) in the case of appeals from a decision of a District Court or Magistrate's Court in civil matters to the High Court, from $5,000 to $50,000; and (ii) in the case of appeals from a decision of the High Court in civil matters to the Court of Appeal, from $30,000 to $250,000; (b) Secondly, to deem any question of law referred to the Court of Appeal by the Public Prosecutor arising from any criminal matter determined by the High Court to be a question of public interest. Let me now deal with the first purpose. Reasons for raising limits for Civil Appeals to High Court and Court of Appeal Sir, on 1st August 1997, the District Courts' jurisdiction in civil matters was raised from $100,000 to $250,000. As a result, more than 1,500 (The exact figure, updated to 19th November 1998, is 1,544 cases.) claims exceeding $100,000 have been filed in the District Courts since August 1997. This has helped to reduce the number of claims filed in the High Court. However, under section 34(2)(a) of the SCJA, appeals to the Court of Appeal from decisions of the High Court in civil matters can still be made as a matter of right, ie, without first obtaining leave of the Court, if the value of the subject matter exceeds $30,000. In view of the enhanced District Courts' jurisdiction to $250,000 in civil matters, the Chief Justice has proposed that the existing $30,000 limit in section 34(2)(a) be raised to $250,000. In other words, bring its limit in line with the enhancement. If the limit is not raised to $250,000, District Court cases of less than $250,000 can first go on appeal to the High Court and then Court of Appeal. This would strain the limited resources of the Court of Appeal. Likewise, the Chief Justice also proposed that the limit of $5,000 under section 21(1) of the SCJA, which covers appeals to the High Court from decisions of the District and Magistrates' Courts in civil matters, be increased to $50,000. The effect is that any appeal relating to a claim less than $50,000 would require the leave of the Court. The purpose of the amendment is that in view of the increased jurisdiction of the Subordinate Courts, there is a need to discourage non-serious appeals to the High Court. This is best done by raising the threshold limit from $5,000 to $50,000. Litigants who feel that their appeals have merit may still apply for leave to appeal. For flexibility, the Bill also provides that the President will be empowered to vary the new limits after consulting the Chief Justice. If necessary, these new limits can be increased or decreased after assessing how they work out in practice. I should point out that the new limits will not have the effect of preventing meritorious appeals from being heard, even if they concern claims below the new limits. The requirement for leave is essentially a screening mechanism to sieve out non-serious and unmeritorious appeals. Appeals can still be brought with the leave of court in cases falling below the new limits. Reasons for deeming a question of law referred by Public Prosecutor to Court of Appeal arising from criminal appeal determined by High Court to be a question of public interest. Let me now deal with the second amendment which is to amend section 60 to deem any question of law referred by the Attorney-General to the Court of Appeal (CA) arising from any criminal matter determined by the High Court to be a question of public interest. Presently, under section 60, when an appeal from a decision of a Subordinate Court in a criminal matter has been determined by the High Court, the Judge may, on the application of any party and shall, on the application of the Public Prosecutor, reserve for the question of the Court of Appeal any question of law of public interest which has arisen in the course of the appeal. However, the existing provision in relation to the Public Prosecutor is unsatisfactory because the issue of whether a question of law is one of public interest is determined exclusively by the High Court. The result therefore is that the Public Prosecutor may be prevented from seeking a conclusive ruling from the Court of Appeal on questions which the Public Prosecutor considers to be of public interest. If the Members of the House are aware, under the Constitution, the Attorney-General, who is also the Public Prosecutor, is charged with the responsibility for the conduct of all criminal prosecutions and for advising the Government on legal matters. In order to properly discharge his constitutional duties, the Attorney-General feels, and the Government agrees with him, that he should be given the freedom to pose questions which he considers to be of public interest for a conclusive ruling by the Court of Appeal. The proposed amendment to section 60 seeks to address this issue by providing that any question of law referred by the Public Prosecutor to the Court of Appeal should be deemed to be a question of public interest. Sir, I beg to move. Question proposed.

Mr Speaker, Sir, in our legal system, there are two ways in which laws are made. The first is through Parliament and the other through judges who decide on individual cases. Uncertainty in the law may arise when there are gaps or when laws are given differing interpretations by judges, or when, in the case of judge-made law, judges disagree with each other. In criminal law and procedure, it is important that there be avenues to correct any such uncertainties quickly. The proper administration of justice requires laws to be certain, especially when criminal laws are concerned. Amendments to statutes can only be done by Parliament, but judge-made law is always subject to a determination by the highest court of the land, namely, the Court of Appeal. Who can appeal, and on what grounds, all provided for in the various statutes and codes. Today, we are considering a particularly important aspect, mainly the role of the Attorney-General in the appellate process. The current practice, as the Minister has indicated, under section 60, is that both party and Attorney-General can appeal from a High Court decision to the Court of Appeal. In the case of an application by the AG, the judge is under a duty for the decision of the Court of Appeal, any question of law of public interest that has surfaced during the High Court hearing. Under the present section 64, the Court of Appeal is under a duty to reserve, hear and determine the question reserved. There is a deeming provision that where there is a conflict of judicial authority on a point of law, the question shall be regarded as one of public interest. How is the proposed amendment different from the current one? The key difference relates to the deeming provision, ie, whenever the Attorney-General makes an application under this section, the question of law is deemed to be one of public interest. That is in the proposed section 65. That this amendment accords more with reality, there is no doubt. It must be a rarity that when the AG raises the question of law, it is not in the public interest. This conceivably can only happen when the AG is personally involved in the case. There is, therefore, a difference between a question of law raised by the Attorney-General and a question of law raised by the accused in a case. The Attorney-General, the member of the Executive, is charged, as the Minister has pointed out, with constitutional duties relating to the legal affairs of the Government and the conduct of prosecutions. Additionally, the Attorney-General Chambers also have a legislative division that in fact drafts all legislation laid before Parliament. It is therefore important to recognise this fact that accounts for the difference between the Attorney-General raising a question of law and the accused in the case raising a similar question. It would, of course, be tidier, if the Attorney-General's ability to raise a question of law for determination by the Court of Appeal is separate from the confines of any case. This is the situation, for example, in the United Kingdom where in the Criminal Justice Act of 1972, a procedure known as the Attorney-General's reference was created. This makes it very clear that the public interest is served every time the Attorney-General makes a reference for determination by the Court. Such references are for the purposes of determining the law in future and this clearly may be beneficial to both accused and prosecution. It must be emphasised that it is not the case that when an accused raises a question of law, it is never in the public interest. But equally clearly, it cannot be deemed to be so. The accused is personally interested in the outcome of the case and is not usually concerned with the application of the law to others. As I mentioned earlier, it could have been better to separate the accused's right of appeal from the Attorney-General's right to ask for determination of questions of law by the Court of Appeal. Perhaps, this matter can be looked at again in due course. Another merit, of course, of the reference approach is that the defendant's name is normally kept out of the appeal, so the Court of Appeal can fully consider the case as one involving prospective cases. At the same time, it reinforces the view that the Attorney-General cannot, in such a case, ask the Court to set aside an acquittal of the accused whose case is the subject of a reference. These amendments can be supported in that the end result on either approach is to produce clearer rulings from the highest court of the land to govern criminal cases. No one, I believe, will dispute the need or desirability to have such a procedure. Finally, there may be a case for considering, in future, a procedure whereby the Attorney-General can refer questions, de novo to the Court of Appeal in anticipation of legal difficulties and problems without direct reference to a particular case. If such a procedure exists, it may help in the development of law without the need to involve Parliament unduly in matters concerning the administration of criminal justice. Sir, in the case of criminal evidence and procedure, there is always the argument made that the judiciary and the legal profession should be allowed to regulate such rules, especially as they are the ones practising in this area, and where a quick decision may be required. It may take too long to take such amendments to Parliament, too cumbersome and perhaps unnecessary. The power of the Attorney-General to refer to the Court of Appeal questions of law therefore remains a most useful and necessary power. Sir, I support the Bill.

I wonder if Prof Chin would clarify his second point when he says, "In future, the Attorney-General should have the power to raise questions." Is he advocating this, both for criminal and civil cases, or only criminal cases?

Sir, the answer is that I would expect it to be restricted to criminal cases, simply because the Attorney-General, as the Minister mentioned just now, is charged with the duty of all criminal prosecutions in the land.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Bill increases the lower limits for appeal without leave, ie, appeal as of right. The limits are changed under the Bill as follows: (a) For appeals from the Subordinate Courts to the High Court, the subject matter must now exceed $50,000 (which increases it from $5,000 to $50,000). (b) For appeals from the High Court to the Court of Appeal, the subject matter must now exceed $250,000. (This is an increase from $30,000 to $250,000). Sir, the effect of the present limits is that cases within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court are appealable as of right to the High Court, but are not appealable as of right to the Court of Appeal. This is a two-tier system. This position is satisfactory, as there is no real need for a three tier-system for Magistrate Court suits. Sir, cases within the jurisdiction of the District Courts are appealable as of right to the High Court and are also appealable as of right to the Court of Appeal. This position is unsatisfactory as there is a three-tier system and it is not something that is really needed. Indeed, the proposed amendments may have been intended to do away with this anomaly. Cases within the jurisdiction of the High Court are appealable as of right to the Court of Appeal. Here again, there is a two tier system. This position is satisfactory and was consciously adopted with the cessation of appeals to the Privy Council. Sir, the effect of the proposed amendments would be that cases within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court are not appealable as of right to the High Court. There will be a single tier system. This is unsatisfactory. I will go on to elaborate later, Sir. Cases within the jurisdiction of the District Courts are not appealable as of right, if the subject matter is between $30,000 and $50,000. Cases with subject matter between $50,000 and $250,000 are appealable as of right to the High Court. The removal of the automatic right of appeal for cases below $50,000 is again unsatisfactory. Again, appeals to the Court of Appeal are also no longer as a matter of right. Cases within the jurisdiction of the High Court are appealable as of right only if the claim could not have been brought in the District Court. While the right of appeal is curtailed somehow, the position under the proposed amendment is still satisfactory. Sir, the main concern under the Bill is that there is only a single tier for cases with subject matter below $50,000. Sir, one of the cardinal principles for appeal is outlined by a famous Judge, as he then was - Megarry Judge in the Erinford Properties v Chesire CC. Sir, judges must decide cases even if they are hesitant in their conclusions. At the other extreme, a judge may be very clear in his conclusion and yet on appeal be held to be wrong. No human being is infallible, and for none are there more public and authoritative explanations of their errors than for judges. Sir, the setting of limits to automatic rights of appeal would streamline the administration of justice in that the number of cases heard in the High Court would be reduced, in particular what the Minister referred to as the non-serious cases. The time taken for the final disposition of a case would also be reduced if there is a single tier. However, it should be noted that there are already deterrents in the present system, and these are the disincentives: (a) The appellant has to pay security for cost. (b) He has to pay the cost of his own solicitors or lawyers. (c) He has also got to pay the cost of the winning party if he loses his appeal. So there are inherent cost deterrents which are already in place. Sir, the proposed amendments would run against the grain for the following considerations: The current limit of $5,000 is a relatively small figure for most Singaporeans. Cases with subject matter of, say, $20,000 to $50,000 are not small to many litigants and indeed the outcome may be a matter of serious economic consequence for a fair number. Sir, from the labour statistics available as at end of 1997, more than 770,000 Singaporeans still earn less than $1,500 per month. The number increases to 1,288,000 earning less than $2,500 per month. Sir, for a large number of Singaporeans, the $50,000 cut-off amount is too large an amount. Perhaps the amount could be increased to $10,000 or $15,000. When this amendment came in 1994, even if one looks at the inflation figure, I think it does not justify such a large jump in the cut-off amount. Sir, we must avoid confirming the feeling of the people that justice is only for the rich. The single tier cases, in addition, would be matters handled by a Magistrate or District Judge. They are all members of the Subordinate Judiciary. The Subordinate Courts are subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, which is the repository of judicial authority in the Constitution and safeguarded with security of tenure. Based on experience and wisdom, a Magistrate or younger District Judge is less likely to be infallible. Sir, appeal and the right of appeal is intrinsic in the judicial process and ensures that justice is seen to be done. A litigant's right to have another higher tribunal review his cause should not be curtailed. If the problem is the increased workload for the High Court judges, let us then appoint more High Court judges or Judicial Commissioners to handle the problem. Sir, the provision of fair adjudication to which all have access is the sine qua non in the administration of justice. The raising of the limit for appeals to the High Court from $5,000 to $50,000 is a ten-fold increase and will result in a large number of individual or small business litigants being subject to a single tier of dispute resolution. The saving grace of applying for leave to appeal may be illusory and create problems of its own. Application for leave would require examination of the merits. Affidavits would have to be filed. The grounds of appeal would have to be identified. If leave is given, the appeal itself will again be determined on merits. So what happens here is that there is an additional step being created with the consequential increase in cost and usage of court time. The Notice of Appeal also cannot be filed unless leave itself is obtained. Hence the grounds of decision will not be available for the purposes of the leave application. This would mean again that the judge hearing the application for leave would have to second guess the trial judge. Counsel, in advising the litigant wishing to appeal, would also have to second guess the trial judge, in formulating the intended grounds of appeal. Sir, there are two possible ways to address the above issues. The limit can be increased from $5,000 but not to $50,000. It can perhaps be increased to $15,000. This would reduce the number of appeals but would allow litigants to whom a five figure claim is significant to enjoy an automatic right of appeal and access to the High Court. Sir, the proposed limits can be retained, but the system can be modified. There should be an automatic right to file Notice of Appeal on current limits or on an increased limit to about $15,000. Leave is required to file the Petition of Appeal if the subject matter is below the proposed limit which, as I have suggested, is perhaps below $15,000. Sir, another amendment that I would like to highlight is the amendment to clause 21(3). This clause allows for the President to increase the cut-off amount, after consulting the Chief Justice, and by publishing the same in the Government Gazette. Sir, justice is a matter of grave importance to the public. I disagree that a matter that determines the access to a right of appeal should be decided by the Chief Justice and the President alone. I think such an important matter must be debated and decided by this House. It is important that in the name of administration of justice, we do not introduce deficiency in justice. On that note, Sir, I would like to support the proposed amendments.

Sir, two intended amendments in the Bill are of concern to me. One is, I believe, something you can question in principle; and the second may in fact raise a constitutional question. The first relates to the access to the courts. I wish to associate my arguments to that of the speaker before me, Mr Ravindran. I share many of the concerns he has expressed about the intended limits of access to appeal. If the amendments are passed, some cases would have no right of appeal. There would be a single tier only and this is something we should question in principle. The right to appeal to the Supreme Court is important. With respect, as compared to judges of the High Court, many judges in the Subordinate Courts are relatively inexperienced and they do not have security of tenure. Moreover, the nature of the Subordinate Courts is that written judgements are not normally issued with full grounds of decision, unless an appeal is pending. Therefore, if we limit the right to appeal, we limit the transparency and accountability of these courts, and the use of their decisions as precedents. The focus on the quantum in each case is of concern. The new sums to be set are high, Sir. I believe that justice is about questions of principle, not quantum. Just because a case is worth less does not automatically mean that it is less important to those involved. One example illustrates this starkly. In the Small Claims Tribunals Act, the sums involved are well below $50,000. Yet section 35 of the Small Claims Tribunals Act (Chapter 308) states that any party may appeal to the High Court on any point of law or questions for jurisdiction. This is of right. To limit access now, as proposed, would seem inconsistent. The proposed amendment might be justified perhaps if there were a backlog of cases caused by a flood of appeals. This, however, is not the case at present, as I understand it. Our courts have shown world class efficiency. This, we can be proud of. We should value the efficiency in the dispensation of justice. But we should pause and question before efficiency gives way to haste or expediency. My second point refers to amendments to section 21(b) and section 34(b). These intend to allow the amounts to be varied by the President after consulting the Chief Justice. I wish to ask the Minister to clarify if the Cabinet or the Minister-in-charge, Minister for Law, is to first advise the President of the matter, or it would be left to the President to act after consulting the Chief Justice. This is not clear to me. The plain wording of the amendment suggests the latter, that it would be left to the President after consulting the Chief Justice. Article 21(5) of the Constitution of Singapore allows for legislation such as this to require the President to consult with any person, other than the Cabinet or Minister. However, Article 21(1) of the Constitution says that generally, unless otherwise provided, the President acts on ministerial advice. My concern is that if the President acts in consultation with the Chief Justice only and without ministerial advice, this raises a constitutional question. Will the Minister please clarify if the Cabinet or Minister will advise the President of any change, and by "advise" I mean in the constitutional sense of putting the question outside the discretion of the President. I assume the Minister will clarify at the end and I shall therefore proceed with the question that arises if no ministerial advice is required and the concerns that therefore arise. If no ministerial advice is required, this raises the concern that it might be against constitutional principle. In raising this concern, allow me to make it plain that I do not question the august judgment of the Chief Justice and the President. Rather, it is question of the constitutional arrangements of power. The Constitution gives separate and different powers to the Executive, the legislature and the judiciary. One institution should not intrude on another's domain. Sir, the judicial power in Article 93 is to interpret law as applied in individual cases. The Chief Justice also has the power to supervise administration of the courts that the Constitution provides or this House creates by legislation. This House cannot make laws that are designed to apply specifically and specially to decide any singular or particular case. This would intrude on the judicial power as shown in the Privy Council case of Liyange. Judicial power, however, is set within its own limits. Judicial power is not a power to make law or to decide general rules on what kind of cases to hear by quantum or other general characteristics as these intended amendments provide. This is the power of the legislation and that power belongs rightly to the legislature and this Parliament. The power to make laws such as the SCJA belongs to this House. So does the power to vary it. It does not belong to either the Chief Justice or the President. The power to make law can be, of course, delegated for subsidiary legislation. The power can be delegated to the Executive, Ministers. Parliament then plays its role by retaining the power to question Ministers over their use of the delegated power to hold them accountable to the House. This is possible because our Ministers are also Members of Parliament. The constitutional principle is that delegated legislation should be in the hands of the Executives who are accountable to Parliament. If we put the power in the hands of the President or Chief Justice, I wish to point out that the House cannot hold them accountable in the same way as Ministers. Sir, this problem can, of course, be circumvented. The amendment can provide for the Minister for Law to act, after consulting the Chief Justice. This will accord the constitutional principles and accountability of this House, while achieving the wish to take into account the Chief Justice's views and to amend as necessary. This is a small change, but it is one that may be necessary to clearly observe the Constitution. I would urge the Minister to clarify these concerns before passing the amendments.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I am obliged to you for giving me this opportunity. Sir, two previous speakers, Mr Ravindran and Mr Simon Tay, have touched on the question of section 34, ie, the power of the President. I totally agree with them, and may I add my own view. As the matter now stands, it is this Parliament that decides the question of jurisdiction. And I see no need for this power to be given either to the President or to the Chief Justice. This is a very important constitutional issue. Question of jurisdiction should be within the hands of this Parliament and this Parliament alone. And I would urge the Minister to reconsider the position. As Mr Simon Tay has said, even if the Minister advises, I still think that this House should be the final body to decide. Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise to support the Bill. However, I must say that I have reservation that the quantum that is being asked in this Bill is indeed very high. As the matter stands now, anything below $5,000, you require leave. Now we are being asked to raise this limit to $50,000, which is 10 times. I am aware that leave will be granted if there is merit. But then it would lead to legal expenses and involve time. The Minister has not given this House any figure to indicate that because of this provision, there is a backlog in the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Justice must be seen to be done and I think justice will be done if there is less restraint on the part of the litigant to seek justice. And I would like to assure this House, Mr Speaker, Sir, that members of the legal profession, who would normally advise on question of appeal, are very cautious. They would consider the merit of the case because time and legal expenses are involved and only when they think there is some merit, then only they will go to court. So I am asking the Minister to increase it by all means, but not 10 times, perhaps $20,000 (4 times) and come back to this House sometime in the future, if need be, as the previous speaker, Mr Simon Tay, has spoken. As a practising member of the Bar, Sir, I am proud of the judicial system. In the last seven years, despite some criticisms from some quarters outside, I can say in this House that we have the most independent and capable judicial system anywhere in the world, and world bodies have reckoned this. But in the name of efficiency, we should not undermine the system to such an extent that the right to appeal is questioned. Sir, I have also a related question which, of course, is not part of this debate, but I will pursue it, with your permission. The Court of Appeal is presently made up of only three permanent Judges. May I urge the Minister to consider in future to increase this to five permanent Judges. I know the Chief Justice from time to time appoints one of the senior Judges of the Supreme Court, but I think this arrangement is not practical. Even Hong Kong, Sir, I am told, has got more Court of Appeal Judges. With more Appellate Judges, there would be more views and our judicial system will benefit. Sir, now I come to another issue which I think deserves mention - the right of appeal. The Attorney-General is the highest officer of the land and I am glad the Minister has brought this amendment. He should have the discretion. He should have the right to appeal in the public interest. And I share Prof. Chin's concern that even on hypothetical questions, he is the man who can foresee what are the problems that are going to face him. He could pose even hypothetical questions, so that the public at large will know what is the legal position. I think it will be a wise thing for us to do this now than to wait for things to happen and then introduce legislation. Sir, as a practising member of the Bar, I would urge the Minister - I am supportive of the amendment - to please go slow. The perception and the signal we must send to the public is that we are interested in justice and we are not, in the name of efficiency, going to change the system to the disadvantage of the litigant. Sir, with that, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to raise my concern on one of the two proposed amendments to the Bill, that is, the monetary limit for an appeal to the higher Court. One of the main rules of natural justice is the quick resolution of disputes. The fat of the proposed Bill may be just that. But many cases may not be referred for appeal to a higher Court and therefore it removes potentially the backlog of appeal cases. But equally important is the accessibility to a right of appeal. The Bill, by increasing the limit from $5,000 to $50,000 for an appeal to the High Court from a District or Magistrate Court, and $30,000 to $250,000 for an appeal to the Court of Appeal, is, in my view, excessive. The public, whose disputes and claims may be small in quantum, may feel that they have no access to appeal to a higher Court simply because the claim involved is small. In fact, it may appear that commercial cases are more likely to qualify for appeal because of the higher limit as quite naturally, cases involving commercial disputes involve large sums of money. But the right of appeal, Sir, is for everyone, not just corporations. For an ordinary man, it is not just the quantum, it is the principle and the law that is involved that is equally important to him. For parties that go to Court, especially when they have used up all the avenues of mediation, his case and dispute could be the most important thing to him, whether the amount is big or small. A more accessible right to appeal also means the opportunity for any person seeking justice to have his case heard before a more experienced Judge, especially when many of our Judges in the District and Magistrate Courts are younger and less experienced. Sir, money cannot be the main determinant whether a case is heard by a more experienced Judge. There could be cases where the amount involved is small but may have very important and wide implications to society. Are we discounting the fact that mistake in judgement and decision could be one of the possible outcomes and consequence of decision at the lower Court? Why make it difficult for parties to appeal? If any, we must make the appeal process accessible, convenient and affordable. I urge the Minister to review and clarify these matters, especially on the limits of appeal, so as not to make it excessive. Based on this qualification, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker, Sir, may I say from the outset that I am most unhappy with the amendments proposed in this Bill. I do not support the Bill, and may I say that my Party does not support this Bill. Mr Speaker, Sir, I do not have to say in this House that justice lies at the heart of every human being. And he wants justice in his conduct of his daily life and in any action taken against him by the Government or the public prosecutor who is a member of the Executive. So, he must be given access to the Courts and to the highest Court, if necessary, if he feels that it is important enough to him. So he must have ready access. Secondly, on which I have expressed my dissatisfaction and the Party's dissatisfaction, although it does not come within the scope of this Bill, is the increasing cost of justice to the ordinary man. We have had cost increases several times and many a man feels now it is too expensive to go to the Courts. This is a very unfortunate and regrettable feeling if it is shared by a great majority of the community. As has been said here, Mr Speaker, Sir, the right of an appeal to test the decision of a single Judge has been with us for many, many years. It is an inherent part of the judicial system of many countries, almost every country I should have said, and not only do they provide a one tier appeal, they go on to provide a further appeal, a two tier appeal. We have seen recently with Malaysia setting up the Supreme Court of Malaysia to hear appeals from the Court of Appeal. And I shall be talking about this later. Instead of moving towards a two tier appeal system, we seem to be heading towards cutting out appeals altogether. Is that what we want in this country? There are other ways than bringing legislation before Parliament to discourage appeals, and which are also to be regretted. Not very long ago, the Chief Justice, who hears Magistrates' appeals, said quite publicly at a hearing that he was going to discourage frivolous appeals by convicted persons who may have had long sentences of imprisonment or heavy fines, and he would discourage that, cut down the number of appeals by increasing the sentences. May I say that is a most unfortunate remark. And now what does the Government propose to do? As has been said by the speakers before me, it proposes to provide from now, with the passing of this Bill, and there is no question that it will become law, that a single magistrate be left to decide claims below $30,000. To the litigant, a claim of $15,000, $20,000 or $25,000 may mean a great lot to him. In that respect, this Bill is discriminatory. Mr Ravindran, I think, mentioned that, but I will go further and say this is totally discriminatory, and questions may be asked whether it does or does not violate the equality requirement in our Constitution. Why should you deny a litigant who has a claim of less than $50,000 any right of appeal from the decision of a single judge or magistrate? Why is it that only persons who have claims of more than $50,000 and $250,000 should have this right and not persons who have claims below the sum of $50,000? Of course, there should be a little restraint in the number of appeals to be allowed and the present limits are good enough. Again, as has been pointed out, there are other restraints by way of requiring appellants to provide security for costs. If the appeal is thought to be frivolous, the answer is to ask for further security and the opposing litigants can do just that. If they thought an appeal was frivolous, they could make an application to the High Court for security for cost to be increased, particularly if there is some evidence that the person appealing will not have the means to pay the costs at the end. So we have the mechanism to prevent frivolous and useless appeals going up to the High Court or to the Court of Appeal. The Minister was very brief in his introduction of this Bill and he says the Chief Justice had requested the amendments. May we know from the Minister whether it is because there are too many appeals and, if so, what is the present number of appeals that judges find difficult to cope with? As has been said before me, justice demands that even if it takes a little longer, that the person seeking justice should be accorded justice and be able to leave the court or tribunal with the feeling that justice has been done to him even though he may not agree with the decision. So what is the need? Is it because there are far too many appeals and we have not got enough judges, or we have not got enough court rooms and appeals are going to be lengthened out to two or three years? Already, I am unhappy at the haste with which cases are processed through the courts. So I am, and my Party is, very unhappy with the proposal that we now increase the threshold for appeal from the Subordinate Courts to $50,000. It is not good enough to say they can still appeal because they can seek the leave of the magistrate. Magistrates are human and, like any other human being. More so because they are judicial officers and they have to decide on the merits they must feel that they are right in their decision. They would be reluctant to grant any further appeal saying, "This question is very clear to me. I cannot see that an appeal is going to help." So the decision is left entirely to the magistrate. May I illustrate this by what the Privy Council said, and I am sure the Minister is aware of this, in relation to applications that were made under section 60 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act. There were two applications made under that, one to the Chief Justice and one to another judge of the High Court. They were criminal cases because section 60 applies only to criminal cases. And in both instances, the applications to refer questions to the Court of Appeal were turned down summarily. The Privy Council which, as I have said before, was then the highest court in the land, pronounced their unhappiness over the decisions of the two judges not to refer the questions to the Court of Appeal. The Privy Council was in no doubt that the questions sought to be referred were questions of public interest and they said they should have been referred. So there is the Privy Council commenting, not on magistrates' decisions, but on the decision of the Chief Justice and a judge of the High Court. So if they can make mistakes, what about magistrates? Are they not liable to fall into the same error? I would like to hear from the Minister the compelling reasons why this amendment is necessary at this stage. If it is speedy justice that we want, cases heard and disposed of immediately, perhaps we should try and take a leaf from what the Prime Minister in Pakistan is proposing to do. He is proposing to have cases heard immediately, appeal heard the next day, execution carried out within seven days. Is that what we want in Singapore - is that the whole aim and object of justice, that it should be speedily carried out and determined? Or is our aim to try and do justice between subject and subject and between the subject and the Government? These are very important questions of principle and cannot be shrugged off or shelved by considerations of time or convenience. Many a judge has said that administrative convenience has no place in the system of justice. However inconvenient it may be, it must be the sole aim and object of justice to do justice even though it may be inconvenient. May I move on to the proposed repeal and re-enactment of section 60. This is again most unsatisfactory. I have raised this, not once, but two or three times in this House, after I returned to this House. The law as it now stands gives the Public Prosecutor the sole right without any hindrance to take up a question to the Court of Appeal. But the accused has to apply for leave and, as I have indicated, whether it reaches the Court of Appeal or not was left to the judge who heard the appeal and who quite clearly felt convinced of the rightness of his decisions. That itself was wrong in principle. Why should the Public Prosecutor be allowed to ride - I suppose I should not say his coach and six horses - his car through the courts? This Bill seeks to give him greater rights. I am sure the Minister is aware, and this comes from the pronouncements of the highest courts which have dealt with the question of Crown privilege. I am sure he is aware that the courts have decided again and again in England and Scotland that the question of public interest is not a matter for the Attorney-General or anyone else, but it is for the courts to determine after hearing both sides what is the public interest. So what is wrong about that? The courts are the persons who should decide what is in the public interest, not the Executive. This amendment seeks to remove that question from the realm of the court to the Public Prosecutor, contrary to the decisions from other jurisdictions. We seem to be stepping out of line with the jurisdictions in other countries. I suppose then it can be said that we are unique, we are different, we do not follow what other countries do. Is that what we want? Or are we concerned with whether our present system serves justice or not? I had proposed previously that under section 60 at least the right to take the matter up to the Court of Appeal should be left to the Court of Appeal itself and that litigants or the Public Prosecutor should make the application to the Court of Appeal and not to the judge who heard it. This was done by Malaysia many, many years ago. They substituted the decision of the judge with the decision of the Court of Appeal, requiring an application to be made to the Court of Appeal. What is wrong with that, instead of giving the Public Prosecutor greater rights? Reference was made to the right of the Public Prosecutor in the United Kingdom. As has been pointed out, in the United Kingdom, the Public Prosecutor has no right of appeal against the acquittal of any accused person by a court. But here in Singapore we do, and it is there that he takes up the questions to the Court of Appeal. In the United Kingdom, it is purely a question of law which would not affect the decision in a particular case. It is to govern the courts in any future cases coming before them involving that point of law. I must also say a few words about the amendment proposed by clause 3 on the amendment of section 34 to add a new sub-section. This is again, may I say, very unsatisfactory. The right of appeal, as I have said, is an inherent part of the judicial system, and is a matter of great public interest. It should only be left to the legislature what limits should be put to it and not left entirely to the Chief Justice or the President. A very valuable point was taken by Mr Simon Tay that under the amendment if a decision to change the limit is taken by the President or the Chief Justice, it cannot be questioned in this House. I would ask the Minister not to move the Second Reading of the Bill but that it be referred to a Select Committee. At least then we will have the views of the public as to what they feel about the rights of appeal being restricted so severely. May I say a few words about the present system of appeals in Singapore. At the moment, as I indicated, we only have a one tier appeal except where in civil cases, decisions go up from the District Court to the High Court. Then there is another tier of appeal to the Court of Appeal. I think it is time we thought of introducing a further tier of appeal, a two-tier appeal, which as I said, is in place in most of the other countries, certainly in the Commonwealth countries and the United Kingdom. And in the United States, you will find that they have more than a two-tier system of appeal. They have three tiers and there may, in some cases, be a four-tier. I know criticism has been made particularly about the death row inmates in the United States. I agree that a person should not be left 10 - 12 years waiting to know whether he is going to be executed or not. May I illustrate, if I have the time, Mr Speaker, Sir, why I think a two-tier appeal is necessary by referring to a case in Singapore where I think a possible miscarriage of justice was done to the litigants by the absence of a further appeal from the Court of Appeal. And this was the case of the three accused persons which I referred to in my motion on the appointment of a commission to look into the investigation of criminal cases. These three men were charged with murder when they should not have been charged. They were not even at the scene and the murder was committed by someone else as was proved later, and that man was convicted after the three men were acquitted. And that came about because the defence sought strenuously to bring that other man to justice. That is the criminal side of it. When the men took their action to the High Court for damages, because they had spent three years in jail, the Judicial Commissioner dismissed the case without answering the question which was posed to him. He was asked to answer how is it that three innocent men could confess to such a gruesome crime as murder when they knew, at the end of it, they would be hanged. He did not answer the question. They took it up to the Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal was troubled with this question. The Court of Appeal felt that the presumption of innocence was very strong. The three men had been acquitted and someone else had been convicted. They felt there was this strong presumption of innocence in favour of the accused who were claiming for damages for malicious prosecution. But the Court of Appeal said in its judgment, "But we can find no evidence that they gave evidence before the Judicial Commissioner that they were innocent and that they were not there at the scene of the crime." That was an error. A total error. They had adjourned their decision and gave their judgment. But they overlooked the evidence the men had given. Yet, in their own affidavit of evidence filed, in the hearing before the Judicial Commissioner, every single accused had started his affidavit by saying, "I am totally innocent of this crime. I was never there. I knew nothing about this. I deny the charge right from the start." So the evidence was there and yet the Court of Appeal missed that evidence. If there had been a further appeal available to the three men, they could have gone up to the appellate court. But that was not possible.

Order. Mr Jeyaretnam, your time is up.

May I say those men have now been made bankrupt.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I wish to thank Members who have spoken and several comments, observations and criticisms have been made. I will try to categorise them in broad categories and deal with the issues that they have raised. First, several Members have expressed the concern that this somehow will affect access to justice and there will be restrictions on justice. Much has been said by Members about the inherent right for litigants to appeal. Some have emphasised the importance of automatic appeal. Mr Jeyaretnam even thought that this amendment raises questions of equality under the Constitution. Before we get carried away in thinking that this amendment has come out of the blue, never done before, and that it violates some sacrosanct principles, I would like to inform Members of the background. The background is that all these years, the principle that leave to appeal is required, coupled with a monetary threshold, is not new. It has always been there in our statute books. That is the first point I wish to make. I think Members should know that this system of leave to appeal, coupled with a monetary limit, has been an essential feature of our legal system. It has been in our laws since 1955. In fact, before that, in 1936, there was no appeal when the amount was below $100. At that time the jurisdiction of the Court was $500. So, in case Members did not realise it, the monetary limit is part and parcel of this principle of leave to appeal. Secondly, periodic adjustments of the monetary limit is also not new, and it has never been argued before that having that limit and persons who do not qualify under the limit having to apply for leave - it has never been argued that justice has been denied and access to justice restricted. Because some of the speakers seem to be unaware of this background, let me remind them of how this has evolved. Before 1986, the monetary limit was $500 in the Subordinate Courts, or with leave if the amount was less. This element of being able to apply for leave has always been there, if the amount was not reached. So the monetary limit was $500 and the jurisdictional limit of the Subordinate Courts was $10,000 before 1986. In 1986, the jurisdictional limit of the Subordinate Courts was raised to $50,000. When that was done, the appeal threshold limit was then raised from $500 to $2,000, a four-fold increase. I was then in Parliament. Of course, some of the Members who spoke were not there. But I do not recall any Member then arguing that this was curtailment of justice. In 1993, seven years later, the jurisdictional limit of the Subordinate Courts was raised to $100,000. The appeal threshold limit was then raised from $2,000 to $5,000, 2 1/2 times. Again, I stress, the element of applying for leave to appeal was always there. Last year, 1997, the jurisdictional limit for the Subordinate Courts was raised to $250,000. But last year the courts did not propose that the appeal be immediately changed. It was kept at $5,000, and monitored for a year. Now, we are altering the appeal limit to $50,000. The element of leave being given is still being retained. So the point to be underscored is that with the increase in jurisdiction of our Subordinate Courts to $250,000, obviously more and more cases are going to be heard by the Subordinate Courts. Therefore, the threshold for appeals has to be adjusted. Then the question arises: what is the figure? $10,000, $15,000, $20,000? The Chief Justice has proposed it be raised to $50,000. I would, as the Minister for Law, accept the judgement of the Chief Justice who is in charge of administration of the courts and who has a good overview of the management of cases. That is the first point I would make. So let's be clear about the background. This is not something that has come out of the blue, it was never done before. These are periodic adjustments of jurisdictional limits and threshold limits for appeals. All along, those who do not meet the threshold limits did not have automatic appeal. But it does not mean that the right of appeal was curtailed because they could have applied for leave to appeal. If there were merits and they made a case, leave would be granted. The second point I want to make to those who have suggested that it somehow conjures up curtailment of justice, some grave injustice is being done, is to say that that is a very narrow way of approaching the issue. They proceed on the narrow assumption that the more appeals you have, the more tiers of appeals you have, the more automatic appeals you have, that is justice. I do not think it follows. That is a narrow view of looking at the whole system of justice because looking at the administration of justice in totality, you have to view what the courts have done in the past many years. A whole array of reforms has been undertaken by the courts. Rather than conclude that automatic appeals, greater number of appeals, greater number of tiers of appeals equals better administration of justice, why not examine and inquire what the courts have done, which is a pro-active case management approach to administration of justice? In fact it saves time, cost and trauma and emotions for potential litigants, with lesser cases having to go to trial, and lesser cases going to appeal. Does that necessarily mean it is bad for justice? The justice system in Singapore has undergone tremendous reforms and many initiatives have been taken by the courts. The quality of judgments, quality of judges improves and judges handle the cases and deal with them seriously and fewer appeals go up. Does this necessarily mean bad? I do not think it follows. Therefore, I would stress that we should look at the totality of our justice system. Look at the whole context of the proactive approach taken by the courts because they have indeed taken a wide variety of measures which have in fact benefited the public. A notable example that comes to my mind is mediation of civil cases since 1994. The law did not require it. It was an initiative, an innovation of the courts, that all civil cases are mediated before trial, and the settlement rate is 92%. From 1995 to October 1998, only 1.6% of 125,000 civil cases proceeded to trial. If you proceed on the assumption that the more cases the better, obviously it is a bad system of justice! I would like to put it to colleagues here that this system of mediation, where so many cases have been settled, has in fact resulted in substantial savings of money, time, heartache, emotion, for potential litigants. None of the MPs have touched on this. In fact, the justice system as evolved by our courts under the leadership of the Chief Justice has in fact led to two bites at the cherry. One bite is to have the case resolved by mediation first. If that fails, then a second bite at the trial. Look at the other proactive measures taken by the courts - mediation and counselling in matrimonial cases which can cause tremendous emotional trauma for the husband or wife and children. The number of cases now going to trial is very small. The courts have reduced the time lag between setting down the case and hearing in the High Court where they had a target of 18 months, and I am told the target has been reached. Even the Subordinate Courts cases are fixed within three to four weeks from the time that the parties are ready. Pre-trial conferences, electronic filing of cases, ability of people to pay fines through ATOMs without having to go to the Subordinate Courts. And the Subordinate Courts have now also had a recent soft launching of its innovative concept known as "Multi-door Hot House", which is a one-stop service centre. Why do I mention all this? Because I am troubled by the approach taken by some of my colleagues who seem to focus just on this right of appeal. They have not been aware that a periodic adjustment has been done from 1986, and before that too. We have to do this because the monetary limit was increased in 1987 to $250,000. Do not take a narrow view. You have to look at the whole system of justice and it is because of all these reforms taken that our judiciary has been given top marks, not by me, speaking as the Minister for Law, but by independent international rating agencies.

By the ICJ.

ICJ is not an independent rating agency! In the PERC study, August 1998, on the ranking of Singapore's Police and Judiciary among certain countries, Singapore was rated to have the best national institutions in Asia. In the ranking of the judiciary and the police, Singapore topped again with a score of 2.87 whereas the rating of the United States and Hong Kong was 3 and 3.11 respectively. Since an interesting debate is going to come later on, PERC commented: "Surprisingly, for a country where the Government is often accused by foreign human rights activists (and if I may add, by somebody else) of using the judiciary to pursue politically-motivated libel suits, our American respondents living in Singapore even rated the island's judicial system as being superior to that of the United States." Please bear in mind this total approach to the administration of justice, and I think colleagues should really join me in giving top marks to our judiciary, ie, the Supreme Court, the Subordinate Courts and our Chief Justice. I think they have done Singapore proud. Far from curtailing access to justice, they have in fact gone out of their way to deliver justice in a more user-friendly and more efficient way. I think the statistics are interesting. When the appeal limit was $5,000 in the Subordinate Courts, in 1996 the total number of claims filed in the Subordinate Courts was 29,281. Of these, 425 went to trial. Of these, only 83 went on appeal. Of these, only 15 appeals were allowed, less than 1%. In 1997, 32,088 claims were filed in the Subordinate Courts. Only 462 cases went to trial. Of these, 87 went up on appeal, of which 14 were allowed. In 1998, up to October this year, 36,269 claims were filed in the Subordinate Courts. 469 went to trial, and 97 went up on appeal. The point I am making is that the system has just evolved shows that many cases have been mediated. Only the cases that deserve to go on trial, or fail mediation, went to trial. Of that, not many went on appeal. So the system of jurisdiction limits and threshold limits for appeals works. In my view, the small number of cases that later went to trial shows the high quality of the Subordinate Court Judges. It shows that the regular adjustment of monetary limits ensures that only serious appeals go up. Otherwise, many other cases would have gone up and occupied precious High Court time. Notwithstanding what I have said and the variation to the limits proposed in the amendment, colleagues have noted that the amendment provides for the President, in consultation with the Chief Justice, to vary the amounts so the Courts can monitor the number of appeals and the number of applications filed for leave to appeal. If necessary, in the light of experience of what happens, the amount can be decreased or adjusted. Several Members - Mr Simon Tay, Mr Ravindran, Mr Shriniwas Rai and Mr Jeyaretnam - took umbrage at this provision and said this is intrinsically wrong, it is Parliament which should decide, and Parliament should be the sole arbiter, whether this or other limit. We can argue this and debate it. But who is the best judge of what limit best works? We in Parliament?

Of course.

Mr Jeyaretnam says, of course. The administration of the Courts is really under the leadership of the Chief Justice. He has brought the Courts and developed the Courts to a situation which has today earned praise and kudos. I for one would have full confidence in the Chief Justice, and in the light of experience, depending on the number of cases, this figure can be adjusted. Mr Simon Tay raised a question as to whether there are some constitutional principles involved here. But I must be careful not to give any authoritative pronouncement or purport to make any authoritative pronouncement on constitutional issue. With that caveat, let me say also that the Attorney-General is very careful when he drafts Bills that he would have taken into account the constitutional aspect of the Bill. But to answer Mr Simon Tay's question, I would think that this provision does fall within Article 21(5) of the Constitution which provides that, "The Legislature may by law make provision to require the President to act after consultation with, or on the recommendation of, any person or body of persons other than the Cabinet in the exercise of his functions other than . [the two provisos are not applicable here.]" But let me say to Mr Simon Tay that, in practice, the Chief Justice, on such matters, has close consultations with the Attorney-General who in turn also consults me for my views. Some have suggested raising the figure to $10,000 or $15,000. This is a matter for judgement really at the end of the day. If you say the figure has to be raised, and has to be raised because of the upping of the limit last year to $250,000, then it is a relative matter, whether it is $10,000 or $15,000. I think $10,000 or $15,000, in fact, comes very close to the cases which the Small Claims Tribunal hears, ie, cases up to $10,000, and with the consent of both parties, up to $20,000. So to raise it to $10,000 or $15,000, which will come so close, and overlap with the Small Claims Tribunal, may be unrealistic. Another argument was made by more than one speaker who suggested that this amendment gives the impression that litigants who have larger claims have better access to justice and better rights, and that this amendment may favour the rich. But they fail to look at it from the other point of view. Because you can have a "rich" plaintiff, big corporate plaintiff, suing a small-timer, small businessman. A small businessman wins a case, the plaintiff, if not for these threshold limits, because he can afford it, can take it all the way up the ladder to the different tiers of appeal where the small-time defendant, who has won the case, would not be able to afford. So it works both ways.

Legal aid.

It works both ways. So it does not follow ---

Order. Mr Jeyaretnam, if you have anything to say, could you please get my attention first? Please continue, Prof. Jayakumar.

Thank you, Sir. So the Members who made that point have failed to look at it from the other side of the coin. Can I touch on the amendments to section 60? First, Prof. Chin Tet Yung has made some interesting observations. He agrees with the premise that there should be a difference between a reference or a question by the Attorney-General and application to refer by the accused person. I think he accepts there is a fundamental distinction. But as I listened to his speech, I think he made two separate points. First, he proposes that the Attorney-General's reference ought to be distinct from the reference by the accused convicted person. And he would want the Attorney-General to have the right to refer any question of law unconnected with the accused person. I think we can consider that. Of course, he would have noted that the amendment does make a distinction in a sense that for the accused person, the Court has a discretion whether to reserve the question for decision by the Court of Appeal. In the case of an application by the Attorney-General, the Judge must reserve the question, provided the other ingredients are met. He has referred to the United Kingdom's position. Of course, in the United Kingdom, the conviction and acquittal is not disturbed by the Court of Appeal's decision. Our existing provision, including the amendment that we propose to make, is different because in cases of acquittal, the Court of Appeal's practice is not to disturb the acquittal even if they agree with the arguments of the public prosecutor. But the Court of Appeal can set aside the conviction if the point of law is decided against the public prosecutor's arguments. But he made a second and even broader proposal, which is that the Attorney-General should have the power to refer any question de novo without direct reference to any case, as I understand it. And he says it will help in the development of the law, and I believe he was supported by Mr Shriniwas Rai who has gone further and said even hypothetical cases could be raised. The significance of this proposal is that it would be delinking from the other elements which have to be satisfied in the existing provision, ie, that it must arise in a particular criminal matter and the determination of that question must have affected the case. But he has clarified that he is still talking about criminal cases. I am prepared to look into this and discuss it with the Attorney-General, and if we conclude that there is merit in this, we may well have to come to Parliament. Mr Jeyaretnam, as he himself admits, has raised much of what he has said before. The first point he makes is that the public prosecutor ought not to have this special right distinguished from the application by the accused - application by the accused is discretionary; the Court can turn it down, but the application by the Attorney-General has to be approved, provided it meets these other elements. Why is this so? Instead of giving a lengthy reply, since he raised it on 30th July 1997, my colleague, Minister of State Ho Peng Kee, gave an excellent reply which was as follows, and I quote: "When the Public Prosecutor prosecutes cases, he prosecutes in the public interest. If there is a point of public interest that needs the clarification of a full Court of Appeal, then as Public Prosecutor he should have the leeway so that the point of law can be conclusively decided." But, then, Mr Jeyaretnam says on the question of public interest, we are out of line with other jurisdictions, and public interest must be determined by the Court. He even referred to Malaysia. He should double check the law in Malaysia because in the case of Public Prosecutor v Lim Joo Soon [1981] 1 Malayan Law Journal, page 107, this was what the Federal Court had to say: ". The Public Prosecutor's application coming as it is as from such an august officer of the law removes from the discretion of the court the right to decide on whether the question is of public interest. When the Public Prosecutor applies for a reference . it must be taken that any question posed by him is of public interest, unless of course it can be shown that the question is indeed of his own personal interest and of no one else." It may be useful for me to explain to this House why is it that the Attorney-General's conclusion that the question he is posing or is applying to refer a matter of public interest must be taken to be a public interest. And the best I can do is to reproduce part of the judgement of the Court of Appeal in the Public Prosecutor v Bridges Christopher case (1998). In that case, the argument was made by the Attorney-General. But the court found that his submissions were "compelling" but felt that the existing provision was not appropriately worded. This is what the Attorney-General argued, and this is summarised by the Court in its judgement and I think it succinctly puts forward the rationale for this amendment to section 60. I quote: "The Public Prosecutor is responsible for and represents the State in all criminal prosecutions. He is also the Chief Legal Adviser to the Government on what the law is. He has a duty to enforce what he believes to be the right law which no one has. Therefore if he does not agree with the law as pronounced by the High Court, he should be entitled to go to the Court of Appeal for a final ruling. Accordingly, the Public Prosecutor submitted in the case that any Public Prosecutor's questions which satisfy the three conditions would invariably be one of public interest based on the need to have a final ruling for future cases. He further submitted that a determination by the Court of Appeal advances the public interest in reinforcing the finality principle in the following ways: (a) the Public Prosecutor is thereafter able to decide on prosecutions in accordance with the Court of Appeal's decision; (b) the Public Prosecutor is able to advise the Government on whether or not it is desirable to change the law; and (c) where the Court of Appeal upholds the Public Prosecutor's case, all convictions and acquittals founded on that principle of law are likely to end at the Subordinate Courts." Sir, since the Court of Appeal's judgement is that the Attorney-General's submissions were compelling, the Government has agreed to give effect to it.

Mr Speaker, Sir, may I raise a number of points with the Minister by way of clarification? As I listened to his reply, I noted that he was saying that the number of cases had decreased tremendously, not only by the transfer of the cases above $50,000 to the Subordinate Courts by the amendment made last year, but as a result of the mediation process introduced in this country. I am all for it. But to say that we have mediation and we do not need appeals seems to me to miss the point altogether. If that is true ---

Order.

I am asking him some questions, Sir.

Could you please ask your question but do not embark on a new speech and enter into a debate?

Yes, all right. Mr Speaker, Sir, I accept your ruling.

All right. Make your clarification now.

Yes, I have got questions to ask him.

All right. Ask your questions.

If the number of cases has been reduced, then what is the compelling need for this amendment? Are our judges overworked with appeals at the moment? May I ask all the questions so that Prof. Jayakumar does not have to jump up every few minutes. May I point out to him, by way of clarification, that I was not relying on the Malaysian Court for the proposition that public interest is a matter for the courts. I am sure he is aware of the decisions in the House of Lords, on appeals from Scotland and England, that public interest is eminently a matter that should be left to the courts, and he mentioned Christopher Bridges' case. I stand corrected of course, but the Court of Appeal there said that the question of public interest was a matter for the courts. It did. So there we have it, supporting what I said that it should be a matter for the courts and not for the Public Prosecutor. Finally, may I ask the Minister whether it is the speedy administration of justice that is important in society? It is important. Or is it the perception in the public mind that every citizen will get the justice that is satisfactory and of which he can feel satisfied? Which is more important - the perception of justice by the public at large or the speedy administration of justice?

Mr Speaker, Sir, on the first point, I did not say that, because there is mediation, there should be lesser appeals. I raised the point on mediation to make the broader point to urge colleagues to look at the total approach to the administration of justice which our courts have taken and that is a considerable development for which the courts are to be congratulated. I have also not justified this amendment on the ground that there is a tremendous overload or flood of cases. The point I made here is that the main reason is because of the increase of the jurisdictional limit to $250,000, there will be more cases. And as we have done before, we will have to increase the appeal limit so as to be in line with the jurisdictional limit. As I conceded, we can have a debate on whether it should be $50,000, $40,000, $30,000, and so on. It is a relative matter. I am more than willing to defer to the wise judgement of the Chief Justice in this regard because he is dealing with the administration of the courts on a daily basis. Who are we to second guess and say, "Well, it should be $40,000 and not $50,000." Next, Mr Jeyaretnam extols what is going on in the United Kingdom and what the courts have decided. I should point out to him that the provision in the United Kingdom which Prof. Chin Tet Yung referred to, would enable the Attorney-General there to refer a point to the court, if I am not mistaken, whether or not it is of public interest. So the United Kingdom's approach in an analogous provision delinks it from the public interest. Mr Jeyaretnam is shaking his head. But he may do well to look up section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1972. It was Christopher Bridges' case indeed. If he had listened carefully to what I have said, I said that the Attorney-General argued and made a lengthy submission as to why there were very good reasons for interpreting the provisions in such a way that when the Attorney-General makes an application for reference of a question, it should be considered to be of public interest. The court found that argument compelling but the section, as worded, they did not feel it was appropriate to accept the Attorney-General's argument. Therefore, the law has to be amended. The final question he asked is that he seems to imply that all the measures which I have praised the court are really for the speedy administration of justice, ie, speed at the expense of justice being done. Actually, if you examine what happens, the measures taken by the courts involve more time, effort, energy and work by the judges, the Registrars and everybody involved. They need not have done it. They can just say, "You have come to sue? A wants to sue B? Fine, let's have a trial." The amount of work it takes for counselling in family and matrimonial affairs and the amount of work it takes to have mediation is tremendous. So it is not speed in wanting to get rid of these cases. It is in fact with the desire to ensure that the parties are able to resolve the cases before they come to trial that motivates them. And I think that is a very important principle in the administration of justice which we should not forget.

I have another question. Is the Minister aware that, in some cases I know personally, a lot of compulsion is brought on litigants and even in criminal cases to either plead guilty or settle the cases?

Since Mr Jeyaretnam says he knows personally that there is certain compulsion, he should raise it with the appropriate authorities, either with the Registrar of the court or the Law Society. This is not the place for us to determine whether he is right or wrong.

Question put, and agreed to. Bill accordingly read a Second time.

I would like my vote to be recorded as dissenting, opposing the Bill, and I would like to know from Mr Low whether he would oppose the Bill.

Let Mr Low speak for himself. So be it. Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House. The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Prof. S. Jayakumar]. Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

Order for Second Reading read. 2.28 pm

Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." Sir, in July last year, I informed this House that the Tripartite Committee on Extension of Retirement Age had proposed that the retirement age be extended from 60 to 62 with effect from 1st January 1999. The Tripartite Committee also recommended the reduction in the employer's CPF contribution for workers above the age of 60 and allowing employers to reduce the wage cost of older employees by up to 10%. Sir, the raising of the retirement age is a strategic move to tackle the problem brought about by our ageing population and declining birth rates. Currently, eight economically active persons aged between 15 and 59 support one person aged 60 and above. This ratio will decline sharply in future. By the year 2010, there will only be four economically active persons supporting one person aged 60 and above. This ratio is expected to fall further to 2.5 in the year 2030. Sir, this decline in economically active persons will affect our economic vitality. The working population will be faced with an increasingly heavy burden of having to support a growing number of elderly persons who are not able to work. The growing number of economically inactive senior citizens will also place a heavy demand for a wide range of social services including health care. This will result in a heavier tax burden on those who are still working. Furthermore, a dwindling supply of local workers will compel employers to turn to more foreign workers to meet their manpower needs. While an increase in skilled and talented foreign workers will be an asset to Singapore, an increase in the number of unskilled foreign workers will create more social problems. The life expectancy at birth is 77 years. Many Singaporeans are healthy and vigorous well beyond 60 years of age. It is a waste of valuable human resources if workers are required to retire at the age of 60 when they are still able to add value to the economy. Moreover, an early retirement means that a retired worker or retiree will have to start living on the CPF savings much earlier. This will result in a faster depletion of their retirement savings. Hence, an extension of the retirement age will not only maximise the utilisation of our human resources, it will also provide the opportunity for older workers to continue earning a regular income and accumulating more savings for their eventual retirement. I should point out that most developed countries are already ahead of us in this area. The retirement age norm in countries like Germany, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Sweden, Netherlands and Italy is 65. Some countries like Norway and Denmark set a higher retirement age of 67 years. We understand that the United States has recently announced its long-term plan to raise the retirement age to 70. The current retirement age is 65 and is due to increase to 67 next year. Even in the Asian NIEs, workers are now working well beyond 60 years. For example, retirement age norm in Taiwan is now 65. As a country with a small population, we should maximize our limited indigenous human resource, including the older Singaporeans who have accumulated valuable skills and working experience. There should be no doubt that raising the retirement age will generate long term benefits for our economy, for the employers and also for the workers themselves. It is a win-win strategy. Despite the current economic downturn and an increase in unemployment rate, we should not ignore the long-term impact of a rapidly aging workforce. We need to take a pro-active approach to address the issue now before it develops into a serious problem in future. The time to tackle such potential problems is now, not when our competitiveness is already seriously weakened by an aging workforce. But in raising the retirement age, we must not ignore the reality to employers, which is, the cost of employing older workers is higher as a result of our seniority-based wage scale. With the current wage structure, the longer a worker has been employed, the higher is his pay. In other words, wage levels are determined more by an employee's length of service than the value of his job or performance. As a result, wages of older workers are not closely linked to their productivity or performance. Consequently, older workers are often being paid beyond their job worth. That is why employers are reluctant to retain or to employ older workers. To address the problems of the seniority-based-wage system, the Tripartite Committee on the Extension of Retirement Age had recommended that employers should implement the base-up wage system. The adoption of the base-up wage system will help to narrow the maximum-minimum salary ratio and enable wage increases to be more closely linked to productivity and performance. However, before the base-up wage system can be implemented, companies have to adjust their salary ratio to the optimal level of 1.5:1. Since it will take some time to achieve the optimal salary ratio, the Tripartite Committee recommended that employers should be allowed to initiate a wage cut of up to 10% for employees above the age of 60. This measure will make it more attractive for employers to retain their older workers. To supplement the 10% wage cut for older workers, the Tripartite Committee also proposed that employer's CPF contribution rate for employees aged 60-65 years be reduced from 7.5% to 4% and from 5% to 4% for employees aged above 65 years. The recommendation to introduce wage and CPF cuts came about after extensive discussions and deliberations by the Tripartite Committee. The Committee took note of the fact that since most workers are on the seniority wage system, it is currently not uncommon for an employee to accept a wage cut of 20% to 25% when they are re-employed upon retirement at 60 years. The Tripartite Committee's proposal to cut wages by up to 10% in addition to the CPF cut is therefore a more favourable arrangement for older workers. This should encourage more older workers to work beyond 60 and continue to contribute to their companies. Although the employers have given the full discretion to initiate a wage cut, the Tripartite Committee also urged them to be judicious in implementing this policy. Employers should bear in mind that the wage cut is introduced with the aim to rectifying the problems arising out of the seniority-based-wage system and to bring wages of older workers in line with their productivity and performance. They should therefore take into account their companies' maximum-minimum salary ratio, as well as their job worth and performance of older employees when deciding on making the wage cut. A wage cut is not needed if the older employees' salaries are already reflective of their job worth or their productivity or where their productivity and performance already justify their salaries. Essentially, the Bill seeks to amend the Retirement Age Act (Cap 274A) to enable employers to reduce the wages of their employees who attain the age of 60 years and above, on or after 1st January 1999. The higher retirement age of 62 will be effected separately through Regulations. Clause 2 of the Bill introduces a new section 4A to spell out the circumstances and conditions whereby an employer can reduce the wages of employees above the age of 60. This section stipulates that an employer should give reasonable prior notice in writing to an older employee of the intention to reduce his salary. The prior notice should furnish information, such as the amount and the effective date of the reduction. The extent of the wage reduction is limited to 10% of the employee's wage at the age of 60. Employers will be required to give the older employees a reasonable opportunity to consider and respond to the proposed wage reduction. In the event that no agreement can be reached, the older employee may choose to retire on his own accord. Alternatively, the employer may retire him from service. A new section 4A(5)(a) lays down the grounds whereby employers can initiate a wage cut. It states that the reduction shall be based on reasonable factors, such as the employee's productivity, performance, duties and responsibilities, and whether he is on a seniority-based-wage system. Employers are prohibited from initiating a wage cut solely on the ground of an employee's age, unless age is a bona-fide requirement for the performance of his job. To provide more flexibility, section 4A(5)(b) allows employers to introduce the wage cut, either at the age of 60 or at any age above 60. Hence, in a situation whereby an employee's salary is still reflective of the job worth at the age of 60 but not beyond, his employer can choose not to cut his wages at the age of 60 but to initiate a cut later on, say, at age 61. At the same time, employers are allowed to either introduce a one-off cut in the wages of their older employees by up to 10%, or to stagger the wage cut in such a manner that the total extent of the reduction does not exceed 10% of the employee's wages at age 60. In view of the differing productivity levels and performances among employees, the extent of the wage cut could vary from one employee to another. The Bill hence enables employers to implement the wage reduction in a manner most suited to the company's needs and circumstances. However, employers should follow closely the Tripartite Committee's recommendation of initiating a wage reduction either through a direct wage cut or through a combination of various wage cost items which include fringe benefits, variable bonus, AWS and the basic wage. In the case of unionized companies, the union concerned should be consulted. Besides the key recommendations on raising the retirement age and reducing wages of older workers, the Tripartite Committee also proposed several other measures to address the problems of an aging workforce. These include :- A 25-year cap on the service period for the calculation of retrenchment benefit; Adoption of a base-up-wage system in place of the seniority-based-wage system; An Alternative Medical Benefit Scheme in place of the current medical benefit scheme; and An outplacement programme to assist older workers who cannot be re-deployed within the company, to secure a suitable job in another company. These are supplementary measures to address concerns of the high costs of retaining older workers. These measures will be implemented through the tripartite guidelines. We do not need legislative changes at this juncture for the measures to be applied. In fact, some employers and unions have already started to implement these measures. While some teething problems may crop up at the initial stage of implementation, I am confident with good tripartite co-operation, we will be able to make progress in these reforms. Mr Speaker, Sir, since the retirement age was raised from 55 to 60 in 1993, it had provided employment opportunities for some 63,000 employees who are above the age of 55. With the raising of the retirement age to 62, it is estimated that another 7,000 employees who will turn 60 next year will benefit. In the 2nd, 3rd and 4th year of the implementation, about 10,000 workers are expected to benefit each year. The raising of the retirement age is clearly beneficial to older workers as it allows them to remain gainfully employed for a longer period. Employers will also stand to gain from the retention of these skilled and experienced workers. Sir, I beg to move. Question proposed.

Mr Speaker, thank you for allowing me to speak on this interesting Bill. I fully support this Bill. I feel that the picture painted by the Minister is indeed a very challenging one for all of us in Singapore because demographic transition will be very dramatic in the years ahead. By the Year 2010, as the Minister has stated, the population of the aged could become quite dramatic and grave for us. It is a issue well thought of, because we would have to think about how we need to deal with this challenging issue of the future, ie, the greying of Singapore. The Bill will be relevant at this juncture, but it will be redundant in the future because we would not be able to talk about retirement in the years ahead as nobody will be retiring and the work world will change significantly. Nobody will be allowed to retire. Mind you, some of you would not be allowed to get off! You will be kept as long as possible and there will be no retirement, Mr Speaker. There would be the issue of information technology. With the change of work itself, people will be retained as long as it is possible and it is not a picture that we can avoid. It could be a real picture in future. Sir, in relation to this Bill, it will enhance the employability of the retirees and this is good. It enables various companies to think about retaining older workers and this is indeed a very positive move. But there are a few areas of concern that I would like to raise, because with this transition, there will obviously be areas of disputes related to wages. I want to find out from the Minister who mediates in case there is dispute on the wages. I can understand that for workers who are unionised, the unions would be able to represent them. But there are lots of workers who are not unionised and one needs to look at how their interest could be protected. Secondly, there would be a lot of employers who might take advantage of this Bill and try and find a leverage to retire off people earlier than they should. So there will be to some extent older workers who would be got rid off because they are either not really productive or found not to be suitable, or some excuses could be given to terminate them from their work world. I want to find out what protection or recourse would be available to ensure that older workers would not be unjustifiably retired off earlier than they should by the employers. Looking at the Bill as a whole, I agree with it because it is going to help us meet the challenges of the aging population of Singapore. On that note, Sir, I support the Bill.

(In Mandarin): Mr Speaker, Sir, to those who have reached the age of 60, "1-1-99" is a very important number to remember because, with effect from 1st January 1999, the Ministry of Manpower will raise the new retirement age from 60 to 62. The new Act will allow employers to cut up to 10% of the wages of employees beyond the age of 60 over a period of two years. Sir, I fully support this Bill. For employees who have reached the age of 60, the employers' CPF contribution has already been reduced from 20% to 4%. With the recently announced employers' cost-cutting measures, this will again be cut by 2%. In other words, the employers' CPF contribution will be reduced from 20% to 2%, which is a reduction of 18%. This will reduce the income of the employees. During their years of employment, these employees have made contributions to the company. They worked hard for the company. I hope that when employers are deciding on the wage-cut of the employees, they will consider all these factors. At the same time, they must also value and treasure the experience acquired by the older employees. I feel that the wage-cuts should not be exercised too frequently, otherwise the employers will be busy calculating the amounts to be cut all the time while the employees will be bogged down with worries and anxiety and lose heart to work. Efficiency will be affected. So will productivity. So I would suggest that wage cuts should be limited to not more than once a year. Private companies and the civil service should adopt the principle of annual increments to evaluate the performance of their employees before the employers decide whether the pay should be cut or not. An annual appraisal will be more rational. Secondly, under the Bill, the employers who intend to cut the pay of employees must give reasonable advance notice in writing to the employees so as to give the employees time to consider the matter. As such, I would propose that the Bill should specify that the employees must be given at least one month's notice and should be required to reply to their employers within one month whether they accept the terms. With the stipulation of one month, it is good for both sides. There will be no unnecessary controversies. Thirdly, the civil servants who are under the pension scheme will be seriously affected by this new Bill when they reach the retirement age at 60. I would propose that the Government consider allowing civil servants to collect their lump sum pension when they reach the age of 60 and then continue to work in keeping with the spirit of the new Bill. These civil servants have worked their whole adult working lives in various Ministries and Government departments and have made contributions to the development of Singapore. I hope the Government will allow them to take their pensions and also to continue working under the provisions of the new law. I support the Bill.

Order. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair again at 3.20 pm. Sitting accordingly suspended at 2.52 pm until 3.20 pm.

Sitting resumed at 3.20 pm

Debate resumed.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the amendment in the Retirement Age (Amendment) Bill, moved by the Minister for Manpower, and I also support the raising of the retirement age for the reasons stated by the Minister and Dr Vasoo. Sir, the seniority-based wage system, practised by the vast majority of employers in Singapore, increases the wages of most workers every year through service annual increments. As a result of these increments, older workers generally receive higher wages compared to younger workers who are still at the lower end of their salary scales even for doing the same job. This may create a situation eventually where it becomes less and less viable for companies to retain the services of their older workers compared to the younger ones. Employers may also resist attempts to raise the retirement age as it will become progressively more expensive to retain an aging workforce. The situation for older workers is especially precarious during periods of economic downturn, as companies retrench and restructure their operations in order to remain competitive and to survive the recession. Higher-paid workers are more likely to be axed if their jobs can be taken over by less expensive younger workers. Our older workers will find it more difficult to hold on to their jobs in companies that are facing difficult times, as the cost differential of keeping them on the payroll compared to younger workers becomes too wide. We have heard from several Members in the last few days, including NTUC Secretary-General, that older workers generally experience more difficulty obtaining and fitting into new jobs, requiring new skills and offering lower salaries, when they are retrenched compared to younger workers. It is therefore imperative that measures be taken to ensure that our older workers stand an equal chance of remaining employed and not be placed in a more disadvantaged position compared to younger workers. Implementation of such measures becomes more critical in these economically difficult times, as companies look at ways to trim costs. Reduction in the rate of employer's CPF contributions for older workers had previously helped to keep the cost differential of retaining older workers compared to hiring younger ones manageable. The employers' contribution rate for younger workers until recently stood at 20% while employers pay only 7.5% or less for workers over 55 years of age. However, with the impending reduction in employer's CPF contribution rate by 10% for younger workers, but only by 3.5% or less for older workers, the comparative cost advantage afforded by lower CPF contributions for older workers will be eroded. Adjustments will have to be made in order to enhance the viability for employers to retain or employ older workers while ensuring that workers, regardless of their age, continue to receive a fair wage for their experience, skills and performance, and not to be discriminated against purely by virtue of their age. Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the amendment for the reasons that have been stated. However, I would like to urge the Minister to consider safeguards that would ensure our older workers, whose salaries are at or below the market rate for the job, would not be adversely affected by this amendment where their salaries can be further reduced by 10% when they attain 60 years of age. New section 4A(3) of the amendment Bill stipulates that the employer has to give reasonable prior notice to the worker before reducing his salary, and that the worker must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. After the worker is heard, new section 4A(3) implies that he is then left with two choices, if he is not happy with the reduction in his salary. He can either retire or be retired by his employer. In effect, it is really no choice, and the worker has to retire. Whether it is voluntarily or involuntarily, it is really quite academic. Sir, I would like to have seen a provision in the Bill that would provide the worker an exemption of the 10% reduction in the salary after he attains 60 years of age if he or his union is able to establish that his cost to his employer is no more than that of younger workers with equivalent job performance in similar jobs in his company, or that his wage is at or below the market rate for this job. Sir, I would also like to urge the Minister to prohibit employers who are not affected by the seniority-based wage system from invoking the provisions in this Bill in order to reduce the salaries of their older workers. For example, if an employer pays his workers a fixed hourly rate for the job, regardless of the seniority of the worker, should the employer still be permitted to reduce the salary of his employee by 10% once he attains the age of 60 years? To permit employers to do so without other valid grounds would tantamount to discrimination against the worker purely by virtue of his age. New section 4A(5) permits an employer to reduce the wages of the older employees differently for various reasons other than age. However, this section may not have gone far enough to prohibit employers not affected by the seniority-based wage system from using provisions in this amendment Bill to reduce wages of their workers purely by them attaining the age of 60 years. Mr Speaker, Sir, on balance, I support the amendment Bill as it will remove one more obstacle and one more excuse given by some employers for not wanting to employ older workers, and it will also enhance the prospects of further extensions of the retirement age for workers who may want to work beyond the current retirement age without imposing too onerous a burden on employers, especially in these difficult times. However, I would like to request the Minister to consider further refinements to the provisions of the Retirement Age Act in subsequent amendments after more companies modify or discard the seniority-based wage system for alternative systems.

Mr Speaker, Sir, today, we face economic difficulties. The number of retrenchments has risen beyond 20,000, more than double the figure for the whole of last year. The unemployment rate has shot up to 4.5% in September, more than double what it was in July. So when the number of jobless rises, we can expect some people to call for a lowering of the retirement age. Yet, we are today meeting to raise our retirement age from 60 to 62, from 1st January 1999, as scheduled. Why are we doing this? The Minister has cited some statistics to show the very rapid rate which our population and workforce are ageing. Faced with this trend, I share the Minister's view that there is an urgent need to raise the retirement age. With rising life expectancy, we should allow our older workers to remain longer in the workforce. This would enable them to continue to contribute to the economy and remain financially independent. The Minister has provided convincing arguments on the need to cut the wages of older workers by up to 10%. This issue has been thoroughly discussed and agreed at the Tripartite Committee on the Extension of the Retirement Age. Unions and employees are aware of the rationale behind the cut and agreed it is justifiable under the seniority-based wage system. But from what I know, most older employees are prepared to accept a wage cut in return for the opportunity to continue working beyond the age of 60. They find this a reasonable trade-off in return for the opportunity to earn a steady income for another two years. In any case, most of them would have discharged the bulk of their financial obligations. They can also tap on their CPF savings to meet their expenses. But, nevertheless, there is concern among some employees that employers might abuse the right to initiate a wage cut. They fear that employers might insist on introducing a wage cut even where the older workers' job worth and performance could justify their salary. It is reassuring earlier on that the Minister has in his speech highlighted the Tripartite Committee's call for employers to be judicious in implementing the wage cut. I certainly hope that employers could heed the Tripartite Committee's call and carefully consider various factors such as the companies' minimum-maximum ratio and the employees' skills, experience and job responsibilities before deciding on wage cut. It is also heartening to note that the proposed Bill requires that the older employees be given reasonable prior notice on the intended wage cut, and also the opportunity to consider and respond to the proposed cut. I would urge both employers and employees to be open-minded and accommodating in their discussion of the wage cut and be prepared to listen to each other's views. If there is any disagreement on the wage cut, both parties should adopt a flexible attitude and strive to come to a compromise. I hope that the proposed section 4A(4) of the Bill would only be used as a last resort and employers would as far as possible avoid exercising the right to retire their employees under this section. Next, I would like to touch on the issue of training. With the extension of the retirement age, older workers are expected to remain longer in the workforce. It is therefore important that they should continue to be given the necessary training to enable them to remain relevant on the job. Training would be especially essential in situations where the older workers are deployed to other jobs. From what I gather, some employers are reluctant to train their older workers because they perceive that these workers are either too old to learn or not cost-effective to be trained because they are due for retirement soon. This perception is wrong. Speaking from my experience, older workers are every bit as keen to learn as their younger counterparts. They take pride in their work and are prepared to upgrade their skills so that they can continue to remain an asset not only to the company but also contribute to its growth. Older workers are also less likely to job-hop so it does make economic sense for employers to continue to provide them with the necessary training. On the whole, I am glad that the Government has taken a long-term perspective on the issue of raising the retirement age and has proceeded to raise the retirement age despite the economic downturn. I am positive that we have moved in the right direction and this policy will benefit not only our workers, but also our employers and the economy in the long run. Mr Speaker, Sir, I believe that we have moved in the right direction by raising retirement age, even though in Germany, the new government is considering reducing it from 65 to 60. What would be the effect if we lower our retirement age? If we do so, we will merely be shifting employment from the old to the young. There is no additional employment created. What would the `young retirees' do? How would they live? In the case of Germany, the unions expect the state to pay pensions. If not, the `young retirees' would have to fend for themselves. Surely, this is not the way we should go. People need money to live on. Extending retirement age has helped the more senior amongst us to be independent. The crux of the problem is to create employment, and keep people employable. So I support the Bill on the extension of the retirement age.

Mr Speaker, Sir, with the rapid ageing of our population, the mapping out of an employment policy must be one of the most urgent tasks, arguably more urgent, than any single employment policy. The Bill to reduce wages of employees above 60 years old must be supported as part of the steps to expand the employment potential of older workers. We should also give priority to efforts to encourage and facilitate employers to retain workers as long as they possibly can. Sir, but the greying of Singapore requires effort that goes beyond legislation. Far from being a relatively young country, Singapore will enter the 21st century with the fastest rate of ageing ever experienced on earth. In the nine years between 2012 and 2021, the proportion of our population above the age of 60 will rise from 10% to 15%. The same process took Japan 15 years. One of the biggest obstacles we face today is the inherent prejudice and wrong perceptions that people have about older workers. We have read recently how difficult it is for a 45-year old young man to look for a job. Quite frequently and wrongly, he is seen as being in poor health, difficult to manage, not strong, does not present an image of dynamism, not adaptable and would stifle the promotion prospects of younger colleagues. Evidence from advertised job vacancies shows the incidence of age qualified vacancies is fairly widespread. They fail to realise that older workers cannot be neatly grouped into skill, ability and physical strength. Although physical strength does decline with age, chronological age is by no means an accurate indicator of one's ability to perform a task. Age does not necessarily affect productivity. But, Sir, we must ensure that older workers are not exploited or discriminated. In 1978, the US introduced a legislation to outlaw discrimination on grounds of age among workers up to the age of 70. Perhaps, it is timely that we should incorporate such legislation here. Many of the older workers want to continue to work, especially if they can find less stressful, less physically demanding work. They want to live independent lives. Many prefer not to depend on their children as a source of income. Many simply cannot afford to remain unemployed without suffering a substantial loss of income and fall in living standards. Even for the increasingly affluent group, work will provide more than just income. But status, interest and companionship and the need for these does not necessarily become less important on retirement. I would like to propose four specific suggestions for the Minister to consider: (1) Prepare workers for retirement. Many are ill-prepared to cope what maybe one third of their lives. We should have programmes that will prepare them and enlighten them of the choices that they can make. For example, volunteer, part-time work, or even a change that will lead to a life of leisure, especially at a time when we are calling for more active people sector. We can also establish more adult education programmes in the existing tertiary institutions to cater to this need. (2) We should encourage and prepare workers for second careers. We must fully utilise aged workers. Their capacities and long job experience are human resources in which tremendous public and private investments have been made. These are reliable resources that have to be effectively utilised not only for their sake but for the community and the society. (3) We must reserve some jobs which are most suited for the elderly. Grandparents today are the most ideal choice of care-givers for our children. Yet, how often do we see grandparents in kindergartens, in childcare centres where they can be effective not only as tutors, but in passing down the right values and attitudes to the younger generation. This also applies to many of the jobs in service counters in Government Ministries and statutory boards. They are especially suited to community organisations, for example, the CDCs, the town councils, which require a high level of human relationship, skills and patience. The elderly make good counsellors because age may bring maturity of judgement and the weight of experience. (4) We must expand the Skills Development Fund. It should be enlarged to allow for the training of older workers for their second careers. The fact is that blue collar workers will have fewer opportunities compared to white collar workers in finding jobs where their skills and experience can be fully utilised in later years. Therefore, programmes to train workers should also be extended to older or retiring workers. Unfortunately, technological innovation may also induce obsolescence in an ageing workplace. Sir, indeed, the current economic crisis will pose a great challenge because of falling demand for labour. Despite the wage cuts and reduced CPF contribution, employers may still prefer to employ younger workers. We must do more to change this. In Singapore, today, sadly, becoming 60s is a watershed because to many, it is an end of employment and the beginning of a loss of income, status and sometimes independence. Retirement may not necessarily mean an end to this. I would urge the Government to do more to change the attitude people have of older workers. Sir, think about this. Few would attribute the same characteristics to a 30-year old as they would a 60-year old. Why then should the 60s and 90s be classed together as one group? It is very easy to assume that all the elderly want this or feel that. It might be more realistic to generalise if people are divided according to how they appear in behaviour, attitudes and thoughts. "As old as you feel" is one approach. And if to act old is to be sad in one way, to lack flexibility of thought and to generally look old fashioned, then, Sir, there are many people in the 20s and 30s who will qualify. With that, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the average lifespan of Singaporeans today is 76 and the current retirement age is 60. What this means is that, on average, Singaporeans would spend about 70% of their adult life working and 30% in retirement. With the raising of the retirement age to 62, this will increase from 70% to about 75% and eventually, if we do raise the retirement age to 67, it will go up to 85%. I therefore support the extension of the retirement age because I believe this will enable Singaporeans to live a more fulfilling life. However, in supporting this extension of retirement age, I would like to raise three points for the consideration of the Minister. Firstly, the purpose of extending retirement age is to secure the right for Singaporeans to work beyond 60. However, we should continue to leave it to the individual Singaporeans to decide whether they want to exercise the right beyond the age of 60. So from that angle, in determining the pension arrangement for civil servants, I hope the Government will not penalise civil servants who are on the pensionable service and who decide to work beyond 60 under this extension of retirement age. Secondly, as we extend the retirement age, we are endorsing pay cut of up to 10%. As the Minister mentioned, this is because of the seniority-based wage system in Singapore. From the union's perspective, we hope that this is only a temporary arrangement because the long-term solution is to move away from the seniority-based wage system towards a base-up wage system. Sir, in this regard, we hope that the civil service can take the lead to move into the base-up wage system because today, the civil service likewise depends very much on the seniority-based wage system. We hope the civil service can respond. As we extend the retirement age, why not take the lead to move into the base-up wage system in a big way, in a concerted way, so as to encourage the private sector to follow suit. The third point is that with the extension of retirement age, even though it will give Singapore workers the right to work, it does not guarantee that Singaporeans will be able to exercise the right. For example, in this particular crisis, many companies are now talking about renewing their workforce so as to gear up for a knowledge-based economy of the future. Some of them are talking about retrenching the older workers and re-hiring the younger workers. So their way of renewing workforce is by retrenching the older workers. If this were to continue in a big way, then obviously, many Singaporeans are not going to be able to exercise their right to work beyond 60 years old under the extension of retirement age. We hope the tripartite partners, namely, the unions, Government and employers, can work together to arrest this particular trend. We need to encourage as many companies and employers as possible to work together to help our Singapore workforce to remain healthy, employable and productive, so that as many Singaporeans as possible can really exercise their right to work beyond 60 under the extension of retirement age. On that, I support the amendment Bill, Sir.

Resolved, That the proceedings on the remaining items on the Order Paper for today be exempted at this day's sitting from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1. - [Mr Wong Kan Seng].

Debate resumed.

Mr Speaker, Sir, let me assure you that I am going to be very brief. I just have one question for the Minister. Isn't this talk about raising the retirement age for employees in the private sector academic so long as the Employment Act allows an employer to terminate the services of any employee by just giving him one month's notice? I can see that this makes a profound change perhaps for the civil servants who have security of tenure under the Constitution. But for the private sector, is this not purely academic?

Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank the Members who have spoken out in support of this amendment Bill to raise the retirement age from 60 to 62. They have raised many valid points for consideration and I will try to address all the concerns that they have raised. First, Dr Vasoo, in supporting the amendment, raised the concern of potential areas of dispute between employers and employees when they come to the age of 60 and they have to give reasonable notice on reducing the wage of older workers. And his question is: if there is a dispute, who will mediate, who will help the employee to listen to his appeal, to listen to his own concern? I would like to assure the Member that my Ministry has since 1994, when we first enacted the Retirement Age Act, established a unit in the Labour Relations Department which is geared towards looking after the needs of older workers who have any dispute with their employers on account of age. So, if an older worker feels that his employer is making an unreasonable offer or that he is being retired prematurely, or his service is terminated on account of age, he can always come to my Ministry to seek conciliation or to seek support in resolving those problems with their employers. I am pleased to say that, although I do not have the exact numbers with me, since 1994, we have been able to resolve the cases we handled expeditiously and satisfactorily for both parties. Likewise, Dr Vasoo also raised this possibility of employers taking advantage of the wage reduction to force out older workers. The recourse here is of course for the older workers to appeal to my Ministry to investigate their complaints against their employers for taking such unfair action. Let me assure Members once again that any such complaints will be carefully investigated. Mr Ang Mong Seng also supported the Bill and he asked that employers should consider the contribution of older employees when they adjust the wages of such employees. I agree with him. I think I said so in my main speech that the Tripartite Committee in fact made specific recommendation that employers should always consider the contribution, the wage level and the performance of the older employees before they proceed to make adjustment to the wages. Mr Ang also suggested that the wage reduction should not be done haphazardly on a month-to-month basis or as and when the employers feel like doing so. We have a certain understanding between the tripartite partners that such wage reduction should in fact be done for a reasonable period, either a year or two years. The extension of the retirement age is for two years. Ideally, it should be for the full period of two years. It is not good management practice to go and change the wages of the employee on a haphazard basis. So I agree with him that the employer should in fact give the employees reasonable notice and also make such wage adjustment over a reasonable period of time. He, in fact, also said that there is this provision in the Bill for employees to give reasonable notice to their older employees. It is not specified what is a reasonable period of notice and the question is: should it be seven days or two months? Let me assure the Member that through the tripartite practice, and through our practice of managing the employer-employee relationship, there have evolved certain norms on what is a reasonable notice. The Tripartite Committee on the Extension of Retirement Age has in fact discussed this particular issue quite extensively and both employer and employee representatives agreed that in amending the law, we should not try to fix a rigid period, whether it should be two weeks or a month. This is because there are many situations in actual human resource management practice where you have to give allowance for the size of the company, the set-up within the company and the company's own management practices. They have recommended that we take a more flexible approach instead of specifying the exact period. Reasonable notices to us, would mean, say, at least a month or something like that. If, in fact, an employee feels aggrieved that the period of notice has been too short, he can always appeal to my Ministry and we will try to resolve these differences. As long as it is in tune with what is current practice in Singapore, it would be considered reasonable. Mr Ang and Mr Lim Swee Say brought up this point that with the raising of the retirement age, pensionable employees in the civil service should not be disadvantaged. Although civil servants are exempted from the coverage of the extension of retirement age, when we moved from age 55 to 60, we gave this exemption to the civil service. I understand that the PSD will in fact apply the new retirement age. In other words, civil servants will be able to work up to the age of 62. For pensionable civil servants, if they want to withdraw their pension at age 60, they would have to retire from the service because they cannot withdraw the pension and carry on working continuously. But if they want to carry on working, then their pension right will be preserved up to the age of 62. And any time between 60 and 62, if they choose to retire, they will be entitled to their pension. I think this is reasonable because if you are already working and drawing a salary, albeit about 10% less, there is really no need for you to have your pension upfront. So, you carry on working, you have a regular income and you do not need the pension. The pension will be released when you retire. But it will be frozen at the age of 60. Mr Charles Chong made several comments in supporting the amendment. I agree with him that older workers right now may have more difficulties fitting into new jobs that are available and I think Mr Lim Swee Say also made a point on the possibility of retrenchment for older workers. Our approach is to try to help the older workers who are retrenched or who are more vulnerable to retrenchment to uplift their skills, so that they would be able to continue to serve or contribute to the company where they are currently working, or if offered an alternative job in another company where they can make a valuable contribution. This is the main thrust of the Skills Redevelopment Programme and I reported to this House yesterday that, in fact, the Skills Redevelopment Programme is progressing very smoothly and the take-up rate is very encouraging. As of now, we already have more than 10,000 workers, mostly older workers, who have signed up for the programme for retraining. This is the way that we can help to look after the older workers who are in need of skills upgrading to ensure that they remain employable. I have to say that this is in fact the only way that we can help these older workers to equip them with the means to hold on to a job. There is no other way that we can ensure that they remain employable. We cannot legislate or force the employers, on their own, to retain the older workers, because there are economic considerations. We must make sure that older workers are equipped with all the skills that are necessary for them to make a value added to their employer and that is the only way to remain employable. Mr Chong mentioned that the cut in CPF arising from the recommendation of the Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness could erode the differential between the younger and older workers. I want to correct an impression. The reduction in the employer's CPF contribution for older workers is a separate matter. So, we are going to proceed with that. We will, on 1st January 1999, reduce the CPF contribution rate for older workers from 7.5% to 4% for those aged 60 to 65, and for those aged 65 and above, from 5% to 4%. This is a separate matter. The CSC's recommendation, which has been accepted by the Government, to reduce employer's contribution by 10% point will also kick in. In fact, for older workers, from 1st January 1999, the employer's CPF contribution rate will come down to 2%, not 4%. So the differential would still be maintained. In fact, it will actually be improved, because in the past, we used to have 12.5% differential between the two groups. Now, we have narrowed the differential some more. Mr Chong and Dr Vasoo also requested that safeguards should be put in place to ensure that older workers who are currently drawing salaries which are at or in fact below the market rate should not be affected by the 10% wage cut. If they were to look at the Bill, they will see that in fact these safeguards are already provided under the new section 4A(5) which stipulates that the wage reduction shall be based on factors such as employee's productivity, performance, duties and responsibilities and the wage system that a company practises or exercises. This provision means that while employers are given the flexibility to reduce the wages of older employees by up to 10%, such cuts cannot be introduced indiscriminately. For employees who are not on the seniority-based wage system, such as those who are paid by hourly rate or fixed rate, regardless of their age - in other words, they are being paid according to their job worth - then the employers would have to take this into consideration in deciding on whether to make a wage cut. If in fact they proceed to make a wage cut and the employees feel unhappy, they can always appeal to my Ministry. We will investigate their complaints and help them to reach a solution with the employers. Mr Chong also suggested that we should prohibit companies which are not affected by the seniority-based wage system to introduce a wage cut for the older employees. While I understand his concern that he wants to provide for this explicit protection for older workers, we are of the view that the companies in fact should be given some flexibility to adjust the cost of retaining their older workers. Apart from the seniority-based wage system, companies may need to adjust the salaries of older workers based on other considerations which are already spelt out in the section provided earlier on. These other factors are productivity, performance and contribution to the company. So we should allow companies to do so to ensure continued cost competitiveness despite the fact that there are going to be more and more older workers. However, I also would like to point out that it would be unwise for an employer to indiscriminately cut the wages of their productive older employees as this will certainly cause a serious effect on the morale of such employees. In any case, employers who intend to introduce a wage cut are required, under the proposed Bill, to give notice to the employees and come to an agreement between the employer and employee. In fact, in companies where the workers are represented by unions, the unions also would want to be consulted on the degree of reduction that the employers want to carry out. Next, I come to Mr Cyrille Tan. I thank him also for the support. He has reinforced my argument on why we should move at this juncture, despite the economic downturn, to raise the retirement age. The fact that most older employees are prepared to accept the wage cut of 10%, according to Mr Cyrille Tan, is an indication that our process of tripartite discussion of a sensitive issue is working well. It is through this Tripartite Committee on Extension of Retirement Age that we have arrived at this consensus that would take into consideration the employers' and also the employees' concern. We have arrived at this level of wage adjustment which I think, as Mr Cyrille Tan has mentioned, is acceptable to the workers. That would help to encourage more older Singaporeans to carry on working. If you make too big a cut, then you will demotivate them and they might just decide not to carry on, in which case our Retirement Age Act would not have achieved its objective. Mr Cyrille Tan also mentioned the need for training of older workers. I touched on it earlier on. I agree with him that we should continue to provide training to older workers, in particular, to help them to adjust to the changed labour market where newer jobs are being created, but requiring higher skills. I think it is of interest for Members to know that the shift towards higher skilled jobs is taking place quite rapidly. In the early 90s, EDB promoted investments and created a lot of jobs. Out of the jobs that were created through EDB's investment promotion effort, about one-third of them required skilled workers. But today the investments brought in by EDB and the jobs that they create require two-thirds of skilled workers. So we have doubled the requirement for skilled workers over a short period of less than a decade. So older workers, in particular, therefore need to make a special effort. Let me assure Members that Government will provide all the opportunities and fundings that are necessary to ensure that older workers who are in need of skills upgrading will receive this training. Next, I turn to Mr Zulkifli Baharudin. He raised several valid points and concerns which I will try to address. He mentioned the possibility of introducing legislation like that in the US to outlaw discrimination of workers up to the age of 70. In fact, the Retirement Age Act is such a legislation because under the Retirement Age Act the employers are not allowed to retire workers on account of age until they reach a minimum statutory retirement age. So, in effect, it provides the same degree of non-discrimination for older workers. Yes, the provision now is to raise to only 62, but we have already served notice that we intend to raise it to 67. But we cannot do this in a rush. We cannot hurry the process. We have to take time to ensure that the employment market can adjust to this change. In due course, when we move it to 67, we would already be very much closer to the target in the US. Mr Zulkifli also suggested that we should prepare workers for retirement. I also agree with him on that score that even as we talk about extending the retirement age and working longer, we do need to make preparation for eventual retirement, and to make both financial planning and also in terms of an alternative or even a second career after retirement. Even at age 62 or, in the future, 65, there will be many Singaporeans who are still very physically and mentally very alert and active. They can do a lot of other kinds of work as a form of a second career. It is part of our continuing education and training programme that we are in the process of establishing under the new charter of the Ministry of Manpower, ie, this concept of a lifelong learning. We will incorporate these ideas to train young and old workers so that they can continually upgrade their skills and capabilities and they can continue to serve their employers or in other areas such as social organisations, as mentioned by the Nominated Member. But there is one point that he raised that I cannot quite agree with him, and that is, the point about trying to reserve certain jobs for older workers. For instance, he mentioned jobs in kindergartens and childcare services. While I agree with him that grandparents are great for looking after young children, we should not be interfering with the job market to the extent that certain jobs such as those in the childcare centres be reserved for older people. That would not help us in the sense that they will introduce rigidities and distortions into our labour market. It may cause unhappiness and resentment among the younger workers who also may want to do such jobs. We cannot generalise to say that younger workers cannot do such jobs. On balance, it is not advisable for us to move towards trying to take a protectionist approach and say that certain jobs must be reserved for older workers or to interfere with our free labour market practice. Instead of adopting this protectionistic approach, trying to reserve jobs for older workers, which is really not efficient, economically speaking, it will be more viable for us to continue to encourage and promote the employment of older Singaporeans for a wide variety of jobs. I am sure Members are aware of how companies like McDonalds, for instance, have branched out in their search for manpower to the older Singaporeans and they have been very successful in that. They can meet most of their labour requirements by employing older Singaporeans, including retirees. More and more companies should adopt this approach and change their mindset to try to create opportunities for older Singaporeans. Mr Zulkifli also suggests extending the Skills Development Fund or setting up a special fund to look after the training needs of older people. I have already mentioned that in our concept of developing a lifelong learning system, we will reach out to both young and old workers. At this juncture, I do not think there is a need to specifically identify a fund for older workers. In fact, the SRP, if you want to look at it, indirectly benefits older workers more than younger workers because the SRP is targeted at the lower skilled and less educated workers who, by virtue of the definition, become the older workers. They are the ones who are now benefiting most from the SRP. All Skills Development Fund training subsidies are eligible for young and old workers. We make no distinction on age. I think I have addressed Mr Lim Swee Say's point about pensionable civil servants. Their pensions will be protected. They can carry on to work beyond 60 to 62. Of course, they would also have to come to an agreement on the amount of wage reduction, just like employees in the private sector. I would pass on his suggestion that the civil service takes the lead in implementing the base-up wage system. I think this will be considered by the PSD. I agree with Mr Lim that while we can amend the law, there is still no guarantee of employment because this is very much dependent on the job opportunities available. In a situation where there is an overall decline in employment, as we have experienced in the last two quarters as a result of the economic downturn, there is of course a greater difficulty to ensure that older Singaporeans stay in the job. But I would urge all employers, even when they have to downsize, not to inflict a penalty on the older workers. I think Mr Lim has adequately pointed out that older workers, and, in fact, several other Members have mentioned this, can continue to make a valuable contribution to the company's operation. Finally, I come to Mr Jeyaretnam. He says that the talk of raising the retirement age is academic as long as employers are allowed to terminate the employee's service with one month's notice. This is not a new thing. This right to give notice to terminate an employment contract is already in our Employment Act. We have to look at it in totality. While the employer can give termination notice, there must be a sufficient reason for such termination. If in fact an employee whose service has been terminated but he feels that it is actually a dismissal in the guise of contractual termination, he can always appeal to my Ministry. Each year we do get a certain number of such appeals and we have always been able to resolve the differences between the employer and employee. So it is not a completely one-sided situation where the employer has absolute right and to exercise it indiscriminately. We have a mechanism within the Ministry in implementing the Employment Act to ensure that employees' interests are also looked after. I am pleased to inform Members that in terms of conciliation of resolving such difficulties, the Ministry's Labour Relations Department has been very effective and efficient. I think the Member also has to look from the point of view of the employer. After all, employees also can leave a job by giving a certain period of notice. So it cuts both ways. An employer has invested money in training an employee and the employee can turn around and say, "Look, I want to quit. I give you a month's notice." So I think in a free labour market, we should allow this flexibility, instead of creating more rigidities, as he seems to be suggesting.

May I just ask the Minister one more question? Does he not agree that there is no provision in the Act for an employee whose services are terminated with the requisite notice of one month to appeal to the Ministry? He is not aware of that.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I have just said that if any employee feels that his services have been unfairly terminated, he can appeal to my Ministry.

Question put, and agreed to. Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House. The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Dr Lee Boon Yang]. Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

Order for Second Reading read. 4.18 pm

Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." Sir, this Bill makes technical amendments to the Civil Law Act for purposes of clarification and law reform. The provisions have the support of relevant bodies such as the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Singapore Academy of Law, where the Law Society of Singapore is represented. The financial services industry and NUS law lecturers were also consulted. The Bill will improve our commercial and civil law and will provide a more predictable legal environment, something important to businesses and financial institutions. Updating the law on contribution Sir, the first set of amendments makes new provisions for contribution between persons who are jointly or severally, or both jointly and severally, liable for the same damage and in certain other similar cases where two or more persons have paid or may be required to pay compensation for the same damage. It also amends the law relating to proceedings against persons jointly liable for the same debt or jointly or severally, or both jointly and severally, liable for the same damage. These amendments are of a law reform nature. They were proposed by the Academy of Law's Law Reform Committee and supported by the Attorney-General (AG). The changes will bring our law on contribution in line with the UK Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 and address anomalies in litigation practice. The law on contribution is a technical area which deals with the payment of a proportionate share of a liability which has been borne by one or some only of a number of persons who are jointly liable. Also, the Civil Law Act will be amended to extend the applicability of the provisions on contribution to damages arising from legal grounds other than tort. The rule in Bain v Fothergill Another amendment of a law reform nature is to abolish the rule of law known as the rule in Bain v Fothergill. This follows changes made in the UK by the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. This rule of law is that "if, a person enters into a contract for the sale of real estate knowing that he has no title to it, nor any means of acquiring it, the purchaser cannot recover damages beyond the expenses he has incurred by an action for breach of the contract; he can only obtain other damages by an action for deceit". This rule is an anachronism and was abolished in the UK in 1989. It was established before the development of a comprehensive land registration system, when parties could not be absolutely certain about their title to land and when there was a requirement to trace a good root of title back for 60 years. The rule is no longer relevant in present day Singapore. Most of our land are now registered under the Land Titles Act or the Land Titles (Strata) Act. Further, all dealings in unregistered land are required to be registered under the Registration of Deeds Act where the duty to show good root of title goes back only 15 years. Creating predictability for financial services law against gaming Sir, the next set of amendments is for purposes of clarification. They are supported by MAS and the financial services industry. These amendments do not affect the regulation of financial and investment activities. The first amendment relates to section 6(1) of the Civil Law Act, which renders all contracts or agreements by way of gaming or wagering null and void. This amendment arose out of concerns expressed by a private sector Corporate Finance Committee (CFC), chaired by Mr Lim Yong Wah, that there is currently uncertainty over whether the trading of "Over the Counter" (OTC) derivatives in Singapore is illegal and unenforceable because of the law against gaming. The CFC felt that this uncertainty has impeded the growth of a thriving OTC derivatives market in Singapore. As a large number of derivatives contracts are settled by price differences based on future uncertain events, and do not depend on any actual delivery of the underlying property, they could technically fall within the definition of gaming. The CFC's report, published on 9th November 1998, recommended that the law should be clarified to facilitate the growth of the derivative business. Indeed, the law against gaming should not apply to any legitimate or hedging investment activity. It should not hinder the dynamic development of innovative financial products in Singapore. The Bill therefore amends section 6 to make clear that the law against gaming does not affect the validity or enforceability of contracts entered into by way of business and the making or performance of which constitutes an investment or hedging activity. A list of these activities, drafted in close consultation with MAS and representatives of the financial services industry, is set out in the Bill. EMU and the Euro Sir, another amendment makes clear that the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will not affect the continuity of contracts denominated in currencies that will be affected by the introduction of the euros. The premise underlying this amendment is that, as far as possible, we should maintain Singapore's competitiveness as an international business and financial centre by providing predictability and certainty to businesses when the euro is introduced on 1st January 1999, the start of the transitional stage. It is modelled after the equivalent New York law. For the avoidance of doubt, a declaratory provision will be enacted that the continuity of contracts will not be affected by the substitution or replacement of currencies by the euro arising from the European Economic and Monetary Union. Consequential and related amendments Finally, Sir, the Bill makes consequential amendments to section 6(1) of the Carriage by Air Act (Cap. 32A) and section 3 of the Contributory Negligence and Personal Injuries Act (Cap. 54). The Bill also makes a related amendment to the Limitation Act (Cap. 163) by inserting a new section 6A to provide for a special time limit of two years for claiming contribution. This will clarify a current uncertainty in litigation practice. Sir, I beg to move. Question proposed.

I am obliged to you, Mr Speaker, Sir, for giving me this opportunity. I am in support of the Bill. The Minister has been very thorough and convincing. I will be very short. Sir, the Civil Law Act is one of the cornerstones of our legal system and the number of amendments that has been proposed will help us in the administration of justice. In our system, we practise the rule of law and the separation of power - Judiciary, Executive and Legislature. The function of the Judiciary is to interpret the law while it is the function of Parliament to enact laws. I congratulate the Minister for introducing this Bill. It is timely. I am especially happy that the rule in Bain's case is being laid to rest. It has outlived its usefulness. It just goes to show that the law cannot be static. It is a living institution. It must undergo change from time to time. And in this regard, I am asking the Minister whether, besides the Law Reform Committee of the Singapore Academy of Law, the Ministry has any unit which monitors changes of law that are required in our system. Sir, to administer outmoded law would do grave injustice to the parties. The Minister has been very, very thorough in showing us the various amendments he is going to introduce, which are going to help us, and I hope other Ministries would also do likewise. I support the Bill.

Sir, the Ministry of Law itself also monitors what laws need to be amended.

Question put, and agreed to. Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House. The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Assoc. Prof. Ho Peng Kee]. Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

Order for Second Reading read.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." When the Minister for Law moved the Copyright (Amendment) Bill in February this year, he informed the House that an inter-ministry Committee has been reviewing our legislation on intellectual property rights to give effect to our obligations under the World Trade Organisation's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property or the TRIPS Agreement, for short. The Committee's work has resulted in amendments to the Copyright Act and Patents Act. This Bill is another product of the Committee's review. It will replace the existing Trade Marks Act. Besides amending the law to comply with the TRIPS Agreement, the Bill also modernises and simplifies our trade marks law in line with international trends. Our trade marks legislation is some 50 years old (1938). Some of its provisions on the registration of trade marks are unnecessarily complicated and onerous, thus impeding the efficiency of the Registry of Trade Marks. A number of provisions are also outdated and do not conform to current international trends. This Bill addresses these shortcomings. Furthermore, the Bill will enable Singapore to accede to the Protocol Relating to the International Registration of Marks or the Madrid Protocol. In the process of drafting the Bill, we have taken into account the views of academics from the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, and consultants from World Intellectual Property Organisation or WIPO, as well as views of the industry. TRIPS related provisions Sir, let me turn first to the provisions inserted to comply with the TRIPS Agreement. These relate to: (a) definition of trade mark; (b) well-known trade marks; (c) collective marks; (d) civil measures; (e) border enforcement; and (f) geographical indications. In the Bill, a trade mark is defined along the lines of the TRIPS Agreement. Basically, a trade mark must be visually perceptible and capable of distinguishing the goods or services of the proprietor. Three-dimensional marks are now registrable. As regards well-known trade marks, the Bill allows the proprietor of an earlier trade mark which is entitled to protection under the Paris Convention or the TRIPS Agreement as a well-known trade mark to oppose the registration of an identical or similar trade mark. Further, the proprietor of a well-known trade mark is entitled to restrain by injunction the use of an identical or similar trademark in relation to identical or similar goods or services where the use is likely to cause confusion. Currently, well-known trade marks are protected under the common law tort of passing off. If they consist of an invented word or words, they can also be registered as defensive marks in respect of goods under the existing Trade Marks Act. A defensive mark is essentially a well-known trade mark that is registered for goods other than those in which the proprietor trades, where a connection in the course of trade between those goods and the proprietor is likely to be inferred. A new feature of the Bill is the registration of collective marks. This is required by the TRIPS Agreement. A collective mark is held by an association and used by its members. It is a mark distinguishing the goods or services of members of the association from those dealt with or provided by persons who are not members. Currently, there is no registration of collective marks in the existing Trade Marks Act. Instead, an association which does not use its logo as a trade mark registers it as a trade mark and then registers its members as permitted users of the trade mark. The registration of collective marks by associations under the Bill will enable their members to use the marks without having to go through the process of registering themselves as permitted users with the Registry of Trade Marks. Sir, the Bill also expressly sets out the civil and administrative remedies available to a proprietor of a registered trade mark. These include injunctions, damages, account of profits, removal of the offending sign and the delivery up and forfeiture or destruction of infringing goods, material or articles. Another important aspect of the Bill pertains to border enforcement measures to prevent infringing intellectual property materials from entering Singapore. The Bill's provisions on these measures are similar to those in the copyright area with adaptation to suit the trade mark field. In line with international trends, the Bill designates the Customs and Excise Department to handle border enforcement. Modernisation and Simplification in accordance with International Trends Sir, I turn now to the provisions which seek to modernise and simplify our trade marks law in accordance with international trends. Some of the more important changes are: First, abolishing the distinction between Parts A and B of the Register of Trade Marks. Trade Marks are presently registered in Part A or Part B of the register. Almost all applications filed with the Registry of Trade Marks are for registration in Part A. If the Registrar decides that the trade marks do not qualify for Part A registration, he may propose to register them in Part B. A trade mark registered in Part A must satisfy a higher level of distinctiveness than a Part B trade mark and thus has greater protection. For example, the validity of a trade mark is presumed to be conclusive after 7 years under the Trade Marks Act. Nevertheless, the differences for the proprietor between registration in Part A or Part B do not justify the considerable amount of time spent by examiners and applicants in determining which Part a trade mark is registrable under. The Bill accordingly provides for a unified register. This will thus simplify examination, resulting in savings in administration costs and also costs to applicants. Second, providing for less stringent criteria for registration of trade marks. This will make it easier for proprietors to obtain registration. The test for registrability will generally be similar to that for a Part B registration under the present Trade Marks Act, that is, a mark must be capable of distinguishing the goods or services of its proprietor. Third, simplifying and expediting the examination process by removing the Registrar's power to impose disclaimers. Under the present Trade Marks Act, the Registrar may, as a condition of registration, require the applicant to disclaim rights to non-distinctive features of a trade mark. The effect of a disclaimer is that the proprietor of the registered trade mark cannot claim any rights under the Act in respect of the parts of the mark to which the disclaimer relates. Therefore, no action for infringement shall lie in respect of the use or imitation of the disclaimed elements. In the Bill, the Registrar will have no power to impose disclaimers. But there is a provision for disclaimers to be entered in the register by the applicants voluntarily. The applicants may wish to do this at the application stage to forestall possible opposition to the registration of their trade marks. Disclaimers may also be entered by the applicants as a result of opposition proceedings. Fourth, abolishing Association of Trade Marks. The Bill abolishes the practice of associating identical or similar trade marks in respect of the same or similar goods or services belonging to the same proprietor. Under the existing Trade Marks Act, associated trade marks must be assigned together, to prevent the public from being misled as to the source of the goods or services. The abolition of the association of trade marks in the Bill is premised on the fact that trade mark proprietors are most attuned to market conditions and are the best persons to ensure that an assignment of their trade marks does not lead to confusion or deception on the part of the public. Fifth, registering marks relating to Ancillary Services. At the second reading of the Trade Marks Bill in 1991, the Minister for Law informed the House that the issue of registration of retail service marks would be reviewed. We have studied the international trend which acknowledges that ancillary services such as retail services have attributes which deserve recognition. The Bill accordingly makes provision for the registration of marks in relation to ancillary services performed for the benefit of someone else other than the proprietor. Therefore, marks such as SOGO and METRO are now registrable in respect of retail services. The Madrid Protocol Finally, Sir, the Bill will enable Singapore to accede to the Madrid Protocol. The Madrid Protocol which came into operation on 1st April 1996 is administered by the World Intellectual Property Organisation or WIPO. Essentially, accession to the Protocol would enable trade marks registered in Singapore to be protected internationally. As at 1st October 1998, 35 countries including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Switzerland and China were parties to the Protocol. Mr Speaker, Sir, this Bill will be an important addition to our legislation on intellectual property rights which have seen significant advancements in recent years. Sir, I beg to move. Question proposed.

Mr Speaker, Sir, thank you for your indulgence. I support the Bill and I just want to raise a small point for the Minister to consider. The Bill, as it stands right now, does not deal with e-mail addresses and domain names. I believe with Singapore's move into e-commerce and greater use of the Internet for competitive purposes, there will be an opportunity given to scoundrels and crooks who would register things as they have done in other countries like ronald@Mcdonald.com.sg and these are things which make use of well-known trade marks or even registered trade marks for purposes which include blackmailing the actual trade mark owner to pay off this particular person. So I would just like the Minister to consider adding this perhaps to the future amendment to the law.

I thank the Member for his suggestion. We can certainly consider it as we see how the law works out.

Question put, and agreed to. Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House. The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Assoc. Prof. Ho Peng Kee]. Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

Order for Second Reading read. 4.38 pm

Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." Sir, this Bill, as in the case of the Trade Marks Bill, which has just been read and put through the House, is a product of the inter-ministry Committee reviewing our legislation on intellectual protection rights. A similar consultative approach was taken. Sir, the aim of this Bill is two-fold. Firstly, it seeks to enhance the level of protection for geographical indications. Secondly, it seeks to enable Singapore to comply with our obligations under Articles 22 to 24 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or the TRIPS Agreement, in short. Geographical Indications Sir, geographical indications are names or signs used in trade to identify a good or product as originating from a place, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of that good or product is largely attributable to its geographical origin. Some well-known examples of geographical indications include "CHAMPAGNE", "SCOTCH WHISKY", "CHEDDAR CHEESE", "PARMA HAM", "BORDEAUX", "PORT" and "SHERRY", names which Singaporeans would likely have come across in any supermarket. Compliance of the Existing Law with the TRIPS Agreement Sir, Singapore presently does not have specific legislation governing the use of geographical indications. It is, however, possible to register them as certification trade marks, if they fulfil the requirements under the Trade Marks Act. Alternatively, owners of geographical indications or those authorised by them to use the geographical indication, may sue for passing off, if the geographical indication fails to fulfil the registrability requirements under the Trade Marks Act. Also, under the Consumer Protection Act, the use or application of a false trade description on goods, including their origin, is prohibited and constitutes an offence. However, Sir, these laws do not meet the standard of protection required for geographical indications in general under the TRIPS Agreement. Also, international trend is to enact specific legislation to protect geographical indications, distinct from those relating to trade marks or unfair competition. Hence, we have decided to enact a separate Bill to cover this specific area. Aim of the Bill Broadly, Sir, the Bill, in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, prohibits the following acts: (a) use of misleading geographical indications; (b) registration of misleading geographical indications as trade marks; and (c) use of geographical indications which would constitute an act of unfair competition within the meaning of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. Sir, further, the Bill provides additional protection for geographical indications relating to wines and spirits by prohibiting the non-misleading use of a geographical indication in relation to wines and spirits, that is to say, the use of a geographical indication for wines and spirits not originating from the place indicated by the geographical indication, even if the true origin of the goods is indicated, or the geographical indication is used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as "kind", "type", "style", "imitation" or the like. Main Features of the Bill Sir, protection under the Bill is limited to geographical indications of a country or territory which is a member of the WTO, or a party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, or a country designated by the Minister as a qualifying country. The last category is to give us the option of entering into a bilateral or multilateral agreement with countries that are neither members of the WTO, nor party to the Paris Convention. There is no requirement for registration of a geographical indication as the TRIPS Agreement does not make protection contingent upon registration. Instead, the Bill allows a producer or trader of goods identified by geographical indications or an association of these persons, to institute proceedings against a person for committing an act prohibited under the Bill. In line with the TRIPS Agreement, consumers may not pursue this avenue. Consumers may, however, pursue existing remedies under the Consumer Protection Act or the Trade Marks Act. Exceptions to Protection of Geographical Indications Sir, protection under the Bill is subject to some exceptions, including: First, no relief may be claimed under the Bill in relation to a geographical indication which is contrary to public order or morality, or which has fallen into disuse or has ceased to be protected in its country of origin; Second, a person may use a geographical indication in relation to goods or services which has become a common name of those goods or services in Singapore. Sir, businesses which produce or trade in products which rely on geographical origin to indicate their quality and for their reputation will benefit from this Bill. It will also have the general effect of facilitating trade and the flow of quality goods, and allow consumers to rely confidently on geographical indications as an indication of the quality commonly associated with the various geographical regions. Sir, I beg to move.

Question put, and agreed to. Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House. The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Assoc. Prof. Ho Peng Kee]. Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

Order for Second Reading read.

4.45 pm

Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a second time". The Estate Duty (Amendment) Bill 1998 seeks to give legislative effect to reductions in the interest payable on estate duty, exemption of donations/gifts and bequests made to Institutions of a Public Character or the Government from estate duty, and to changes which will facilitate the administration of estate duty. Currently, interest of 3% is payable on all estate duty within the first six months after death. The rate is 6% if estate duty is unpaid 6 to 18 months from the date of death, and there is no provision to reduce the rate if reasonable cause for the delay can be shown. For the period beyond 18 months, the 12% interest rate can be reduced to 6% provided reasonable cause for the delay can be shown. To encourage the administrator or executor of an estate to file in a complete affidavit early, the rate for the first six months after death will be reduced to 0% if a complete affidavit is received. The rate on unpaid estate duty 6 to 18 months after death will also be reduced from 6% to 3% if reasonable cause for the delay can be shown. Clause 12 re-enacts the Sixth Schedule of the Estate Duty Act (the Act) to empower the Commissioner to reduce the interest rates payable under these circumstances. Under the Act, gifts or donations made more than a year before the death of the donor for public or charitable purposes are not subject to estate duty. However, under the Income Tax Act, tax deductions are allowed for donations made to Institutions of a Public Character (IPCs) or the Government at any point of time. For consistency with the Income Tax Act, donations, gifts and bequests to IPCs or the Government will be exempt from estate duty regardless of the point of time they are made to these institutions. Clauses 3 and 4 amend the Act to provide for the estate duty exemption on donations/gifts and bequests made to these institutions while clause 13 repeals the Ninth Schedule which is no longer required. To facilitate administration of estate duty, clauses 2, 5, 6 ,7 and 8 amend the Act to provide for the following: (a) To empower the Commissioner of Estate Duty, instead of the Minister for Finance, to determine the forms for notice of assessment, estate duty affidavit and the estate duty form of account; (b) To remove the requirement for the Commissioner of Estate Duty to certify the payment of estate duty on the estate duty affidavit or the form of account for internal record purposes; and (c) To allow the shares of a deceased person in the CDP account or CPF investment account to be transferred without estate duty clearance if the market value of such shares in either account at the time of death does not exceed $50,000. Statistics show that such cases are generally not liable to estate duty. Sir, I beg to move. Question proposed.

I rise to support the Bill. The new amendment would allow the Commissioner of Estate Duty flexibility in issuing notices of assessments in such form as he may determine. Similarly, the Estate Duty affidavit which has been in circulation for a long time would also be updated. I applaud the exemption of gifts and donations to be made to Institutions of a Public Character (IPC) as well as to the Government and I hope that the media will give enough publicity so that more donations could be made. Mr Speaker, Sir, I find clause 8 which amends section 44 of the Act very progressive. However, my complaint is why the Minister chose only a figure of $50,000 instead of $100,000. I think another method could have been adopted. Instead of setting the limit at $50,000, we could have empowered the Minister to vary the figure. As it now stands, he has to come back to this House whenever he has to make any amendment. Sir, Singapore must be Asia's largest shareholding country and this is why I am appealing to the Minister to reconsider the position. I also hope the Minister would consider introducing legislation where small estates below $100,000 need not go to court. It could be administered either by the Public Trustee or even institutions like banks and solicitors. The amendment to the Sixth Schedule is to be welcomed. However, I have one plea for the Minister, and that is, he should give outright exemption for interest for the first six months and thereafter the interest should be added in accordance with the current prime rate. I am aware of the fact that the Commissioner is quite generous in exempting interest but I am puzzled that the upper limit of 12% is indeed high. May I urge the Minister to reconsider the position. I have got another request. I know I am not going to be happy at the end of the day but I am still asking the Minister to consider abolishing estate duty itself gradually. I am not asking him to do it now but eventually I hope he would consider that

Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to thank Mr Rai for his comments. I consider the figure $50,000 adequate for the time being although the suggestion that the Minister should be allowed to vary it is reasonable which may be incorporated in future. On the introduction of legislation to exempt small estates, I will consider the suggestion. On interest rates, if an affidavit is filed within six months, the interest rate should be zero. Thereafter, the interest rates are applied to induce estates to submit their affidavits in a timely manner so as to expedite the process. But we will always review this from time to time. Finally, on his suggestion to abolish estate duty altogether, I would like to assure him that the issue of estate duty revision is reviewed annually, and I will take his request into consideration in the next Budget, although I cannot promise anything now.

Question put, and agreed to. Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House. The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Dr Richard Hu Tsu Tau]. Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment, read a Third time and passed.

Order for Second Reading read.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time". The Bill before the House mainly seeks to improve the standard of the professional accounting practice in Singapore, as well as to streamline disciplinary proceedings for better regulation of the profession. With the worldwide trend towards greater transparency and disclosure in corporate regimes, there is a need to ensure that our public accountants continually improve their high standards to ensure the continued integrity of our financial system. I believe that the proposed amendments take us a step further in that direction. The amendments in the Bill arose mainly out of recommendations made by the Accountants Act Amendments Committee and the Public Accountants Board (PAB) Working Committee to Review Accounting and Auditing Standards in Singapore. The two Committees included academics and practitioners from the Nanyang Technological University, the Stock Exchange of Singapore, the Auditor-General's Office, the Attorney-General's Chambers, the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Singapore (ICPAS), and the Registry of Companies and Businesses. I will now briefly explain the key provisions of the Bill, starting with those which strengthen the regulatory framework of public accountants, contained in the following clauses of the Bill. Clause 6: Validity Period of Licence and Prescribed Requirements Clause 6 repeals and re-enacts section 15, which governs the certificate of registration of a public accountant. The duration of the registration of a public accountant is reduced from three years at present to one year. The Public Accountants Board will then be able to gain more timely information about applicants, and more effectively regulate errant practitioners. Rather than an automatic renewal of the licence once every three years, it is now provided that the Board will renew the certificate of registration of a public accountant only if he has complied with the prescribed requirements relating to continuing professional education (CPE), and meets what is expected in his professional conduct and practice. This re-emphasises the importance of training and practice review to maintain the high standards of accounting and auditing practices in Singapore. It will give legal effect to standards already required of public accountants by ICPAS. Clause 8: Preliminary Information/Need for Deposit Clause 8 amends section 20, which governs procedures on complaints. The Board, in the event of a complaint against a public accountant, can now require the accountant to respond to its preliminary inquiries, before the complaint is referred to an Inquiry Committee. A maximum fine of $2,000 may be imposed if the accountant concerned refuses, without good reason, to respond to the preliminary inquiry. To weed out frivolous complaints and abuse of the disciplinary process, the amendment will also allow the Board to require a refundable deposit not exceeding $1,000 to be placed with the Board. This amount may be forfeited in full or partially if the complaint is found to be frivolous or vexatious, or dismissed because the complainant refuses to co-operate with the Board. Clauses 6 & 9: Suspension and De-Registration Clause 9 amends section 21 to add to the grounds on which the Board may suspend or de-register a public accountant. Every public accountant who is registered with the Board has to observe the Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics, set out in the Third Schedule of the Board Rules. He has to conduct himself in a manner consistent with the good reputation of the accountancy profession, which demands high standards of integrity, objectivity, independence and moral character. The amendment gives legal effect for failure to conduct oneself properly. Consequential amendment is made via clause 6 to section 19 to allow an Inquiry Committee to be set up for purpose of ascertaining whether an infringement or failure to observe the Code has been committed. Public accountants will also benefit from this amendment, which provides that any suspension, de-registration or imposition of penalty on a public accountant may take effect only after the expiration of one month from the date on which the appeal against the decision made to the High Court has been determined or withdrawn. This new provision seeks to minimize losses suffered by the public accountant as a result of the cancellation or suspension of his licence. The High Court may also assess any cost charged against a public accountant. Clause 11: Voluntary De-Registration Upon Complaint/Summary De-Registration Clause 11 amends section 23 to add to the grounds on which a public accountant may be summarily removed from the Register of Public Accountants. A new provision is inserted to prevent a public accountant from applying to be removed from the Register of Public Accountants if disciplinary action is pending against him or if he is being investigated by an Inquiry Committee. This is a loophole that should be plugged and is a fair amendment. Since the introduction of the Bill, we have however received feedback from various sources that the other intended provisions may be too harsh. In particular, in the current economic environment, business revenues may be severely affected, leading to unavoidable credit problems. As such, I have decided to remove "insolvency" and "entering into composition with creditors" as grounds for summary removal. Instead, in such cases, we will rely on existing provisions under section 21 of the Act, which requires an Inquiry Committee to be first set up, with its appropriate appeal channels. However, in cases where the public accountant has already been adjudged a bankrupt through the usual processes, there is really no need for the PAB to go through a further Inquiry Committee. Hence, there are grounds for summary removal in the case where a public accountant is an adjudged bankrupt. I propose to move amendments to clarify these points. With the consent of this House, I will therefore be proposing these changes to the Bill when we are in Committee stage later on. Clause 13: Imposition of Composition Fines Clause 13 inserts a new section 56A. This enables the Board to impose deterrent fines on minor offences without having to bring offenders to court. However, offences involving personal misconduct, which will be dealt with under the Board's disciplinary proceedings and subject to due process, shall be excluded. I now turn to other amendments which will improve the operations and efficiency of the Public Accountants Board. Clause 3: Adoption of Accounting Standards Currently, PAB rules already require a public accountant to carry out his professional work in accordance with technical and professional standards expected of him as a public accountant. While the practice of the Public Accountants Board is to adopt the standards issued by ICPAS, its power to do so is implied by section 5(d) as one of the Board's functions is to "control and regulate the practice of the profession of accountancy by public accountants". In comparison, in the United States and United Kingdom, the regulatory bodies for the accountancy profession have the legislative power to prescribe such standards. Hence an amendment is required to amend section 5 of the Accountants Act to expressly empower the Board to prescribe the standards, methods and procedures that public accountants have to follow in the course of their professional work. Clause 12: De-Regulation of Tax Consultants Clause 12 amends section 48 to enable persons not registered as public accountants to practise as tax consultants. Tax consultancy should not be the sole preserve of public accountants and solicitors, as currently provided under the Accountants Act. Indeed market forces will drive tax consultants who do not deliver good quality service out of business. In addition, unlike public accountants whose work has a great impact on the public, the argument for the protection of general public interest holds less weight in the case of tax consultancy as it is a service offered exclusively to an individual paying customer. There is thus no specific need for the Board to regulate tax agents. Nevertheless, the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS) will be examining ways of ensuring the continued high professional standard of tax agents, and this will be announced when ready. Clause 4: Change to Self-Funding Status of PAB Finally, clause 4 amends section 7 to enable the Board to meet its expenses through Government funding. Presently, the Board is funded solely by fees collected from the registration and renewal of public accountants' licences. This is not sufficient to cover the Board's operating expenditure, especially when legal and inquiry costs need to be incurred. The grant is necessary as the Board's expenditure will continue to be pushed up by rising administrative expenses as well as investigation, prosecution and legal assessment costs for increasingly complex complaint cases. These costs are essential to ensure a thorough, fair and effective complaints inquiry process. The other amendments are to clarify interpretations and relate to consequential amendments to the Bill. Sir, I beg to move. Question proposed.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise to speak in support of the Accountants (Amendment) Bill. I would like, however, to express some concerns over some of the proposed amendments and also to seek clarification on some others. The new section 21(1)(a)(viii) appears to be very stringent such that the public accountants are not able to pursue other business interests. This does not provide for the entrepreneurial spirit, which our country is encouraging currently. Moreover, this will pose hardship to many part-time and small time public accountants who form quite a substantial portion of the accountant community. They will feel the adverse effects of this amendment as in most cases they do provide other non-accountancy-related services as well. The new section 23(g) should stop at the word "bankrupt". This is because, with the current economic crisis, a public accountant may need to enter into a composition with creditors and should he be successful, there is no reason why he should be removed from the register. In section 56(A), there is no consistency in this provision whereby any offences under this Act or any rule made thereunder which is prescribed as compoundable offences may be compounded for a sum of money not exceeding $1,000. This is because certain provisions call for a fine not exceeding $2,000, an example which may be found in section 20(3E). Therefore, this provision may have been better to be in line with the others, ie, a fine not exceeding $2,000 as well. The amendment in section 19 provides a much wider scope for misconduct for public accountants, unlike the old Act which restricts complaints to professional misconduct only. There is ambiguity in the "improper act or conduct" which brings disrepute to the accountants' profession or which makes them unfit for practice. There is a need for clarification here in the nature and extent in the meaning of "improper act or conduct". As regards section 15, firstly, subsection 5(b) on "appraisal of the public accountant's professional conduct and practice" calls for further clarification on the operational methods to ensure effective and credible judgement and, secondly, in subsection 5(c) on "any other matter which the Board considers relevant" embodies too much and the nature of these matters should be specified and should be confined to technical, professional or moral issues. The amendments in section 5 appear to prepare the way for the Public Accountants Board to prescribe the accounting standards, methods and procedures to be followed by public accountants when doing any work in the course of their profession. I would like to seek clarification on the kind of resources which will be committed to this function in order to benefit the general public. Sir, I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise in support of the Bill. I would like to declare my interest as a practising public accountant, as a Council member of the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Singapore, and as someone who has participated in some of the discussions earlier on over some of these amendments. Today, I would like to state that I am expressing a personal view. When I first read the Bill for the first time as an individual, as anyone else would have been looking at the text of the Bill, I had this feeling that the amendments were rather draconian. Then I read it a second and third time, but this time as a practitioner, as a public accountant, and I realise that the amendments really were to bring the Accountants Act in line with other Acts regulating the other professionals. In some respect, because it is a more recent amendment than the Act regulating, say, the solicitors, we have actually improved on it. We have included composition for very minor offences as well. I am quite convinced that the amendments have been made not to make life more difficult for public accountants, but to help public accountants maintain their stature. I am in support of the Bill but there are some areas of concern that I feel need to be addressed. Section 15(5)(a) on continuing professional education and section 15(5)(b) on the appraisal of the public accountant's professional conduct and practice are two of the areas for compliance that will be considered by the Board for the annual renewal of their certificate. I think there will be some problems here because Continuing Professional Education (CPE) is being monitored for compliance over a 3-year period. The practice review to appraise the public accountant's professional conduct and practice is also done in cycles. Perhaps there is a need to add that compliance in these two areas is assumed unless there is evidence to the contrary. I am glad that there is going to be an amendment to the amendment because I was quite concerned over the inclusion of the condition of insolvency and of a composition with any creditor for a public accountant to be struck off. Especially in current times, a public accountant having bought a home with a bank overdraft, and with the fall in the property market, may well find himself to be technically insolvent. But I think it is now water under the bridge as there is now a proposed amendment. So overall, yes, I find it is more stringent on the public accountants but it is a profession, the stature is respected and should be maintained. I am particularly glad with the amendment in section 48 which now allows non-accountants to practise as tax consultants. For some time now, I feel that it does not make sense that a person, who has passed all the vigorous examinations of the Institute of Taxation, and perhaps even with experience practising taxation, or perhaps has been in employment of the Inland Revenue Authority, cannot come out and practise as a tax consultant. I think now this addresses that issue. However, having opened it up, there is a need perhaps for regulation to control and maintain the standards of tax consultants in the interest of the public. It would be a sad day if the public is represented by someone holding himself up to be a tax consultant and who is not competent, and therefore results in huge losses. With the amendments to the Accountants Act, the public accountant is well regulated, and I am sure some will feel that we are being over-regulated. I am very sure over the next few months, some public accountants will be arguing and debating over the amendments. The question that remains is: who then regulates the accountants in commerce? After all, they cause financial statements to be prepared and often are the ones who prepare the financial statements themselves. I think there is a need also to control the conduct and the standard of accountants in commercial practice. If the work of both the commercial and public accountants is of a high standard, they become complementary. But, as it stands now, in some cases where the standards do differ, the respective positions of the commercial accountants and the public accountants can then be adversarial to the detriment of all parties. In conclusion, I do support the Bill, Sir.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to thank Dr Neo and Mr Ee for their comments and points raised and I will try to address their concerns. First, disciplinary proceedings. Dr Lily Neo has commented that section 21(1)(a)(viii) is too stringent and may deter entrepreneurship. She also feels that it will pose hardship, especially on small time accountants, since in most cases they do provide other non-accountancy related services. She is also concerned that section 19(1) may be too wide as the grounds for an Inquiry Committee to be set up have expanded beyond professional misconduct, and now include an "improper act or conduct" which brings disrepute to the profession or makes them unfit for practice. I will address these two concerns together, as they are related. First, in moving the amendment, I had earlier informed the House that every public accountant has to observe the Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics and has to conduct himself or herself in a manner consistent with the good reputation of the accountancy profession. The Code already imposes the requirement that public accountants should not be substantially engaged in any other business, other than that of a public accountant. This is to pre-empt situations where public accountants are put in a position where their independence is compromised, and there is a conflict of interest between his professional responsibilities and the pursuit of wider business interests. The amendment to section 21 merely picks up on these professional obligations which are, in fact, being observed already. Section 21 sets out the grounds for the PAB to suspend or cancel a public accountant's licence, following investigations by an Inquiry Committee. It thus establishes the legal recourse (of suspension or deregistration) for failure to act professionally and independently, resulting from a range of causes, including that of engaging in business at odds with the demands of the profession. I am therefore confident that the amendment should not in any way hinder entrepreneurship, as public accountants would remain quite free to carry on non-accountancy-related services, as long as there is no conflict of interest. The proposed amendments to section 19 are really consequential to the broadening of the causes for deregistration in section 21. The amendment will allow an Inquiry Committee to be set up when a public accountant brings disrepute to his profession, by behaviour in areas beyond his professional capacity. Some may say that this appears draconian, but let me assure Members that the provisions will not be triggered when a public accountant has committed an improper act per se. An inquiry can only proceed if the act has an adverse impact on the general standing of the profession, or shows that the public accountant is unfit for his profession. This is a fair application of the law, in order to safeguard and uphold the integrity of the accounting profession. The powers are crafted broadly in the statute in order to ensure that the PAB has a wide enough remit to achieve its objective. But I expect the PAB to be circumspect in its administration. Members may also be interested to know that largely similar provisions exist in the Legal Profession Act, where "misconduct unbefitting . an advocate or solicitor" is also grounds for discipline by the Courts. On the issue of renewal of certificate of registration, both Dr Neo and Mr Gerard Ee have asked for clarification on how the new provisions in section 15 on the renewal of certificates of registration will work in practice. As I said earlier, renewal of certificates will no longer be automatic, but conditional on satisfying "continuing professional education" (CPE) and "appraisal of the public accountant's professional conduct and practice". In response to Mr Ee's question, the annual CPE records of public accountants will be considered by the Public Accountants Board when the renewal of public accountants becomes due. But given the three-year compliance rule, consideration will be given to whether or not the public accountant has fulfilled the requirements for the preceding three-year period on a rolling basis. For practice reviews, the Board shall consider only the reports of accounting firms for which the review has been completed in that year. Only the public accountants of these particular firms will have the renewals of their licences to be subject to the practice review reports being satisfactory. However, over a three-year cycle, all public accountants will be covered as it is intended for all public accounting firms to be reviewed. The practice review of accounting firms with public listed companies as clients will be more regular. For both CPE and practice review requirements, if a public accountant does not satisfy either requirement for the first time, he will be issued with a warning letter. Only if he persists in failing to meet the requirement will the licence not be renewed. The PAB's Rules will be suitably amended to incorporate the new provisions in due course. As for Dr Neo's concern that section 15(5)(c) is overly wide, I would like to assure her that the Board will continue to confine itself only to technical and professional issues. There is no intention to deliberately make it more difficult for public accountants to renew their licences. On the issue of composition fines, Dr Neo has commented that the new section 56A, which allows PAB to compound offences of up to $1,000, is inconsistent with provisions in the Accountants Act on other offences, some of which can result in fines of up to $2,000. I think there should be a clear distinction between a compoundment of an offence and a statutory fine. A composition sum is that which the authority administering an Act allows an offender to pay, in lieu of prosecuting him in the court for the offence, whereas a statutory fine results from a conviction in court, and covers more serious offences. Thus, the penalty for compounded offence should necessarily be lower than that of a statutory fine, as the two are not equivalent. Compounding is really for more minor offences or offences where there are mitigating factors, such that a prosecution is not warranted. Without an option to compound fines for minor offences at a lower amount, the High Court may be clogged up with even the most minor offences. If the composition fine is raised, offenders may find it more attractive to fight it out in court in the hope of getting undeserved acquittals. This would defeat the whole purpose of the compoundment provision. On regulation of tax consultants, Mr Gerard Ee has asked who will regulate the tax professionals. As I have mentioned in my Second Reading speech, the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore would be examining ways of ensuring the continued high professional standard of tax agents, and this will be announced when ready. Under the Tax Acts, where there are errors (and omissions) in tax returns, IRAS can prosecute those who flout the law. If the error is due to negligence of the tax agent, he would be required to pay penalties. On regulation over non-practising accountants, Mr Gerard Ee also feels that there should be greater regulation and control over non-practising accountants who are the frontline people preparing or influencing the preparation of financial statements. I think this is a fair statement. But control already exists in the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Singapore (ICPAS) as it regulates non-practising accountants who are its members. For example, ICPAS has also made continuing professional education (CPE) hours mandatory for such members, who can also be deregistered from ICPAS for various offences. ICPAS, however, has no hold over non-practising accountants who are not its members, and it is unclear that such regulation should be mandated. This was debated at length by the PAB Working Committee to Review Accounting and Auditing Standards, whose rationale was as follows. As non-practising accountants generally work for companies, it is more of an employer-employee relationship. And since it is the responsibility of company directors to ensure that the proper records are kept and that accounts are properly drawn up, it is less imperative that such accounts preparers be directly regulated. On PAB resources, Dr Neo has commented on the amendment to section 5, which provides for PAB to prescribe the accounting standards and procedures to be followed by public accountants. She would like to know what kind of resources will be committed to this function. At present, the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Singapore prescribes auditing and accounting standards, and as earlier explained, the amendment will expressly empower the PAB to adopt such standards. Therefore, I do not expect this to result in a significant increase in resources required for the PAB. Nonetheless, I wish to point out that I have already introduced, by way of clause 4, a change to the self-funding status of the PAB. The Government is prepared to extend operating grants to PAB, and this co-sharing of regulatory costs signifies the Government's commitment towards strengthening the integrity of the financial system. I believe that this, and other proposed changes, will all contribute to a major enhancement of the regulatory framework for the accounting profession, and deserve the support of this House. On the issue of summary removal due to composition arrangement with creditors, I have already addressed this in my Second Reading speech, and I believe that Dr Neo and Mr Ee should be pleased with the outcome.

Question put, and agreed to. Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House. The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Dr Richard Hu Tsu Tau]. Bill considered in Committee.

Clauses 1 to 8 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 9 -

As the notice of amendment is out of time, I give my consent to the Minister to move the amendment. Has the Minister the general assent of Members to move the amendment? Hon. Members indicated assent.

Mr Speaker, I beg to move, In page 6, after line 10, to insert - "(c) by deleting the words "has been adjudicated bankrupt or" in sub-paragraph (v) of subsection (1)(a);". Members will recall that I had touched upon this in my speech earlier. The reason behind the amendment is that for cases where the public accountant has been adjudged a bankrupt, summary removal of his name from the Register of Public Accountants without the need for further inquiry is an appropriate course of action. Amendment agreed to. Clause 9, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

The consequential amendments will be made: In page 6, to re-letter paragraphs (c) and (d) as paragraphs (d) and (e), respectively. Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 11 -

As the notice of amendment is out of time, I give my consent for the amendment to be moved. Has the Minister the general assent of Members to move the amendments? Hon. Members indicated assent.

Mr Speaker, Sir, may I have your approval to move the two amendments together?

Yes.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, (1) In page 7, line 22, to leave out "become insolvent or who has". (2) In page 7, lines 23 and 24, to leave out "or who has entered into a composition with any creditor". Again, Members will recall that I had earlier explained that due to the current economic environment, business revenues may be severely affected leading to unavoidable credit problems. As such, insolvency when entering into composition with creditors should not constitute grounds for summary removal. These words should be omitted from the Bill. Instead it is proposed that such cases continue to be referred to the PAB Inquiry Committee, which is currently the practice and already provided under section 21 of the Act. Amendment agreed to. Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 12 to 15 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill. Bill reported with amendments, read a Third time and passed.

Order for Second Reading read.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." The Bill before the House principally focuses on the repeal of the provision in the Currency Act which currently imposes strict controls on the existence of full colour copying machines in Singapore. Apart from this major amendment, opportunity is also taken to incorporate 16 other amendments to improve and update practices and procedures of the Board of Commissioners of Currency of Singapore (BCCS). Clause 13: Lifting of Controls over Colour Copiers Clause 13 of the Bill seeks to repeal the existing provision on the controls of colour copiers governed by section 20A of the Currency Act and the Currency (Full Copying Machines) Regulations of 1996. These statutes require a permit for the use of colour copiers, as well as a counterfeit prevention system (CPS) to be fitted in every such machine licensed for use in Singapore. Controls on colour copiers had been put in place since 1979 to combat counterfeit activity. They were enhanced in 1995 when currency counterfeits made by even low-end colour copiers were found to be good enough to be passed off as real currency. However, with rapid advances in technology, a drastic reduction in the cost of producing colour copiers, and therefore the widespread availability of these colour copiers worldwide, the Government has acknowledged that our controls on colour copiers are becoming increasingly onerous and impractical, and cannot be expected to be water-tight. Therefore, instead of seeking to continue strong and direct controls which disadvantage Singaporeans and inhibit industry players, especially those based in Singapore, we have chosen instead to speed up the development of a new Portrait series of Singapore currency notes that are more resistant to counterfeiting via colour copiers. BCCS will be issuing the new Portrait Series incorporating the latest anti-colour copier and anti-scanner security features, including the Common Mark System (CMS) in 1999. The CMS is designed to distort the image of any attempted colour photocopies of these notes. It is timely for the existing controls of colour copiers to be lifted. The main beneficiaries would be Singaporeans, who will now have wider access to full colour copiers, and the business community, not only users but also manufacturers trying to create a mass market for low-cost colour copiers. The other proposed amendments to the Currency Act are to improve the practices and procedures of the BCCS. I will now bring the House through the main amendments. Clauses 4 and 5: Board Appointment Clause 4 seeks to amend section 6 of the Act to clarify that all members of the Board, including the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, shall be appointed for a specific period not exceeding three years and shall be eligible for re-appointment. The proposed amendment is made in view of the provision since 1991 that the post of Chairman, BCCS, is no longer held automatically by the Minister for Finance, hence the need to specify the duration of the Chairman's appointment. Clause 5 extends the general disqualification provision in section 8(1) of the Currency Act to apply to all members of the Board, including the Chairman. Clause 12: Provision on Currency Reproduction Clause 12 seeks to amend section 20(1) and (2) to clarify and extend the restriction on the use of photographs, drawings or designs of Singapore currency notes and coins. The clause also seeks to enable BCCS to impose conditions in granting permission on the use of these photographs, drawings or design of currency notes and coins. The effect would be that selected manufacturers and others who have been licensed to use Singapore currency note or coin design for souvenirs, merchandise, etc, could have their licences rescinded by BCCS should they fail to comply with the conditions specified in the licences.

5.40 pm Clauses 14 and 18: Currency Fund and Liquidity Requirements Clause 14 amends section 21(5) to remove the percentage of 30% of the Currency Fund which must be held in liquid portion. This specification is considered unnecessary as currently, the liquid portion can be varied with the unanimous approval of the Board. Clause 14 also seeks to delete section 21(6) which defines the list of assets previously deemed to be liquid, such as gold, silver, foreign exchange and Government guaranteed securities maturing in less than two years. The amendment brings the Act up to date with current developments in the financial landscape, in which liquidity is no longer static or quantifiable concept, given that the ease with which investments are liquidated would differ under varying circumstances. The proposed amendment will accord the Board greater flexibility in maintaining adequate liquidity in the Currency Fund to meet demand. Clause 15: External Assets Clause 15 seeks to amend section 22 to specify three other types of external assets in the Currency Fund, namely, equities, corporate bonds, and currency and financial futures. This amendment makes it clear in the legislation the inclusion of the three additional external assets which have already been approved by the President. The other amendments are of a drafting nature to rectify inconsistencies, and clarify provisions where there have been difficulties in interpretation. Sir, I beg to move. Question put, and agreed to. Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House. The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. - [Dr Richard Hu Tsu Tau]. Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed.

5.43 pm

The motion is subject to signification of support by at least one Member. Does the motion have the support of at least one hon. Member?

I support.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, That this House, recognizing that in a true democratic society, every citizen should have the basic right to comment on and criticise the conduct of public officials in the discharge of their public functions and duties, resolves that a Commission be appointed to examine and recommend what changes should be made to the law of defamation to give every citizen this basic right to exercise without fear. Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, this motion that I am tabling this evening is a logical follow-up to the last motion that I tabled and which was debated some four months ago on the removal of fear in Singapore. And I dare say that Members, feeling perhaps exhausted after a long day and not only just the long day but the week, will say to themselves, "Are we going to have another tedious hour from Mr Jeyaretnam?" It is probably for that reason that our faithful Singapore press did not report anything of what I said at the last motion. They find it tedious to bore their readers and that is probably why nothing was said about what I said in Parliament two days ago. But I am not going to bother about what the Singapore press has to say. This motion, Mr Deputy Speaker, moves the focus to this House. May I make that clear. The previous motion was examining the role of the people in our society, particularly their role in the participation in decision-making. But this motion now proposes to examine the role of Parliament in such a society. I will explain what I mean as I go on. As I have said once before, in 1947, when we, as a people, were deciding what sort of a government we desired, because the British had offered some self-autonomy, we sent an All-Party Commission to London to say that we wanted a parliamentary democracy based on the Westminster model. And it is not surprising, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, that we should have chosen that, that is, that we wanted a parliamentary democracy where the Government will be subject to Parliament, representing the will of the people. I said it is not surprising because that system of government was accepted by the people of the United States when they decided to break away from the United Kingdom and become a nation by themselves, only that they carried it to more rigid divisions of power and it was also accepted by countries which were once under British rule and then broke away from British rule. And Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, and who was a great, passionate believer in parliamentary democracy, chose that as the model for India. May I say, it was not just Jawaharlal Nehru, even our present Senior Minister who was a member of the All-Party Commission to London, chose for Singapore, along with the others, this parliamentary system of government. It was not surprising that he should choose that, having come from Cambridge and studied DICEY and the rule of law. Under this system of government, it is Parliament that, as representatives of the people, should have control over the Government. It should act not only as offering advice on legislation, law and other matters, but first and foremost, as a check on executive power. That was the foremost intention of the people who evolved Parliament into what it is today in the United Kingdom and other countries. The question that I am posing today, and which I would ask the Members to answer honestly, is: is this Parliament, now 50 years down the road, after we accepted the parliamentary system of government, performing such a role, and if not, why not? I propose in the course of my speech to give the answers as to why this House is not performing the role that it should be performing in a parliamentary democratic form of government and suggest the remedy for that. It was envisaged by those who were setting out on the nationhood for Singapore that Parliament should, as I said, be the supreme body and that the Government be subject to it. Of course, I have to acknowledge that in the years before 1959, when the present Senior Minister was in the opposition, the Legislative Assembly, even though it had limited powers, was trying to do just that, to act as a check on the Government then. Those Members who have read the debates would have seen that Mr Lee wasted no time, although again his Opposition Members were not very large, in trying to bring the Government to check, probing and seeking answers to questions. He then showed himself as a firm believer in parliamentary democracy. But for Singapore, this fervour somewhat began to cool off after the PAP took power in 1959, though from the years 1963 to 1965, when we were part of Malaysia and Mr Lee was attending the Malaysian Parliament, there he again found his fervour and spoke at length, whenever it was possible, on the need for parliamentary democracy and the government being subject to parliamentary control. But after we came out of Malaysia and perhaps before that, Parliament began on the road of not being able to exercise its role which was intended for it. This became very marked when the Barisan Sosialis who were still in the Assembly after they had broken away from the People's Action Party and were sitting in the opposition benches, decided, for some reason or other, that they would take their battle to the streets, and would no longer attend the sittings of the Assembly. That, may I say, and I have said it, was a wrong move and it was a disservice to the people of Singapore when they left the Legislative Assembly. Then, when we came out of Malaysia, we found ourselves with a Parliament totally composed of One-Party Members, the ruling party Members, and that continued until 1981 when there was one other Member from another party in Parliament. But today, 50 years down the road, we still have not reached anywhere near the stage of performing the role that Parliament was intended.

Order. Mr Jeyaretnam, can I just hear from you whether you have any experiences to demonstrate that we need to change the law of defamation?

I am coming to it, but I must perhaps lay the background and show you the present role of Parliament and why it is such a damaging thing for our society. I will be coming to it.

We have heard your views on a number of times. Otherwise, I will not allow it because you are repeating your points over and over again over the years.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, this is important so that Members can understand why we need to change the defamation laws. They should understand the role of Parliament and ask the question where they are moving.

Do not go back to history because what you have said has already been mentioned over and over again in this House.

I am not repeating what I have said today.

All right. Proceed and go to the point.

You must bear with me. This is Parliament and Members should have the right to speak their minds on the present position.

Mr Jeyaretnam, there is a Standing Order to discourage repetition of points. So can you just stick to the point and do not go back to history all over again?

All right, Mr Deputy Speaker. But the point is that by a systematic and deliberate move, which I am going to spell out, the libel suits would be one of these measures. That is why I am going to ask for an amendment to the defamation laws. But I am saying, by a systematic and deliberate move, the Government has so far succeeded in preventing the election into Parliament of Opposition Members and that is what I am talking about this evening, and that is why I am asking for an amendment to the defamation laws in accordance with the spirit and Articles of the Constitution. Do I make myself clear, Mr Deputy Speaker?

Come to the point.

Yes, thank you. As I said, by a deliberate and systematic course of action, they kept Opposition Members out. At first, it was the use of ISA, and making life inconvenient for those who aspired to enter Parliament. But now, over the last few years, we see an increasing trend to keep Opposition Members out by the use of the libel law and which deters very effectively, may I say, persons who aspire to enter Parliament to serve their country, but think that their place should really be in the Opposition, and not in the Government party. But they are deterred by the defamation actions. I am going to ask whether these defamation actions accord with the spirit of the Articles in the Constitution and with the law as it is being developed in other countries. If you want me to move on, I will. But the quintessence of a parliamentary democracy, may I say, is the presence in Parliament of a sufficient body of members to perform the primary role of Parliament as a check on the Executive. So the point I am making is that if you really believe in a truly democratic society, then you should put no impediments, no blocks, on Parliament playing the role that it was intended to play. It can only play that role if you have a sufficient body of Opposition Members. They can only enter Parliament through elections and there is no substitute for allowing the electorate to elect the Opposition Members into Parliament. With respect to the Nominated Members, they are no substitute. Parliament should have the Opposition Members in Parliament elected by the electorate. For this, there is a basic right on the part of voters to receive information on issues in the elections and corresponding right on candidates to impart information. Therefore, free speech becomes the life blood in elections for voters to make their choice. All this is guaranteed by the Constitution. Article 14, Part IV of the Constitution, enshrines what are the essentials of a democratic society and which Singapore should have. Article 14(1) of the Constitution grants every citizen the freedom of expression and assembly. Article 14(2)(a), however, seeks to impose a restriction on this right where it is considered necessary. It says, "Parliament may by law impose . such restrictions as it considers necessary." Article 162 of the Constitution expressly mandates the courts, Parliament and all other law-making bodies to construe any existing law with modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions to bring them into conformity with the Constitution. So there is clear mandate in the Constitution that there should be no law which unnecessarily, and that is important, puts an impediment on the development of a truly democratic society. I will illustrate how the defamation laws have been applied by the courts, and I am not here to criticise the decisions of the courts, but I am here to ask whether we should now make an amendment to the defamation law to bring it into accord with the Constitution. I will illustrate this by three cases of libel suits that were brought, and they are of very recent origins, so I expect Members must be more than aware of these suits. The first was a suit brought in 1989 and it arose over questions asked about the death of a Minister. Members will, of course, recall that the former Minister for National Development of whom Mr Lee, when I was in this House, declared, "Where can I find another Mr Teh Cheang Wan." He was found dead in bed one morning and the cause of death was an overdose of amytal tablets. It was then revealed that he was under investigation for corruption. So that was immediately a matter of great public interest. There is no question that it was a matter of great public interest. Our party asked questions saying there should be a full investigation into this death and how he came by his death. We asked two questions because it was revealed that he had written to the then Prime Minister, the present Senior Minister, a letter the day before he died. It was not revealed whether there was any reply to that letter. So we asked whether there was any reply given to him. The second question was: how did he get these amytal tablets? Because amytal tablets, Mr Deputy Speaker, as you are probably aware, are on the Poisons List. Their stocks and distribution are controlled, and should be controlled very strictly, with proper records kept. When we asked for questions through the party, there was no answer. But when I asked the same questions in an election in 1988, I was served with a writ. I do want Members to understand this clearly that this arose over two questions asked, questions which were of great public interest. In any other country, the press and public would be in full cry wanting to know the answers to several questions. But I was taken to court as having libelled the then Prime Minister. Finally, in court, we got an answer from him that he did not reply to that letter. As someone observed to me, "Well, you had to pay $260,000 for an answer to a question. Was that not a bit expensive?" The question that we should ask is: should we permit actions like this, or should we not amend the law to prevent actions of this nature where the action arises over legitimate questions of public interest asked of Ministers and public officials? It is very important that we grasp this because if Ministers are going to serve a writ on any member of the public or any member aspiring to come into Parliament because he asks questions of public interest and then scare him into coming into Parliament, we are never going to get a Parliament to play its role. We are not going to get the Opposition Members coming into Parliament. So that was one case. Then, of course, the more recent cases brought after the last elections or just towards the tail end of the elections. I do not have to repeat or give a lot of information to Members about how these libel suits came about. But, of course, Members will recall that it was revealed publicly that a Cabinet decision had been taken to keep Mr Tang Liang Hong out of Parliament. That the Cabinet had decided that he should not be allowed into Parliament. Of course, that meant that the whole team could not come in. I could not come in either because he was part of the team. In pursuance of that, they decided, and this is all public, that they would expose him as a Chinese chauvinist and an anti-Christian. He had not said anything but they decided that they would expose him as a Chinese chauvinist and an anti-Christian so that he would not enter into Parliament, and along with him, me and the others who were standing in this constituency. And Mr Tang said he was not a Chinese chauvinist, he was not anti-Christian, because he could not keep silent when he was accused of these things, and so he spoke to the press, and he said, "I am not." He said, "They are telling lies." But he could have said they were not telling the truth. There is no truth in what they say. And for that, it was decided that libel suits should be issued against him. I hope Members can see how oppressively libel suits are being used in Singapore. Here is a man who is accused of being a Chinese chauvinist, being anti-Christian, because it is thought that he should not be in this House. And libel suits are issued against him when he denies it, says that they are not telling the truth when they accuse him of being a Chinese chauvinist and anti-Christian. Then there were other suits against him. One was that because he said in Kuala Lumpur when he was informed that the Prime Minister had said that he would not be arrested under the ISA, "Should I trust him?" or something. He was again slapped with a libel suit. Again, the question that Members should ask is: was a libel suit necessary in these circumstances? There was no statement, I repeat, made either by me in the 1988 statement in the elections or Mr Tang Liang Hong accusing anyone, any Minister, of corruption or of committing criminal offences. I was asking questions of public interest and Mr Tang Liang Hong was seeking to deny allegations made against him. Is it justifiable that he should then be the subject, as I was the subject, of libel suits, simply to frighten - I am saying in this House - others who may aspire to come into Parliament? Then following that was the Prime Minister's suit against me. And, again, I do not have to remind Members - I am sure it must be fresh in their memories - that the words over which I was sued for libel were to give a statement of fact that Mr Tang Liang Hong had made reports to the Police, as he had said he would. And his report to the Police, if you care to look it up, was simply denying the allegations, and to ask for Police protection. And I was slapped with suits. Just as he, there were about eight or nine suits against him (I think it is probably more), but I had eight suits against me. Is this how we are going to keep Opposition Members out of Parliament? The question we have to ask, and I keep repeating this: should we allow in this country these libel actions to continue? Or should we say enough is enough now, we want a society that is progressive, and we can only become progressive if Parliament is allowed to play its role as a check on the Government. And if that will not be possible, we will never become a progressive society, we will never become an open society, so long as these impediments are in place, preventing candidates from speaking their mind openly and freely at the elections. I am not advocating - let me make it very clear - a licence for candidates to defame Ministers or others in public life, to accuse them falsely of anything. But as I have tried to show in these three actions, there was nothing of that sort. And yet the actions were brought. The Courts have held that the meanings were that we were defaming them. But, as I said, I am not here to criticise the decision of the Courts. But if that is how it is going to be interpreted, then it is time we looked at the law of defamation to see whether actions like these should be allowed to be brought in the Courts in Singapore, but that candidates should have, as was intended by the framers of the Constitution, the uninhibited basic right to give information to the voters and to ask questions that are necessary and that will help to guide the voters in the choice of who they should send into Parliament. Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, perhaps I will deal at length with the laws in the other countries in my reply, but I wish to say this now, so that whoever is replying can consider this. Article 14(2)(a) allows Parliament to make such laws as Parliament considers it necessary to impose restrictions on the right of freedom granted under Article 14(1). The question is, would these laws be necessary? There is also the question of which is the greater public interest - the asking of questions, the attempt to deny allegations made against you or is it the supposed protection of the reputation of public officials? Which is of greater public interest? And I am sure, if you ask any Parliamentarian, he would say the greater public interest is that questions should be asked and information given honestly to voters. The first decision which made an inroad to cut on this attempt to shut members of the public from questioning or criticising the conduct of public officials was way back in the 1940s when the US Supreme Court decided in the case of Sullivan and the New York Times that public officials cannot maintain an action against any criticism of them even if the facts were wrongly stated, unless the public officials were able to show that whoever made that criticism had actual knowledge that the facts were false and so were acting maliciously. Knowing something to be false and stating it. That was a revolutionary change in the law. It stopped public officials from bringing actions because of criticism of the officials concerned. But even at the beginning of this century, a minority view in a Supreme Court (I think it goes back to 1908), it was a State Supreme Court, held that the greater right was the right to ask questions and that libel actions should not be entertained where a citizen seeks to criticise, even wrongly on wrong facts, the conduct of public officials. Sullivan's case was followed by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of a journalist who wrote an article criticising the Austrian Chancellor, accusing him of very grave offences, of harbouring and protecting Nazis during the Nazi regime. And he was convicted in an action brought for criminal defamation. He took up his case to the European Court of Human Rights. Fortunately, Europe has thought fit to have a court of human rights which would entertain petitions of this nature. I shall read the provision in the European Charter, which I say corresponds almost identically with our Article 14. The Court held that the conviction was an unnecessary interference with the liberty of this journalist to write on a matter of public interest and they set aside the conviction and ordered compensation to be paid to the journalist for all the suffering he had suffered. They had no doubt of what was the greater right in a truly democratic society. Then there was a case in England brought by a County Council against a newspaper which had criticised, not public officials, I must point out the difference, but the Council itself, and I shall read some of the passages in the judgement in my reply but time does not permit me to read them now. It was held that in a truly democratic society, this freedom is important, the freedom to criticise and comment on public officials, and the action by the County Council was thrown out. It went up to the House of Lords. The County Council took it up to the House of Lords who dismissed the appeal, again, declaring what had already been said about the vital importance and role in a truly democratic society for citizens to comment on and criticise the conduct of public officials and to ask questions. So we have these developments in the law in other countries. This development of the law is also taking place in Australia where the High Court of Australia has ruled that it is of the utmost importance that the right of citizens to criticise and comment on the conduct of public officials should not be curbed in any way unless it is absolutely necessary. These three cases that I have illustrated, I hope, will demonstrate that the actions were totally unnecessary because there was no question of the Ministers being accused of crimes or misconduct in their lives. These actions arose over the exercise of our rights as citizens to ask questions and, in the case of Mr Tang Liang Hong, to deny accusations which were made against him. Here is a man who was seeking elections to Parliament along with me. If he did not deny it, and if he did not say it was not the truth, what would the electorate say? Those who had to make up their minds would say, "I see. He admits that he is a Chinese chauvinist. He admits he is an anti-Christian. So we better not vote him in." So does he not have a right to deny that he is a Chinese chauvinist and an anti-Christian? I do not believe that he is a Chinese chauvinist, and I said that several times during the elections, neither is he an anti-Christian. His daughter is a Christian. And as we said, it is quite inexplicable that if he is an anti-Christian, he should decide to team up with me who is a Christian, and he knew that. And it is not only him who suffered, it was his wife of whom we have seen some publicity the week before. Her passport was impounded illegally. She was prevented from leaving Singapore. I could go on but probably I am nearing the time I am allowed to speak. But what we have to ask is, as Mr Lee was asking when he was in the Opposition, do we believe in democracy or do we not? He was asking that question. He said that it was simple. "You answer that", he said. Do we believe in democracy or do we not? If we do believe in democracy, then there is no answer except to say that we should allow the practice of democracy in this country which means the right in every citizen to ask honestly, without any malice, any questions of public officials in their conduct and discharge of public functions. If, however, we do not believe in democracy and we do not want a democratic society in Singapore, we do not want a Parliamentary system of government which can only function with an adequate number of Opposition Members in Parliament, not Nominated Members, but Opposition Members in Parliament, then let us tell the world we do not want democracy in this country. We do not want Parliamentary democracy. We are quite happy with our own autocracy. So then we will be honest with ourselves. But, on the contrary, we hear protestations from Ministers that we are a democratic country, that we are an open society. The questions I asked in 1988, may I say, Mr Deputy Speaker, were in reply to Mr Lee's statement then that the Singapore Government was an open Government accountable to the people. And I posed several questions and these questions were among those questions: were you open and accountable to the people in those situations? It is for us who have the mandate under the Constitution to see that the spirit of the Constitution is preserved and enforced. We take the oath when we come into this House that we will defend, preserve and protect the Constitution. If we are to be true to that oath, then we have got to take steps to see that the Constitution is not in any way hindered or impeded by laws or administrative action, but that the full spirit of the Constitution be given effect. Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I am not suggesting what amendments should be made. A Nominated Member queried why we need a Commission. I thought it would be obvious. I am not suggesting what amendments should be made. I am suggesting that we appoint a Commission now to inquire into whether it is time for us, as a society, to look at the way the defamation law is applied and whether it should be continued to be applied as it is at the moment. It is of the utmost importance, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, that we should take steps now. We were debating the whole of this week on competitiveness and about going into the 21st century. If we are to go into the 21st century, we have got to go in as a progressive society.

Order. Your time is up.

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker.

Mr Deputy Speaker, in the earlier motion that Mr Jeyaretnam referred to, I was concerned about the rules of preventive detention. But I did not support that motion because I felt that there were smaller concerns that might limit free speech in our society. I turn then to this motion to think whether our defamation laws are one of those concerns. In speaking today, I must say that while some sectors of Singaporeans have sympathy for Mr J.B. Jeyaretnam for the various suits that he has fought and lost, I would wish to make my remarks less personal and avoid the cases he has referred to which have already been decided by the courts and which stand today as the law in Singapore as decided by our highest courts. Let me then turn to four questions. The first is the importance of free speech. The second is whether this important free speech needs to be balanced in some way. The third is what is that right balance. And the fourth is how do we change the law. Is a Commission, as proposed by the motion, the best way to go about it? On the first question, the importance of free speech. I have served this year, and I am still serving, as a member of the Singapore 21 Committee. In this context, I co-chair a committee concerning the search for consensus and consultation on one hand against decisiveness and quick action on the other. In our meetings with many people, we have emphasised that, for consultation to happen in Singapore, there must be free speech, there must also be a sense of participation and there must be a recognition of our national interests and the harmony that underpins our society. Only when we accept on one hand the right to speak and, on the other, recognise the due limitations to those who speak. This helps make consultation work, and Singapore is a better place rather than a more fragile place. In this context, the law of defamation concerns me because it is not about all forms of speech. Defamation, as any law student will tell you, is about false statements. If you are saying the truth, you cannot be found guilty of defamation. You must first be saying something that is false. There are other elements such as, secondly, that false statement then injures the reputation of the person you refer to. That is the first distinction I want to make about the broader question of free speech and the narrower question on defamation. While we value free speech, should we value it so much that we want to protect false statements that harm reputation? This question is an important one because it leads me to my second, the question of balance. Having said that free speech has a value and is recognised in the Constitution under Article 14, we have to recognise that there are concerns that the politicians, or those who would be politicians, would have their reputations injured falsely, or ordinary citizens would. This might lead to the lack of good people to volunteer themselves for public office and to have their reputation scrutinised and publicly criticised. This exception of question of defamation is also in the Constitution. So, if on one hand, the freedom of speech is in the Constitution, so is the exception of defamation, and we have to recognise that that is the substance of our Constitution. We cannot on one hand inflate the value of free speech, and pretend the exception does not exist in our Constitution. But I still think that there is room to recognise that the law of defamation, as it exists today, can have unintended consequences that it can chill free speech. It can prevent some good and honest citizens from speaking up in case they make a false slip. And I want to emphasise "in case" because we recognise that Singaporeans, as a generic quality, are somewhat "kiasu", too careful. We would also have to think about the law of defamation that exists and the unintended consequences because of two things. The first is the privilege that all of us in this House enjoy as Members. In this House, we are free from civil suits, including suits for defamation. Why do we enjoy this freedom? It is because this House should have the freest debate possible. We may be brought up for parliamentary processes, but we are free from civil action while we speak in this House. The second reason I can think of to re-look at defamation law at this point in time is the example set by our own Prime Minister, Mr Goh Chok Tong. In the recent suit with the NCMP, Mr Jeyaretnam, I, and I think, many Singaporeans, were heartened by PM Goh's offer to forgo a certain amount of damages if Mr Jeyaretnam was to publicly accept the judgment of the Court of Appeal and to apologise in certain terms set by the Prime Minister's lawyers. This offer did not come to pass but the Prime Minister's offer itself makes it clear that he is cognizant of an unintended consequence that might otherwise have come to pass. That, in the legitimate interest of protecting his reputation, he might unintentionally knock out a Member of Parliament, an NCMP, which he said was not his intention. Let me turn then to the next question. Having said that there is a reason for balance, what is the right balance? I do not want to guess what Mr Jeyaretnam will bring up as examples. Let me just quickly sketch two extreme positions and some places in between. The two extreme positions, as I see them, is first the USA, and second, ours. I mean there are positions beyond ours, but for the spectrum I wish to sketch, I will take these two ends. In America, as regards politicians, you cannot defame them, even if you are completely and utterly false without basis, only if you can prove actual malice, that is, out of a vendetta, a hate, a personal vindictiveness, you have said what you know to be false, and obviously, this is very hard to prove. So, the American political figures live with all sorts of slander. In Singapore, at this end of the spectrum, there is no difference between politicians and private individuals. Whether you are running for office or whether you choose to lead a quiet, private life, the rule is the same for you. It is important to see therefore when we think about law reform, that there can be places in between these two positions. But even if we choose to reform, we need not open up the box to be exactly like America. That may be fine for Americans but it may not suit our temper and tenor of our society. This position in between can try to make a distinction where a false statement is made recklessly, or a false statement is made negligently, or a false statement is made out of some sincere belief or honest mistake. Let me quickly sketch the differences between these three intermediate positions. "Recklessly" might mean I heard some rumour about Mr X and I just simply blurt it out publicly. I make no attempt to find out whether it is true. Second, negligently, I heard the same rumour. Perhaps I am a more careful man, I call up the newspaper or somebody who is supposed to be the authority, his boss, his subordinate, and I check. But somehow, that same mistake is duplicated. It is not cured. I make my statement and fail to check properly; I make some checks, but I do not check properly, and I am negligent. The third: sincere belief or honest mistake is when I have been thorough in my checking, I have already tried exhaustively to check out whether what I am saying is true or not true, and yet it is still possible to make a mistake. As I said, we are talking here about false statements in defamation that lower someone's reputation in the public eye. I myself will stand for the idea that if there is malice, or if it is reckless or negligent, the value of free speech should not cover such sins. We should not excuse such forms of defamation. That leaves me only with the concern about honest mistakes and sincerely held beliefs. The law of defamation, as it stands in Singapore, recognises various defences, one of which is the defence of fair comment. This has to be a question of opinion, of course, rather than a statement of fact. It is of course possible to add other defences, such as honest mistake and it is possible to twin this with other questions and limits, such as to limit this extent of greater freedom to times of political competition in elections, or to limit to politicians or those who run for public office because they put themselves up for public choice and the public should have a right to know. We could also cap damages to a sizeable amount, an amount that has bite, but one that will not necessarily ruin a person for a single mistake. We could institute a formal role to the question of apology. Many of you know that when an apology is given honestly and sincerely and accepted, this defamatory mistake can be forgiven. However, as it stands, this is a matter of negotiation between the wronged party and the person who has wronged them. It is possible to make this matter of public process in the courts. There are many possibilities of which I have quickly sketched my own inclinations. But the motion today is not about any particular choice and I do not want to over-argue this point. I just want to demonstrate that if a Commission is called for, there is room to work on the law, to refine the law, finding a new balance without abandoning certain cornerstones of our belief, such as democracy, and on the other hand, the need to defend reputations which are falsely accused. My fourth point then is the question of institutions. Courts themselves have regulated defamation. There is a Defamation Act of course passed by this Parliament or its predecessors, but that Act does not really provide the body of defamation law. It provides rather some narrow exceptions to it. The body of defamation law is carried over by Singapore from other precedents in England particularly, and more recently, our own precedent, as one case builds on another. The courts themselves, I believe, are always the first person to turn to, to change their own mistakes. In this House, I have previously spoken and cautioned against over-anxiety of legislation to cure one or two judgments, and I have not shifted my position. That is still my view that the courts themselves should be the primary focus when we think about an evolutionary change in law. How else can the law be changed? Normally, when there is a call for reform, the Government will take it up and the Attorney-General's Chambers will do the work, call in together the various ministries and other agencies that are concerned or involved. The motion standing in the NCMP's name is different from this. It calls for a Commission of Inquiry. I am not sure this is at all the right institution. It is certainly different from what has been done before and I think it is quite different from the nature of most Commissions of Inquiry to investigate a certain, fixed and quite narrow question. But when I think through the motion and whether I should support it, I am reminded that in one of the sittings in this House that I attended, the NCMP said in a rather sarcastic tone that he was not at all surprised that one of the NMPs supported the Government. I then shared my view of the function of NMPs with him and the House. NMPs, to my mind, are neither for the Government nor against it, neither are we for the opposition nor against them. I try to look at the law and policies in a non-partisan light to give what inputs we can, and I have tried to do this today. Despite Mr Jeyaretnam's personal remarks and the cases that he has brought up concerning himself or his fellow opposition candidates, I do believe, for the reasons I have given, the law could stand the question of reform. When we look at this question of reform, we may not in the end decide we do need a reform. If we do decide on a reform, we do not need to decide that it is American or some other western form. We can find our own way. With this hope and with this reservation also about the institution, about some of the arguments that the NCMP has made for the law and for the value of freedom of speech, I support the motion. 7.00 pm

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I would personally agree with the call to review the Defamation Act but certainly not the formation of a commission. I do not wish to comment on the personal experiences of Mr J. B. Jeyaretnam except to say that the law must apply if defamation is proven. But it is another completely different matter and outside the present law if the Prime Minister offers him avenues to help lessen the burden and consequences brought about by the decision of the court. Personally, I am encouraged by PM's gesture of tolerance and forgiveness. But I would like to ask the Minister to consider the wider implication of the Defamation Act. Article 14 of the Constitution clearly guarantees every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression. But this certainly does not mean the right to defame. We can speak freely, but certainly no one can defame freely. The other thing that I would like to highlight is that the Defamation Act is not necessarily for politicians only or political parties. It is available for any citizen, corporation or organisation. The law of defamation essentially attempts to strike a balance between the public's freedom of speech and the individual's right to the protection of his good name, and that certainly must be a very sensitive and important matter of somebody who holds a high public position like the Prime Minister. Unfortunately, in Singapore, people tend to associate defamation laws with political figures and politics, because of the series of legal suits involving politicians and the high profile publicity given to such suits. My concern is that it has brought about, like what my colleague, Mr Simon Tay has mentioned, the unintended consequences and some negative implications on civil society. Because of that, some people are reluctant to speak up and comment on controversial public policies or on public office holders because of the fear that they may be subjected to legal suits. Generally, most people have no problem giving their views to local newspapers because they feel that the local press will exercise care and caution not to defame public officials. But this is not in the case of foreign publications or journalists because of their past experience of being involved in defamation suits themselves. Quite frequently, foreign journalists have problems getting enough people in Singapore willing to express their views. "No comment" or "Don't quote me" are common responses. As such, we may unnecessarily be sending a wrong signal to Singaporeans who are afraid to speak up. But to be fair, Sir, a lot depends on the person himself to exercise caution when commenting on personalities and public policies. While it is quite easy to determine whether a person making defamatory statements has been malicious or reckless by exposing the person to hatred, contempt or ridicule which, in my view, is what the Act is intended for, it is quite difficult to determine intent and impact of other less damaging statements which may arise out of mistakes or negligence or, at the spur of the moment, reliance on wrong source of information. I do not necessarily condone this. But perhaps in view of that, it may be useful to consider amending the present legislation to give more weightage to apology in mitigation factors or in assessing damages. Perhaps one suggestion is to consider limiting or specifying the quantum awarded in a different type of defamation cases, especially parties who have relied on the process of mediation or in settlement are prepared to make public apologies. Sir, in the past, political leaders who have been defamed, quite rightly have taken strong actions to protect their reputation. Although monetary compensations were given, as in most cases quite large sums, these do not seem to be the objective of those seeking remedies, as charities have been the main beneficiaries of such monetary awards. Again, the intention here is not to bankrupt anybody but to redeem one's reputation. However, the consequence is that, as it stands today, because of the monetary compensation given, some people stay away from political controversies of criticising on public policies or politicians because of the fear that it may lead to financial ruin. What in fact happens is those who have been found guility, and I said guilty, are certainly liable for defamation. In this case, they may find themselves paying a heavy price or penalty for it. I now move on to elections where some of these issues have cropped up, especially during elections, and it can be expected that during the heat of elections, statements that can be made may be construed as defamatory, not in its intent, but in its environment and the situation that is found. Based on past cases, one has to be extremely careful and one should in making speeches during election rallies. While care must always be exercised, the law should not cause unnecessary restrictions, especially during elections. One suggestion is perhaps to exercise more tolerance before resorting to legal suits. Of course, this works both ways for all parties taking part in election rallies. Another, Sir, is to provide for limited privileges during elections, especially to cover cases of unintentional defamation. Of course, one can argue that this suggestion may mean giving political parties or individuals a leeway to criticise and defame others and later get away by merely apologising. But I would say today, Sir, that it would be foolish for any politician seeking office to think that he can get elected if he has the habit of frequently having to apologise to his political opponents. At the end of the day, Sir, defamation, especially the one Mr Jeyaretnam mentioned, is a very personal matter. I think the Prime Minister has demonstrated that avenues have been made available, which is relevant to this case. At the end of the day, the two parties must explore those personal avenues available to settle what is essentially a personal matter. But I hope the Minister would consider the suggestions that I have referred to in the wider context.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, Mr Jeyaretnam's motion to call on the Government to appoint a commission to examine and recommend what changes should be made to the law of defamation is misconceived and should not be supported by this House. Sir, for the benefit of Members of this House who may not be familiar with the subject, the general starting point of a defamation law begins with a published defamatory statement which refers to the person concerned. I underline the words "persons concerned" because this will be relevant subsequently when I respond to Mr Simon Tay's point. A defamatory statement is one which is calculated to injure a person's reputation and to diminish the willingness of the others to associate with him. Where it is alleged that a defamatory remark has been made against a person, the person who is alleged to have made the defamatory remarks would not be liable for those defamatory remarks if he is able to establish certain defences such as justification, absolute privilege, qualified privilege or fair comment. For instance, if I called somebody a cheat and a liar, I would, on the face of the statement, be liable for defamation. However, if I am able to, among other things, show that the person whom I had called such was indeed a cheat and a liar, then I would not be liable as I had spoken the truth. Alternatively, if it was found as a fact that a particular person indeed told a lie, it would not be defamatory for one to pass an opinion that it was wrong to lie, since this comment was based on a proven fact. Sir, I had broadly stated the underlying principles of defamation only to show that contrary to what Mr Jeyaretnam seems to suggest, there is generally a right to proffer what is on the surface, defamatory comments on the conduct of public officials or anybody whatsoever, provided that the author of the statements is able to raise the defences which I mentioned earlier. If I may add, defamatory statements are not just statements alone but also include innuendoes or suggestions indicating the conduct or otherwise of the person concerned. Mr Jeyaretnam had numerous encounters with defamation laws. Unfortunately, not all of his encounters have met with successes in his favour. Perhaps that is the reason, and we have heard this to be so, why he is asking this House to appoint a Commission to reform the laws of defamation. We must recognise that in every democratic society, there must be a constitutional right of free speech. We are no exception. Our Constitution provides the assurance that all Singaporeans have that right. However, we must also recognise that there is equally the right of individuals to protect his honour, reputation and dignity. The right of free speech must be subject to some form of legal control. An English jurist put it well when he said: "Firstly, any person is entitled prima facie to his good name, and imputations are not to be made without justification which are detrimental to his reputation. Secondly, any person should be entitled in a free democratic community to publish fearlessly statements of fact and expressions of opinions however forthright or unpopular and even though they may reflect on or displease particular individuals or groups." Sir, the freedom of expression without fear or favour serves as an important underpinning in our democracy. Without the freedom to speak up, our people will not have the ability to determine their own future in this country. To be able to criticise and comment is the spur by which our Government is kept perpetually on its toes. In any democracy, if the people do not have the right to speak nor the courage to get themselves involved or heard, there will not be any check on the Government. In the end, they only have themselves to blame if the Government abuses its powers at the expense of the people. However, while we recognise the constitutional right of free speech, it is another thing altogether to give people the carte blanche licence to go into scurrilous attacks on the integrity and reputation of any individual member of society. The cases which Mr Jeyaretnam referred to in his earlier speech did not provide the complete picture because while he tried to paint the picture that he merely made those remarks innocently, as a lawyer, he should know that taken in toto, those remarks represent certain innuendoes which, if not pursued in a court of law, will result in the undermining of the character of the person concerned. Certainly, an innocent remark which he presented earlier, as asking questions about the conduct of a particular Minister, can be seen as disparaging the good name of the Prime Minister, as it was indeed so, as found by the court in the decision which he referred to; and that is the Teh Cheang Wan's case. What Mr Jeyaretnam is asking for is not freedom of speech. That is an inalienable constitution right of Singaporeans. What Mr Jeyaretnam wants, although he has said that this is not the case that he wanted, is a licence to defame people without being called to account for the basis of his allegations. Mr Jeyaretnam knows that it is no defamation for anyone to comment and even to criticise stridently, any policy of the Government. Outside this House, people are free to criticise Government policies and Acts. At the last general elections, many of the Opposition Members had been volubly vocal about many of our Government policies. Are these criticisms made out of fear? Sir, what we must realise is that at the end of the day a distinction must be made between the criticism of a particular policy for which the fight for the vote of the people must stand on as opposed to an attack on the integrity and the good name of the person concerned. Sir, what we must realise is that in a country as important as ours, human resource is our only asset. Making it more difficult for public officials to sue in defamation may well discourage many from joining the public sector. The Government would end up being poorer for it. It may not be the case for some, but for many, honour, reputation and integrity are qualities that many work hard at building and preserving. The case which Mr Jeyaretnam cited, and that is the New York Times' case, has been considered in a Canadian court, Court of Appeal which decided not to endorse it. In Derickson v Tomat [1992] 88 DLR 401, the British Columbian Court of Appeal in that case took the opportunity to consider whether or not the New York Times' case ought to be adopted in Canada. The judge said that this particular decision has no application in Canada, and I will read the dicta from the decision. "The rule that the New York Times case leaves vulnerable the reputation of all who are, or would be, in public life by depriving such people of any legal recourse from defamatory falsehoods directed against them, except in those rare cases where actual malice can be established. Such a rule would likely discourage honest and decent people from standing for public office." Thus, the rule destroys rather than preserves the delicate balance between freedom of expression and protection of reputation which, as I already noted, is vital to the survival of a democratic process of government. For that reason, I would oppose introducing such a rule in this country. So there you are, Mr Jeyaretnam, it is not by uniform consensus that the rule in the New York Times case is universally applicable even by western standards. For many of our public servants, they are not likely to allow anyone to fritter away their good name through spurious allegations which cannot be substantiated. If we allow that, there will be many, I am sure, who will have second thoughts about being a part of the public service. And I am sure you agree that this is not in our interest. Of course, if the pubic servant concerned was engaged in some illegal or improper acts, Mr Jeyaretnam is at liberty to report the matter to the proper authorities. Let them deal with it. Indeed, it if were true, there is nothing to stop Mr Jeyaretnam from stating the substance of his concern publicly. If an officer, for example, were engaged in an act of corruption by accepting some form of gratification, it would be a defence to a claim in defamation if one can justify the statement. What the law cannot accept, however, is the allegation of improper acts through indefensible statements or innuendoes which diminish the standing of the person in the eyes of his peers. This is the real intention of Mr Jeyaretnam's call for the reformation of defamation laws in this country. Mr Jeyaretnam is aware that our laws apply equally to all. If I choose to defame Mr Jeyaretnam publicly outside this House, he can sue me in a court of law. Whether or not he chooses to sue me is a separate matter. That is the essence of our democracy. The rule of law applies to all. It does not matter if Mr Jeyaretnam was making the defamatory remarks against me, or if I was making a defamatory remark against him. The law is respecter of no class or rank. Sir, we recognise that with widespread literacy and universal suffrage, Singaporeans have the opportunity to participate in the political and community affairs of our country. With better education, Singaporeans are better able to articulate their views more effectively. We have seen that over the years, Singaporeans are more actively involved in the political processes than before. They would want more information rather than less of it. We recognise this and we encourage the flow of free and frank discussions. This is necessary for the maintenance of democracy in this country. However, and I say it again, it is another thing altogether to say that that right extends to defaming the character of another fellow human being and to destroy his or her reputation. Mr Jeyaretnam's motion in part relates to some recent matters which involved several international NGOs. I am referring in particular to defamation suits against Mr Jeyaretnam which attracted much media and international attention. Sir, at this moment, I would like to touch on the comments of several parties who have spoken publicly on this matter. Against the issue of reformation of defamation laws is the question, as alleged by some critics, of whether we use defamation laws here to stifle and oppress opposition voices. Both the ICJ and the Amnesty International observed the defamation trials involving Mr Jeyaretnam. Amnesty International in their report expressed the concern that the decision to launch defamation was unnecessary and unreasonable. They feel that the combined action of the leadership and the decision of the court placed restrictions on freedom of expression that cannot be justified by international standards. Amnesty International went on to pontificate that civil defamation has been misused by the Executive to intimidate and deter those with dissenting views. The suits have a chilling effect on the political life and place unreasonable and unacceptable restrictions on the right of Singaporeans to freely hold and express their views. The International Commission of Jurists, on the other hand, through their self righteous representative Stuart Littlemore, blatantly stated that the courts have assisted the plaintiffs in this case. Sir, I have two comments to make on these. First, we must recognise that as a matter of first principle, every country with its duly elected government has the sovereign right to determine its own destiny. I have stated, at the onset, that the freedom of expression and speech must be balanced in every democracy against the right of any individual to protect his reputation and standing in the eyes of the community. Where that balance lies is to be decided by the people of the country concerned. It is not for any one, Stuart Littlemore included, who has no stake in his country, and who had himself sued others for defamation, to pass judgment and to say where that balance should be. Here, in Singapore, we have leaders who have worked hard at transforming this country into an economic miracle. The success of this country rides not only on the back of the labour of our people but is also founded on the integrity and honesty of the leadership. Their integrity has helped to build up the trust that the people have in the leadership of this country. It is this inherent trust that our people have in our Government that has led to the quiet confidence that this Government will lead the country through its present difficult time. The leaders did not forge this trust overnight or through subterfuge. It is through years of hard work, and the success of our leaders at every general election is an affirmation of that trust. We are not going to allow anyone to fritter away the trust that our people have in the leadership by allowing anyone to cast aspersions on the character of our leaders which is indefensible in law; and certainly not allow anyone who, after they have lost their case in a court of law, should now come to this House to ask for the rules to be changed so that he has the licence to defame others. The principles of defamation may be similar in most common law countries, but the standards of defamation are and should be different. The Guardian, in its editorial, has called our leaders thin-skinned. If that is the allegation, so be it. We have seen the buffoonery of the English press in the handling of their own leaders under the guise of freedom of expression. If that is the standard they want us to go down to, Sir, we are not interested. Let us decide what those standards are and let us be our own judge. Secondly, the reports that have emerged suggest that we have no avenue for constructive criticism at all. Is this true? Are we deterred as a people from speaking up publicly? Mr Simon Tay said earlier, people are discouraged from speaking simply in case there is a chance that they may be sued for defamation. I did say earlier that a distinction must be made between defamation which goes towards the integrity and the good name of a person as opposed to a fair criticism and comment of the policies of a country. I think, in any election, there must be a contest of ideas. In the last elections, we have seen that the people have had no restraint in publicly criticising, rather stridently at times, some of our Government policies. But let there be no mistake about it, that here it is the good name and the reputation of the people concerned that we are trying to protect. And it is a matter of policy, we have decided, or at least I feel we have decided, that if we allow people to launch into scurrilous attacks against the good name of the people concerned, then the people may feel discouraged from participating in the political process. But then, of course, Mr Zulikifli has also said that people who are involved in elections should be prepared to have their feet muddied in the process. But then I ask Mr Zulkifli, the hon. NMP, why should politicians be any different? Are they not human? Are they not entitled to have the right to defend their good name in a court of law? At the end of the day, let us ask ourselves: Is there a forum for our people to express deep unhappiness over policies? Are there people in prison today because they spoke out their minds and spoke from conscience? No. The answer is a resounding no. Sir, over the years, we have put in place institutions that encourage people to participate in policy formulation and implementation. Mr Simon Tay, for example, is involved in a forum that looks at deciding policies that will carry Singapore to the next millennium. If it was our intention to gag opposing, or even remotely, dissenting voices, he would have no place in this Committee today. And that is why we have the Feedback Unit, the Forum page of the Straits Times, the Internet, and, as I said earlier, more recently the Singapore 21 Committee where the people involved have actually gone out of their way to solicit views as to the kind of society Singaporeans want in the next millennium. In all these discussions, one would say that there were no attempts to put any unreasonable restrictions other than those which go beyond the bounds of human decency, in matters which they have been allowed to raise. Did we go after them because of such adverse remarks? Was there ever any indication of oppression or fear which prevented them from speaking out? No. If there was any effort on the Government's part to gag these voices or to instil in them a fear to speak out against what is perceived as bad Government policies, we would not have seen or heard any of these strident criticisms that we see or hear of these days. We should realise that nowhere in the world would you find a Government that has taken the trouble of constitutional reform to ensure that there is adequate representation in Parliament for the minority voices. It is for this reason that we have in this House today Nominated MPs and the NCMP. These representatives have no obligation to anyone and are encouraged to speak without fear or favour. Mr Jeyaretnam, a loser in the last election, is here today by the grace of the same Government he now claims is suppressing this right of free and fair speech. Has the Government tried to stop him from speaking in Parliament? No. On the contrary, we have been patiently listening to him going on and on in this House almost ad nauseam on the same themes like an old record. If we had a strict democracy, where the right of admission into this august House is through the vote of the people, then these people, like Mr Jeyaretnam, will not be here today, and we all agree that Singapore will be poorer for it. So, Mr Jeyaretnam, how are we, with all that we have sought to do in these past years, any less democratic? How can we be said to be oppressive and stifling free expressions and discussions? Mr Jeyaretnam, unfortunately, has his pet peeve and would waste no time in bringing it into this House without considering whether it stands to reason. Today's motion is yet again another example. For the above reasons, I do not support the motion.

Sir, first, let me say, before going into the motion proper, but I would not take as long as Mr Jeyaretnam did, when he introduced this motion with a 20-minute speech which sounded like a history lecture, that this House is doing well. Mr Jeyaretnam asked whether this House is effective. He has criticised this House as not doing its job of checking the Executive. But, of course, from his standpoint, Mr Jeyaretnam would like a gridlock, as happened in some countries, where the Legislative arm and the Executive arm cannot see eye to eye, and government cannot function. But, Sir, in Singapore, we do things differently. Yes, Parliament has a role, and Parliament plays its role effectively. This, in fact, was a subject matter of a motion which Mr Jeyaretnam himself had moved in this House six months ago. So we have already dealt with that effectively. It is not only me who says this, because here again if you look at independent polls, I think it was 1996, the PERC polls talked about the state of the legislatures in the Asian region. The PERC polls put Singapore at a very high placing, saying that despite the absence of strong Opposition in the House, there was rigorous and vigorous debate. So there you have it. The other thing about Mr Jeyaretnam is that he keeps returning to old themes. He laments why there are so few Opposition Members in Parliament. He has given other reasons in the past. He has a new one this time. He says that Opposition politicians are defeated in the polls because of the law of defamation. Mr Jeyaretnam, what else will you come out with next? Sir, let me first say that the motion is misconceived. It must be rejected because its basic premises are false and untenable. These are, firstly, that the law of defamation denies every citizen the right to comment on and criticise the conduct of public officials and the discharge of public functions and duties. And secondly, without changes to the law of defamation, citizens cannot exercise their right without fear. Sir, Mr Sin has just said that this is far from the truth. Because, as Mr Sin has said, and indeed this is the case, Singaporeans are not afraid to criticise Government policies or indeed officials, if justified. I think in the last debate in this House, again on Mr Jeyaretnam's motion, Mr Zulkifli and Mr Simon Tay had alluded to this, that as a civil society, we are opening up and more people are speaking up. And for those who are not speaking up, it is not so much for fear of being put in prison or Government reprisal, but I think Mr Zulkifli also said it is partly due to a cultural basis. People may not want to speak up in public to avoid the embarrassment of being put down or having to rebut and to debate publicly. Sir, certainly, it is not the fear of defamation that puts people off from speaking up. In any case, even if there are some, like Mr Zulkifli has mentioned, who may have this fear, I hope that, after today's debate, knowing what the ambit of the law of defamation is and how Government leaders have in the past used it, the few instances when PAP leaders had used defamation in what context and what were the words in question, I think such fears can be put to rest. What is Mr Jeyaretnam's motivation for moving this debate? I think he shows it quite clearly. He has talked about cases he had been involved in, two of which he was involved in, and the other one involving Mr Tang Liang Hong, a Party member. Like Mr Sin has mentioned, and the other two Nominated MPs have also said, these are cases which have been dealt with fully by the courts, up to the Court of Appeal, which have examined them in the context of the law and in the context of accepted standards, tests and principles, whether the words in question were defamatory or not. Of course, Mr Jeyaretnam, in this House, tries to tell us that they were all innocent statements, they were innocent denials. Again, without going into the details, surely the courts examined these words very carefully, not only in the context of what was the natural and ordinary meaning, but also what was the innuendo meaning in the context in which the words were uttered, and after a full consideration in the cases that Mr Jeyaretnam had mentioned, the courts had held that indeed defamation was made out. Mr Jeyaretnam talks about democratic society and freedom of speech. He makes a big pitch about it. Let me first say that there is no democratic society in the world, let alone true democracy, words in the motion, whatever true democracy means, where the right to exercise free speech includes the right to defame individuals, including public officials, not here, not in the US, not anywhere. As Mr Tay has pointed out, every society has to strike a balance. What is this balance between the individual's right of free speech and the interest of society? Our defamation laws are well established. They have worked well and I would say that there is no need for a Commission of Inquiry to look into changes. Mr Jeyaretnam talks about democratic freedom. Sir, it is not a democratic freedom to defame and attack another person's reputation with falsehoods to impugn his integrity without basis. Our defamation laws give everyone, including politicians, and that is what it should be, the right to protect one's reputation and honour. It is one thing to engage in robust political debate and criticise the Government as leaders or policies in the process. In fact, Opposition leaders, Members like Mr Low Thia Khiang, Mr Chiam See Tong and others, have done for many years. They have not been sued for these criticisms. But it is another thing to defame. And indeed, everyone, including politicians, must take the legal consequences of their words. It is not only Government leaders who sue in defamation. I am sure Mr Chiam knows this very well. He has also invoked the law of defamation. When justified, he has sued. He has won cases, not just against other Opposition politicians but also against PAP leaders. Indeed, Mr Jeyaretnam himself has invoked the law of defamation when he sued the Prime Minister who was then DPM in 1989. That case went up to the Privy Council and was dismissed.

Why?

Whatever it is, the highest court at that time dismissed Mr Jeyaretnam's case. Mr Jeyaretnam also talks about our Constitution. In Singapore, yes, there is freedom of speech in Article 14 of the Constitution. Yet, at the same time, and Mr Tay has alluded to that, it must be balanced because the word "defamation" is also mentioned expressly in our Constitution. Therefore, the requirement of balance is in fact expressly set out in the Constitution. But Mr Tay supports Mr Jeyaretnam's call for a Commission of Inquiry. A Commission of Inquiry is normally set up to inquire into alleged wrongdoing. It is not the proper forum for the examination of an area of the law. Of course, with Mr Jeyaretnam back in the House, I think one other theme that is recurrent has been his constant calls for the formation of Commissions of Inquiry, committees and whatnots. Perhaps he sees himself playing a starring role in these committees. He wants a higher profile for himself in Parliament. Like I have said just now, the law is working well. Indeed, the law is evolving because our courts are still looking at how defamation laws can be applied in various contexts. So I would say, let the courts do the job. I think this is an approach Mr Tay himself has previously argued for. So our position is that unless there is a need for Parliamentary intervention, the courts should do their job. I should take this opportunity to explain why PAP leaders sue for defamation. We have explained this many times before, both here and outside. Defamation is taken very seriously in Singapore, not just by the Government, but indeed by all Singaporeans, more so when the integrity of its political leaders and key institutions is questioned. In a Singapore lacking in natural resources where the cutting edge that has made a difference is human resource, it is critical that at the apex where the national political leadership and key institutions sit, there is no doubt that there is absolute honesty and integrity. Wild allegations must be deterred and debunked in accordance with the law. Why? Otherwise the ability to govern will be undermined. This indeed is a democratic and conclusive way to settle disputes and thus maintain high standards of truth in politics. The other way, as is the case in some countries, is to exchange defamation for defamation in the media with the public never the wiser as to who is lying. Singapore leaders therefore sue in defamation to clear their names and protect these key institutions through due process of the law, not to stifle, intimidate, harass or bankrupt the Opposition. Therefore, these actions are not politically motivated. Ultimately, Singapore will benefit. The other point of course is that politicians who do not clear their name in court, when defamed, will lose the respect of the electorate. They will ask what is he fearful about. Why is he not suing? A key ingredient of good Government is that political leaders have the trust and respect of the electorate. PAP leaders working with important institutions, such as the civil service, have through many years of hard, honest work won this trust and respect. Public interest demands that such good repute be accorded the protection that it deserves, because we cannot risk what has happened in some countries where politicians are regarded very lowly. One must not forget that when anyone, more so a national leader, sues in defamation, he is putting his own reputation on the line. As such, PAP leaders sue in their personal capacity. I think all of us know a key defence to a defamation action is justification. In other words, it is open to the defendant to prove that what he says is true. A politician who sues thus opens himself and his actions to public scrutiny and rigorous cross-examination in court. Hence, with all these constraints, why then do politicians sue? The main point is to establish the truth. A politician knows that scurrilous accusations left unchallenged would poison the public's mind. For example, past allegations against PAP leaders which have prompted them to sue for defamation include imputations or implications of nepotism, corruption, lying, abuse of power, all of which are very serious allegations, and of course implication in the death of a Minister and other such implications. In a Singapore founded on good honest Government, we cannot allow such poison to fester and go unchallenged. Besides risking exposure, if the allegations are proven to be true, a losing plaintiff has also to pay costs. Therefore, the point is no PAP leader will sue for defamation unadvisedly and without just cause. Should there be a higher threshold when remarks are uttered in the heat of the hustings? This is Mr Zulkifli's point. Indeed, this is the situation on which the three cases are founded. But the question really is: why should it be so? Elections and electioneering should never be justification for defaming and maligning an opposing candidate whether with words which are plain and ordinary in the meaning or, more often than not, words with innuendo meaning. Why should the law give licence to politicians, whether Opposition or Government, to make defamatory statements? If any politician thinks it is in the public interest to expose any character flaw or wrongdoing of an opposing candidate, he can and indeed should do so. But, at the same time, he must be prepared to justify these allegations, and that is the way it should be. There are rules of conduct in election campaigning. Otherwise, we can imagine that the noble task of choosing political leaders who form the Government to lead the country will become an open season for mud-slinging and character assassination, an outcome we must avoid. In any case, another important point is that the defamation action is not a blunt instrument. And I am sure that Singaporeans, I think not many, who fear defamation action if they criticise the Government or public officials, if they know this, they will be assured. Because, besides the defence of justification, there are also other defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege. In addition, a person who innocently defames another may make amends in accordance with section 7 of the Defamation Act. Even if not made innocently, he can mitigate damages by making an unreserved apology. And indeed an early, sincere, unqualified apology may in fact avert a defamation suit. In many cases, the publication of an unqualified apology in the newspapers will result in a full settlement of any potential action for damages. Some may argue that freedom of speech should include freedom to err in speech. Our defamation laws allow for freedom to err in speech but not freedom to perpetuate defamatory statements to the detriment of the person defamed. Sir, I have made these points to show that the law of defamation is not a sledgehammer. Quite the contrary, the law is sensitive and nuanced enough to differentiate fair criticisms on the one hand, innocent, unintended or careless remarks on the other hand, and malicious falsehoods in the third category. The law also ensures that fair and justified comments, even if defamatory, will not necessarily get its maker into trouble. The next point is that Mr Jeyaretnam cites support from developments in overseas jurisdictions. He talks about Derbyshire. He talks about New York Times. He talks about the Theophanous and Stephen's cases in the Australian High Court which incidentally were only 4-3 majority decisions.

Lingers in the European Court of Human Rights.

The Austrian case, I know. My response is that as Singapore matures as a society, we must build up our own legal jurisprudence. This must be so. This is an inexorable process, applicable not only in the case of the law of defamation, where there are well over 100 local reported and unreported cases, including several important Court of Appeal decisions, but in many areas of the law, such as criminal law, family law, as well. But I would say that more so in the law of defamation, we cannot follow developments in Western democracies such as UK, US or Australia blindly. Why? Because defamation laws are society-oriented. The test of defamation involves how ordinary members of that society would view the plaintiff in the light of the alleged defamatory remarks. Hence, every society must, in the final analysis, evolve its own benchmark and yardstick. What amounts to defamation in one society may not be so in another, and this is shown very clearly in the US, for example, as Mr Tay has alluded. And indeed, even among the countries that Mr Jeyaretnam cites, whether it is US, UK, Australia, their laws of defamation also differ which proves my point. There is therefore no one right approach. Neither is there an international approach. Ridiculing and sullying the reputation of national political leaders may be acceptable, say, in the US. But why should it be so in Singapore, where the standing of politicians and the process are different? Hence in the US, because of this requirement for express malice, it has become well-nigh impossible to sue in defamation when a politician is defamed. Hence, we have the media coverage and stories being exchanged, defamation for defamation. Is the country better off for it? Surely not. So that cannot be the better approach. In the same vein, maybe not as dramatic, but different nonetheless, we are also evolving differently as a society from the British society, the Australian society. Or as Mr Simon Tay says, "Why not the middle ground? US in one spectrum, or at one end, and Singapore at the other end, but there may be other models in between." We have to find our own model, especially when we talk about political leaders having to protect their own reputation because the way political leaders are elected differ from country to country. The compact between the elected and the electorate differs from country to country. Therefore, we must evolve our own way. The next question is: should there therefore be a different yardstick for political and public figures? I think, Mr Zulkifli, and if I am not wrong, Mr Tay, also asked this. Should politicians be treated differently? Should they be more thick-skinned? Sir, the law of defamation protects everyone, both public officials and private citizens alike. It must be so. There is equality before the law. In fact, this point was brought up in one of the cases where section 12 was cited. Why should the reputation of public officials matter less? Indeed, it is already hard enough attracting able Singaporeans to give up the privacy of their lives to heed the higher calling of politics. A higher requirement of suing and succeeding in defamation, to clear one's reputation, when smeared, would be an unnecessary additional barrier. Hence, Singaporeans can criticise Government's policies, implementation of policies, conduct of public officials, but I would say, no defamation, please. These will be met with rebuttals, explanations and consultation, if need be. But, let us not open Pandora's box because when the horse bolts, we may not know how to rein it in. We have kept it in this manner which has worked all these years. Singapore has done well. It is the right approach. Let us keep to it. Otherwise, there will be a lot of energy spent by Government leaders, not governing but handling the media, countering these defamations in the media. Another important point which I have made is the occasions when PAP leaders have sued. I have made this point already. That is a point worth repeating. It is not because of criticisms but because of grave and serious allegations, personal ones, going to the heart of good governance. Therefore, the falsehood must be shown up and the best way to do it is decisively, independently, objectively, according to principles and standards which are all laid out in the case laws in our courts. This afternoon, the Minister for Law has, in a very convincing speech, highlighted the reputation of our Courts, not just in Singapore but worldwide. It is not just said by us, but by independent polls. So let the Courts do their job. Should there be a cap on the quantum of damages? Again, I would say that there is no need to do this because the cases differ on the facts. Unlike the UK where the jury decides on the damages and it has been said the damages can be inordinately large and somewhat inconsistent, in Singapore, where judges decide on the damages, they look at the framework of cases and they decide based on precedents. They would say, "In this case, because of these facts, so much will be given." I think we should not have a cap and limit the quantum. Sir, let me conclude. It is obvious that this motion cannot stand. Ever since Mr Jeyaretnam returned to this House, he has sought at every turn for a higher profile for himself in Parliament. I think this time round, as in other times, we must deny him that. Our approach has worked well. It has resulted in good government where honest and able men and women of integrity are prepared to step forward, sometimes as a sacrifice to themselves, to assume public office. What is happening in the region in the last 2-3 years where Singapore is standing up very well, shows that this approach is the way to go. Politicians who are subject to scurrilous attacks on their personal integrity and character must continue to receive the protection of the law. In this, they should not be singled out and additional fetters should not be placed in their path when they sue for defamation.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, may I say that, apart from the two Nominated MPs, what we have heard from the Government benches, Mr Sng in particular, and the junior Minister are all old hat. They say I keep repeating but theirs is old hat. We have heard this over and over again, perhaps not from them but from Ministers. Mr Goh Chok Tong, even from the witness stand, was saying what Mr Sng was repeating here.

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, for the record, it is Mr Sin, and not Mr Sng.

Mr Sin. Forgive me. It is nothing new to me. But, as I have said before, there is a total failure to come to grips with the question raised by this motion. There are even misconceptions completely of the terms of the motion and its purpose. Instead of that, both Mr Sin and the junior Minister questioned my motivation. It is not surprising to me that they should question that motivation. But that is something I am used to. We have heard this from Ministers over and over again but when we question their motives for bringing the action they take umbrage. As I said, it does not worry me if they should accuse me of motivation. But whatever the motivation, the question is, and which must be answered honestly, is: should we allow in Singapore actions for defamation on the facts that I have outlined in these three cases? I think both Members, particularly the Minister of State, suggest that I am perhaps seeking a high profile in this House. But again, it attacks my personal motive. May I ask is that the reason, because they think I am trying to achieve a high profile. Is that the reason why the media have been told to shut me out completely so that the public may not know anything about what I say in this House, even questions that I ask? Nothing is shown on TV or mentioned over the radio. The press, particularly the English press, have nothing to say. Is that the reason, may I ask, for this blocking out of whatever I say in this House because I am seeking a high profile and that should not be allowed? The question is: what do the public want to hear? What do the public feel about the role of opposition in Parliament? Not whether the Opposition Members are seeking a high profile or not. If they are talking nonsense, let it be reported so that the public can see it. On the misconceptions, both Members, I think perhaps even one of the NMPs, questioned whether a Commission was the right way. But if you read my motion, I am not asking for a Commission of Inquiry. A Commission of Inquiry is set up to inquire into some wrongdoing or some accident to find out the facts. But that is not what the motion is seeking to bring about. The motion is asking for a Commission. Have the Government Backbenchers and the Minister of State not heard of law reform commissions appointed to look into the law and to suggest ways of bringing the law up-to-date, if it were necessary? That is the sort of Commission I am asking, not for a Commission of Inquiry into why they brought these actions. But a Commission on whether the law of defamation in Singapore intrudes unnecessarily, may I repeat, intrudes unnecessarily, into the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. That is all. And no one is suggesting that we bring in carte blanche the American model or any other model. All that I am asking is that we should seriously examine this question. Are the defamation laws curtailing in any way this basic right of the individual? So that is the first misconception. The second misconception is that, somehow or other, I am asking that the law of defamation be amended to give persons the licence to defame everybody, including politicians in high places. I do not know whether it is because they did not hear me, or whether they thought they should just ignore what I said and continue to make the same allegation that I am asking for a licence. I made it clear that I was not seeking a licence for defamation, for the right to defame, whether at elections or at any other time. The US law does not give the citizens the right to defame. It only protects the right of citizens to question and participate in the affairs of the country. And it protects them if there are errors of which they were not aware at the time they made the statement. What is wrong with that? The US decision in the New York Times and Sullivan does not say that you can defame the President, you can defame all the other public officials, you can go ahead, and the Constitution gives you the licence. It does not say that and neither do the laws in other countries. So, do not be carried away by the idea that I am proposing for Singapore a licence to defame. All I am concerned is that we should move from the kind of society we are in now into a freer society, with the right of every citizen, in elections or out of elections, to question the Government and to have answers given to those questions, and without being shut up by the threat of defamation actions. Again, a big misconception by Mr Sin and the Minister of State, and perhaps also the point taken by one of the NMPs, Mr Zulkifli, is that, in Singapore, people have the channels to criticise and they do it fearlessly. I do not know how this perception was arrived at. I would commend to the Minister of State and to the Government that perhaps they should appoint a fact-finding body, not the Government, to inquire from the citizens whether they feel they have a right to speak up freely and criticise the Government and its officials in the discharge of its public duties. May I say from what I know, if such a body is appointed and the citizens are told, "You need have no fear. You can give the answers truly.", it will surprise the Government. Not a day passes without me encountering people who tell me, "In Singapore, we cannot breathe. In Singapore, we cannot speak up." It does not only come from taxi drivers. It comes from people way down. So, I fail to understand this statement that, in Singapore, no one need be afraid, whether of defamation laws or the ISA or any other administrative action. What fora are there in Singapore for expression of public opinion? It is no good pointing to feedback systems set up by the Government. I have mentioned before that it has been reported to me that even at these feedback sessions, questions have first to be given and they have to be approved. But what I am suggesting is that if you are really sincere in your statement that there are enough avenues, or you would want avenues, then open up, and allow public discussion. Take away the permit requirements for public meetings. Allow persons to congregate and discuss openly. Then you can say, "Yes, in Singapore, we have all the avenues necessary." But that does not obtain in Singapore. There is no freedom of expression in Singapore. The chilling effect of the defamation actions on the freedom of expression is not something that just the Amnesty, the ICJ or other NGOs have brought up. This chilling effect of restricting, by defamation laws, public participation was noted by the House of Lords in the Derbyshire County Council case. It is probably from there that people have begun using the term "the chilling effect". It is not just the ICJ or Amnesty which talks about the chilling effect. The courts in other countries have recognised that and they recognise the importance of free speech for a truly democratic society which rates the freedom of the citizens to participate in public affairs higher than the right to protect personal reputation. But, of course, they are not suggesting that we go overboard. The other big misconception is to totally ignore the three cases on which I have relied and to talk generally that we cannot allow our citizens, even if they are Opposition politicians, to run down political leaders. Do I need to go over again the facts upon which the actions were brought in the three cases? There was no smearing of the plaintiffs in these actions. In Mr Tang Liang Hong's case, it was a denial of defamation against him, that he was a Chinese chauvinist and anti-Christian. So are we saying that in Singapore, if a Minister decides to call someone a liar, he should just shut up and not say, "I am afraid the Minister is not speaking the truth"? Because the Minister will then say, "Oh, you are accusing me of lying. I am going to sue you in the courts." Is that not the situation in the case of Tang Liang Hong? Reference is made to the perception of Singaporeans that in our society politicians should immediately take action to protect themselves if there is anything unkind said about them, even if it is defamatory, and especially it is slightly defamatory. Again, I ask: where do you get that perception from? Has any poll been conducted, as it would have been conducted in other countries, as to what Singaporeans thought of the defamation actions in the circumstances over which they were brought? I would urge the Government to carry out that survey. You can dismiss what I say as just my own perception or because a few have told me. My friends have told me and, of course, they would say that. But my own perception is that many Singaporeans were very disappointed and upset over the defamation actions. I think I had said in the previous motion about the letters that I had received after the last elections where Singaporeans said they were sickened to the pit of their stomachs by what had happened during the elections. They said they were ashamed that this should be allowed in Singapore. So, please carry out a survey. I would be very glad if you would carry out a survey among Singaporeans as to what they think about the defamation actions. I am not disputing that we should make laws that we think are necessary for our society. And this would be the purpose of the Commission. The Commission would examine the present defamation laws and see how they have been applied in the Courts. The Commission would go into the facts and then come out with their recommendation whether they think any change should be made. That is all. What is so difficult about it? We should all accept that with open arms if, as I said, we believe in democracy. So we come back again and again to this question: what kind of society do we want in Singapore? Do we want an open democratic society? Or do we want a society where the people's mouths are shut and they are not able to speak up and make their contributions to the society? There was, in the speeches of the NMPs, the need to protect politicians from false charges or reckless charges. My answer to that is, of course, I can see the need to protect them against scurrilous false charges, but we would have to examine and answer the question whether, in these three cases, there were false scurrilous charges. In my own particular case, it was a statement of truth, that he had placed in front of me reports which he had made to the Police. On that it could not be denied, it was nothing but the absolute truth. There is nothing false about it. And, indeed, as Members must know, the next day the press carried Mr Tang Liang Hong's reports to the Police, released by no less than the Senior Minister, in conjunction with the Prime Minister. So they were informing the public and yet I was sued because I had told the public that he had lodged the reports. It is this situation that one should examine and answer the question whether we should allow libel actions in these situations. Of course, there is the law, the defence of justification, the defence of fair comment, the defence of qualified privilege. But, as has been observed in the decisions in the other countries, it is almost impossible for a person who makes a comment to prove something which lies peculiarly within the knowledge of the other party. So it is for the other party to bring all the facts and to show that the statement was false and that the person knew the falsity of the statement when he made it. Both Mr Sin and the Minister of State talk about the sovereign right in Singapore to make its own laws. Where does this motion deny that sovereign right? So what is the purpose in repeating that? We are asking independent people to advise the Government on the law of defamation. We are not asking them to import any other laws. We would be asking them to appoint a Commission to make recommendations. I was going to read, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, and I could read, statements in all the cases decided outside Singapore to show what importance they attach to the rights of the citizens. But I do not intend to do that. I have kept Members long enough.

Yes, it is getting very late.

And if I carry on, it will probably take us up to 10 o'clock. But I do not intend to do that.

I think you should wind up the debate.

So I will sit down. Thank you.

Thank you. Question proposed.

I call for a division on the motion, Sir.

All right. You require five Members to call for a division.

Yes.

Those in favour of a division, would you please stand? Mr Chiam See Tong and Mr Low Thia Khiang rose.

There are only three Members. That does not qualify you to call for a division.

Yes, all right. But I have called for a division.

We will note it. It shall be recorded. Question on the motion put, and negatived.

Resolved, "That Parliament do now adjourn to a date to be fixed." - [Prof. S. Jayakumar]. Adjourned accordingly at Twenty-Eight Minutes past Eight o'clock pm to a date to be fixed.