General Division of the High Court · Decided 8 July 2022
Ayaz Ahmed and others v Mustaq Ahmad (alias Mushtaq Ahmad s/o Mustafa) and others and other suits
Feedback & support[2022] SGHC 161 · Case no. Suit No 1158 of 2017
✱ What happened, in plain English
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Grounds of decision
Official text from eLitigation
- [1]
[1] There were three suits heard together before me in the present case: HC/S 1158/2017 (“Suit 1158”), HC/S 780/2018 (“Suit 780”) and HCF/S 9/2017 (“Suit 9”). The six plaintiffs in Suit 1158 are the beneficiaries of the estate of Mustafa s/o Majid Khan (“the Mustafa estate”). The first plaintiff in Suit 780 is one of the two trustees and executors of the estate of Samsuddin s/o Mokhtar Ahmad (“the Samsuddin estate”) and also a beneficiary of the estate, while the second plaintiff is another beneficiary of the estate. Both the Mustafa estate and the Samsuddin estate are registered owners of shares in a company known as Mohamed Mustafa & Samsuddin Co Pte Ltd (“MMSCPL”, the sixth defendant in Suit 1158 and Suit 780). Suit 1158 and Suit 780 concerned claims of minority oppression against the directors of MMSCPL.
- [2]
[2] In addition, the plaintiffs in Suit 780 made other claims; in particular, that the Samsuddin estate was entitled to certain assets held for it by the first defendant Mustaq Ahmad @ Mushtaq Ahmad s/o Mustafa (“Mustaq”) on an express trust; and that Mustaq had breached his duties as executor and trustee of the Samsuddin estate.
- [3]
[3] Suit 9 was a claim brought by the beneficiaries of the Mustafa estate against Mustaq in his capacity as the sole administrator and trustee of the Mustafa estate, for breach of his duties as administrator and trustee.
- [6]
[6] These are the written grounds for my decision in all three suits.
Background
The parties
- [7]
[7] Mustafa was born on 1 February 1918 while Samsuddin was born on 25 July 1925.
- [8]
[8] Samsuddin’s cousin, Momina, married Mustafa in 1945 and they had a son, Mustaq. After Momina’s death, Mustafa married one Mdm Asia (“Asia”) in 1957 and had five children with her – Ayaz Ahmed (“Ayaz”), Khalida Bano (“Khalida”), Ishtiaq Ahmad (“Ishtiaq”), Maaz Ahmad Khan (“Maaz”), and Wasela Tasneem (“Wasela”). These five children, now adults, are the plaintiffs in Suit 1158 together with Asia (the “Suit 1158 plaintiffs”).
- [9]
[9] Samsuddin had five children with his wife, Sitarun Nisha (“Sitarun”): Nausaba Khatoon, Mohamed Zakaria, Mohammad Asrar Ahmad, and the two plaintiffs in Suit 780, Fayyaz Ahmad (“Fayyaz”) and Ansar Ahmad (“Ansar”).
- [10]
[10] Mustaq and his wife, Ishret Jahan (“Ishret”), are the first and second defendants in both Suit 1158 and Suit 780. They are both shareholders and directors of MMSCPL. One of their three daughters, Shama Bano (“Shama”), and their son, Abu Osama (“Osama”) are the third and fourth defendants in both Suit 1158 and Suit 780. Both Shama and Osama are directors of MMSCPL. Mustaq and Ishret have two other daughters, Shams Bano (“Shams”) and Bushra Bano (“Bushra”), who are not parties to any of the three suits. Iqbal Ahmad (“Iqbal”), the fifth defendant in both Suit 1158 and Suit 780, is Ishret’s brother. Iqbal is a director and company secretary of MMSCPL. MMSCPL, as the sixth defendant in both Suit 1158 and Suit 780, is a nominal defendant.
The origins of MMSCPL
- [11]
[11] The issue of the origins of MMSCPL was relevant to both Suit 1158 and Suit 780 because of the parties’ starkly differing positions as to the true ownership of MMSCPL. The two sets of plaintiffs had a very different account from the defendants as to how MMSCPL was started.
The plaintiffs’ account
- [12]
[12] According to both sets of plaintiffs, on 11 July 1973, Mustafa and Samsuddin commenced a wholesale business through a partnership known as Mohamed Mustafa & Samsuddin Co (“MMSC”). On 23 July 1973, Mustafa and Samsuddin lodged a form with the Registrar of Business (“ROB”) to notify the ROB that MMSC had changed its registered address from 19 Campbell Lane to 67 Serangoon Road Singapore, and that MMSC’s branch would operate from 19 Campbell Lane.
- [13]
[13] On 12 September 1973, Mustafa and Samsuddin added Mustaq as a partner in MMSC. On 31 July 1975, MMSC submitted its application for the business name “Mohamed Mustafa & Samsuddin Company” to be approved by the ROB.
The defendants’ account
- [14]
[14] Mustaq alleged that he used to help Mustafa and Samsuddin at their street stall when he was about 12 years old, but that he went on to set up his own independent stall along Campbell Lane in 1963. Around 1971, Mustaq rented 1 Campbell Lane and conducted his business there under the name “Mustaq Ahmad”. Sometime in 1973, when the landlord informed him the master lease was about to expire, Mustaq bought 19 Campbell Lane to house his business, and rented 67 Serangoon Road to store his goods (collectively, the “New Premises”). According to Mustaq, he made all these payments with no assistance from Mustafa and Samsuddin.
- [15]
[15] Sometime in May or June 1973, before Mustaq was able to move his goods from 1 Campbell Lane to the New Premises, he made a trip to India to visit his wife. Mustafa offered to help supervise the running of Mustaq’s business together with Samsuddin. To facilitate the administrative aspects of the move to the New Premises, Mustafa and Samsuddin commenced MMSC on 11 July 1973 on the understanding that the business operating out of the New Premises was Mustaq’s business. When Mustaq returned to Singapore in August or September 1973, Mustafa and Samsuddin informed Mustaq of the commencement of MMSC, and Mustaq added his name to MMSC sometime around 12 September 1973.
Events of 1989
- [16]
[16] MMSCPL was incorporated in Singapore on 21 February 1989. At that time, Mustaq and Samsuddin were MMSCPL’s sole directors and shareholders, with each subscribing to one share of MMSCPL. The Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of MMSCPL (the “MMSCPL Constitution”) were executed only by Mustaq and Samsuddin. The defendants alleged that MMSCPL was incorporated because Mustaq realised that the partnership structure was not ideal for the business’ growth, and Mustaq had incorporated MMSCPL without seeking input, financing or support from Mustafa and Samsuddin.
- [17]
[17] About two months later, Mustafa was appointed a director of MMSCPL. According to the defendants, this was done out of “goodwill and respect” by Mustaq for Mustafa.
- [18]
[18] On or around 27 April 1989, Mustafa subscribed to 190,000 shares in MMSCPL, while Mustaq and Samsuddin also subscribed to further shares in MMSCPL. As a result, Mustafa held 19%, Samsuddin held 30%, and Mustaq held 51% of the shares in MMSCPL.
- [19]
[19] Around 30 September 1989, the MMSC partnership was terminated.
Appointments of Ishret, Iqbal, Shama and Osama
- [20]
[20] On 19 June 1991, Ishret was appointed as a director of MMSCPL. On 17 January 1994, Iqbal was appointed as company secretary of MMSCPL. He was appointed as a director of MMSCPL on 3 September 2001.
- [21]
[21] On 14 February 2001, Shama and Osama were appointed directors of MMSCPL. Osama resigned as a director of MMSCPL on 10 February 2004, but was reappointed as a director of MMSCPL on 24 December 2014.
Mustafa and Samsuddin stepped down as directors
- [22]
[22] Mustafa stepped down as a director of MMSCPL on 11 March 1999, while Samsuddin stepped down as a director of MMSCPL on 14 July 2003.
- [23]
[23] For ease of reference, the dates of appointment of the various parties as directors (and in Iqbal’s case, as company secretary) and the dates of their resignation or retirement (where applicable) are set out in the table below.
Individual
Date of Appointment
Position
Date of resignation/ retirement (where applicable)
Mustaq
- [21]
[21] February 1989
Director
N/A
Samsuddin
- [21]
[21] February 1989
Director
- [14]
[14] July 2003
Mustafa
- [10]
[10] April 1989
Director
- [11]
[11] March 1999
Ishret
- [19]
[19] June 1991
Director
N/A
Iqbal
- [17]
[17] January 1994
Company secretary
N/A
- [3]
[3] September 2001
Director
N/A
Shama
- [14]
[14] February 2001
Director
N/A
Osama
- [14]
[14] February 2001
Director
- [10]
[10] February 2004
- [24]
[24] December 2014
Director (re-appointed)
N/A
The Share Allotments
- [24]
[24] From the time of MMSCPL’s incorporation on 21 February 1989 until 11 December 2001, various share allotments were carried out in MMSCPL. I summarise these below, reproducing the table tendered by the Suit 780 plaintiffs (the accuracy of which was not disputed by the other parties).
Date
Mustaq
Ishret
Mustafa
Samsuddin
Shares allotted
Total shares
Percentage
Shares allotted
Total shares
Percentage
Shares allotted
Total shares
Percentage
Shares allotted
Total shares
Percentage
- [21]
[21] February 1989
1
1
50%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
50%
- [27]
[27] April 1989
509,999
510,000
51%
0
0
0
190,000
190,000
19%
299,999
300,000
30%
- [27]
[27] June 1991
300,000
810,000
35.22%
300,000
300,000
13.04%
400,000
590,000
25.65%
300,000
600,000
26.09%
- [16]
[16] January 1993
340,200
1,150,200
34.85%
160,000
460,000
13.94%
247,800
837,800
25.39%
252,000
852,000
25.82%
- [19]
[19] May 1993
448,500
1,598,700
34.01%
239,400
699,400
14.88%
353,900
1,191,700
25.35%
358,200
1,210,200
25.75%
- [5]
[5] January 1995
700,000
2,298,700
42.57%
0
699,400
12.95%
0
1,191,700
22.07%
0
1,210,200
22.41%
- [9]
[9] April 1996
681,100
2,979,800
42.57%
207,230
906,630
12.95%
353,100
1,544,800
22.07%
358,570
1,568,770
22.41%
- [24]
[24] February 1997
851,370
3,831,170
42.57%
259,037
1,165,667
12.95%
441,370
1,986,170
22.07%
448,223
2,016,993
22.41%
- [11]
[11] December 2001
4,340,000
8,171,170
61.25%
0
1,165,667
8.74%
0
1,986,170
14.89%
0
2,016,993
15.12%
- [25]
[25] Both the Suit 1158 and the Suit 780 plaintiffs seek to set aside the 5 January 1995 Allotment and the 11 December 2001 Allotment. The Suit 780 plaintiffs additionally seek to set aside the 27 June 1991 Allotment, the 16 January 1993 Allotment, the 19 May 1993 Allotment, the 9 April 1996 Allotment and the 24 February 1997 Allotment. I will set out their allegations in respect of each allotment in further detail later in these written grounds.
Mustafa’s death in 2001
- [26]
[26] Mustafa died intestate on 17 July 2001.
- [27]
[27] On 16 August 2001, the Syariah Court of Singapore issued an Inheritance Certificate stating that the Mustafa Estate was to be divided into 80 shares, with each of Mustafa’s sons (Mustaq, Ishtiaq, Maaz and Ayaz) receiving 14 shares, Asia receiving 10 shares, and each daughter (Khalida and Wasela) receiving 7 shares.
Power of Attorney and Grant of Letters of Administration
- [28]
[28] It was not disputed that on 22 December 2001, Mustaq visited Jaunpur, India, where the Suit 1158 plaintiffs were staying. The Suit 1158 plaintiffs signed a Power of Attorney (“Mustaq POA”) on 22 December 2001, which was drafted on Mustaq’s instructions. The Mustaq POA provided, inter alia, that the Suit 1158 plaintiffs jointly and severally appointed Mustaq to apply for and obtain Grants of Probate or Letters of Administration (“LA”) for the Mustafa Estate. The Suit 1158 plaintiffs said that, at the time they signed the Mustaq POA, Mustaq failed to disclose the 5 January 1995 Allotment and the 11 December 2001 Allotment. Mustaq, for his part, denied this – he said that he had never attempted to conceal either allotment.
- [29]
[29] On 30 October 2003, the Mustafa Estate was registered as a shareholder of MMSCPL. On 18 November 2003, Mustaq filed a petition for the Grant of LA in relation to the Mustafa Estate. Mustaq was granted the LA on 24 November 2003, and he extracted the Grant of LA on 28 January 2004.
Samsuddin’s death in 2011
- [30]
[30] Samsuddin died in April 2011. Pursuant to his will dated 5 November 2004, Fayyaz and Mustaq were appointed joint and several executrixes and trustees of his estate (the “Samsuddin Estate”). On 24 October 2012, Mustaq applied for a grant of probate, which was issued to Mustaq and Fayyaz on 25 June 2013.
- [31]
[31] Based on the Syariah Court Inheritance Certificate, the beneficiaries under the Samsuddin Estate were the five children of Samsuddin and Sitarun (including Fayyaz and Ayaz), and Sitarun herself. For completeness, I note that the defendants have pointed out that Mohd Jakariya Haji Samsuddin (alias Mohamed Zakaria) was not named in the Inheritance Certificate, and that the aliases of Ansar and Naushaba Khatun were not reflected in the Inheritance Certificate.
The plaintiffs’ requests for information from Mustaq from 2013
- [32]
[32] In both Suit 1158 and Suit 780, the plaintiffs alleged that from 2013, Mustaq sought to conceal from them the truth about MMSCPL’s affairs.
The plaintiffs’ account
- [33]
[33] According to both sets of plaintiffs, in or around 2013, Ayaz (the first plaintiff in Suit 1158) made repeated requests to Mustaq for information about the Mustafa Estate and Samsuddin Estate, which Mustaq wrongfully refused to provide.
- [34]
[34] Instead, in an attempt to placate the plaintiffs, Mustaq procured MMSCPL to declare a dividend in each year from 2014 onwards. However, he arranged for MMSCPL to pay it over twelve monthly instalments instead of in one lump sum. By doing so, he made sure the plaintiffs understood that the dividend payments would cease if they chose to resort to their legal rights. Additionally, from around February or March 2017, dividends were halved; and in February 2018, the dividend payments stopped completely – which suggested that Mustaq was trying to exert further pressure on the plaintiffs.
- [35]
[35] The Suit 780 plaintiffs also asserted that around 2013 to 2014, in an attempt to placate the Suit 780 plaintiffs and in breach of his duties to the Samsuddin Estate and/or in breach of trust, Mustaq offered to pay the Samsuddin Estate the value of the shares in MMSCPL that Samsuddin had originally held. To finance this payment, Mustaq caused MMSCPL to issue three-year bearer bonds for approximately $75 million in 2014, which was not in the commercial interests of MMSCPL.
- [36]
[36] In mid-2015, in a further attempt to forestall legal action against himself, Mustaq made a verbal proposal (“Mustaq Proposal”) to Ayaz to restructure all companies that were directly and/or indirectly owned by Mustaq, Ishret and/or MMSCPL. On or around 29 March 2016, Mustaq produced a Deed which he claimed contained the terms of the Mustaq Proposal and which he asked (among other persons) Ayaz to sign. However, the Deed did not accurately reflect the terms of the Mustaq Proposal; and the Suit 1158 plaintiffs did not sign it.
- [37]
[37] Around April 2016, Ayaz asked Mustaq further questions pertaining to the affairs of the Mustafa Estate. Ayaz then engaged one Rajesh Bafna (“Rajesh”), a consultant, to look into the Mustafa Estate’s interest in MMSCPL. From Rajesh, Ayaz learned of the 5 January 1995 Allotment and the 11 December 2001 Allotment.
- [38]
[38] Around the end of June 2016, Ayaz asked Mustaq to account for how he had used the Mustaq POA and also to provide an explanation for the 5 January 1995 Allotment and the 11 December 2001 Allotment. On 1 July 2016, the Suit 1158 plaintiffs revoked the Mustaq POA, and the revocation was registered with the court on 24 April 2017. By a letter dated 13 July 2016 from the plaintiffs’ lawyers, the plaintiffs informed Mustaq they had executed a new Power of Attorney in favour of Ayaz, and asked Mustaq to provide information and documents in relation to the Mustaq POA – which he refused to do. On various occasions thereafter, including in August 2016 and September 2016, Mustaq repeatedly asked Ayaz to sign the Deed, which Ayaz refused.
The defendants’ account
- [39]
[39] Mustaq – as the first defendant in both minority oppression suits and as the chief protagonist according to the plaintiffs’ narrative – presented a totally different version of events in his pleaded defence. Mustaq denied having received any request for information from Ayaz or Fayyaz around 2013. Mustaq claimed that he had decided to issue dividends as a way of paying the plaintiffs and other beneficiaries of the Samsuddin Estate. He denied making the Mustaq Proposal. Instead, according to Mustaq, around March 2016, Mustaq, Ayaz and Fayyaz reached a verbal agreement regarding Fayyaz’s increasingly unreasonable demands of Mustaq for more “gratuitous property, assets and financial benefits”. On 29 March 2016, the Deed was signed by Fayyaz and other beneficiaries of the Samsuddin Estate. A supplemental Deed was subsequently made to amend one of the terms of the verbal agreement, which was signed by Mustaq and Fayyaz. However, Ayaz reneged on the verbal agreement and refused to sign the Deed and the supplemental Deed. This led Mustaq to reverse the steps which had been taken to give effect to the terms of the Deed and the supplemental Deed. Mustaq also alleged in his pleaded defence that since mid-2014, Ayaz had constantly harassed him and demanded from him more benefits.
- [40]
[40] Per his pleaded defence, Mustaq claimed that prior to 2016, the Suit 1158 plaintiffs had never requested updates or information concerning the administration of the Mustafa Estate, and that in his correspondence with them from 2016 onwards, he had acceded to their requests for information when these were reasonable.
Commencement of the present suits
- [41]
[41] On 8 December 2017, the Suit 1158 plaintiffs commenced Suit 1158 and Suit 9. As noted earlier, Suit 1158 is a minority oppression claim by Asia and her five children (including Ayaz), on behalf of the Mustafa Estate. Suit 9 concerns Mustaq’s alleged breach of his duties as the sole administrator and trustee of the Mustafa Estate.
- [42]
[42] On 6 August 2018, the Suit 780 plaintiffs filed Suit 780. Suit 780 is a minority oppression claim by Fayyaz and Ansar, on behalf of the Samsuddin Estate.
The present suits
- [43]
[43] As there is some overlap between the issues raised in each suit, I first set out the common aspects of the plaintiffs’ cases in Suit 1158 and Suit 780.
Allegations of oppressive conduct common to Suit 1158 and Suit 780
- [44]
[44] In claiming that the defendants had oppressed the rights of the Mustafa and the Samsuddin estates as minority shareholders, the Suit 1158 and the Suit 780 plaintiffs raised some of the same allegations of oppressive conduct in their pleadings. However, they asked for different reliefs in respect of some of these allegations. I set these out as follows.
The 5 January 1995 Allotment and the 11 December 2001 Allotment
- [45]
[45] Both sets of plaintiffs alleged that the 5 January 1995 Allotment and the 11 December 2001 Allotment were, inter alia, carried out in breach of the MMSCPL Constitution. There was nothing to suggest that these allotments were needed in MMSCPL’s commercial interests. Instead, the two allotments had been devised by Mustaq and/or Ishret for Mustaq’s own benefit as they allowed him to acquire more shares in MMSCPL at an undervalue while diluting the estates’ shareholding. Both sets of plaintiffs both sought a declaration that the 5 January 1995 Allotment and the 11 December 2001 Allotment were void and of no effect and should be set aside.
Systematic misappropriation of MMSCPL’s funds
- [46]
[46] Both the Suit 1158 and Suit 780 plaintiffs raised the same allegations about the defendants’ systematic misappropriation of MMSCPL’s funds:
(a) Between 2000 and 2015, the first to fifth defendants utilised for their own benefit sums taken from MMSCPL under the guise of unsecured and interest-free loans, which were not in MMSCPL’s interests.
(b) The Suit 1158 plaintiffs also alleged that between 2004 and 2005, Mustaq concocted sham invoices to create the appearance that MMSCPL was indebted to B.I. Distributors Pte Ltd (“BID”), a company wholly owned and controlled by Mustaq and Ishret. The Suit 780 plaintiffs alleged that this was done between 2000 and 2006.
(d) After Mustafa’s death on 17 July 2001 and until 2014, Mustaq and Ishret adopted a policy of paying themselves substantial directors’ fees amounting to an average of 51% of MMSCPL’s net profits per year. Further, Mustaq, Ishret, Shama, Osama and/or Iqbal each procured, caused and/or allowed MMSCPL to not pay and/or did not take steps to prevent MMSCPL to pay no dividends at all to the shareholders of MMSCPL until 31 December 2013. This was despite MMSCPL earning substantial profits between 2000 and 2013. The Suit 780 plaintiffs sought a declaration that the various resolutions at the Annual General Meetings of MMSCPL approving Mustaq’s and Ishret’s directors’ fees were null and void and had no effect. Though the Suit 1158 plaintiffs pleaded the same dividend-related complaints as one of the instances of oppressive conduct, they did not seek such a declaration.
Other reliefs sought by the Suit 1158 and Suit 780 plaintiffs
Additional allegations in Suit 780
- [51]
[51] The additional allegations by the Suit 780 plaintiffs may be summarized as follows.
Share allotments
- [52]
[52] First, in addition to the 5 January 1995 Allotment and the 11 December 2001 Allotment, the Suit 780 plaintiffs alleged that the 27 June 1991 Allotment, the 16 January 1993 Allotment, the 19 May 1993 Allotment, the 9 April 1996 Allotment, the 24 February 1997 Allotment and the 11 December 2001 Allotment were carried out (inter alia) in breach of the MMSCPL Constitution.
Authorised Capital Increases
- [54]
[54] The Suit 780 plaintiffs also alleged that Mustaq had, on two instances, wrongfully caused MMSCPL to increase its authorised share capital.
- [55]
[55] First, on 17 January 1994, Mustaq wrongfully caused MMSCPL to increase its authorised share capital from $5,000,000 to $10,000,000, divided into 10,000,000 ordinary shares of $1 each (“First Authorised Capital Increase”). This was done in breach of provisions of the MMSCPL Constitution and for the benefit of Mustaq and his family.
- [56]
[56] Second, around 26 September 1997, Mustaq wrongfully caused MMSCPL to increase its authorised share capital from $10,000,000 to $15,000,000, divided into 15,000,000 ordinary shares of $1 each (“Second Authorised Capital Increase”). This allowed Mustaq to wrongfully procure the 11 December 2001 Allotment so as to acquire further shares in MMSCPL at a significant discount and dilute Samsuddin’s shareholding in MMSCPL. It was also done in breach of the MMSCPL Constitution.
Additional allegations concerning the systematic misappropriation of MMSCPL’s funds
- [57]
[57] In addition to the common allegations of oppressive conduct, the Suit 780 plaintiffs also pleaded the following:
(a) Mustaq directed MMSCPL to pay salaries and Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) contributions to some of his children (Shams, Shama and Bushra), prior to their being employed by MMSCPL or any of its related companies.
(b) Mustaq wrongfully caused MMSCPL to pay substantial consultancy fees to Zero and One, a sole proprietorship which he had set up on 1 February 2006. These payments had been made since the inception of the sole proprietorship and were against MMSCPL’s commercial interests. Mustaq also used Zero and One as a vehicle to pay one Rajena Begam d/o Sheik Noordin (“Rajena”) monthly consultancy fees of between $20,000 to $50,000, without any basis. The Suit 780 plaintiffs claimed that Rajena “was and is in a relationship with Mustaq”. Mustaq did not cooperate with the police when Rajena was reported for wrongfully taking goods from MMSCPL, and even caused MMSCPL to pay the rent for her accommodation.
(c) Between 8 January 2004 and 26 May 2017, Mustaq contracted on behalf of MMSCPL to sell gold to Ruby Impex LLP (“Ruby Impex”) and Shams Gems LLP (“Shams Gems”), being partnership firms jointly owned by his daughters, Shams and Bushra, by adding only a 0.5% margin without reference to market value, thereby causing MMSCPL to enter into contracts at a significant undervalue.
(d) From January 2010 to May 2018, Mustaq failed to adopt a proper accounting system for MMSCPL and caused debit notes of MMSCPL to be generated with the amount being zero.
(e) Between 2007 and 2016, Mustaq used the funds of MMSCPL and the Related Companies’ funds to purchase properties in Cambodia in his own name and/or that of City Mart Co Ltd, which was registered in his sole name. Mustaq then engaged in self-dealing by causing MMSCPL to pay him for a share of the properties purchased in Cambodia. The Related Companies have been defined in the Suit 780 plaintiffs’ pleadings as comprising Mustafa’s Pte Ltd (“MPL”); BID; Mustafa Air Travel Pte Ltd (“MAT”); Mustafa Foreign Exchange Pte Ltd (“MFE”); Mustafa Holdings Pte Ltd (“MHPL”); and Mustafa Development Pte Ltd (“MDPL”).
(f) Between 1996 to 2000, Mustaq remitted US$10m from MMSCPL through Mustafa Foreign Exchange Pte Ltd (“MFE”) to Hang Seng Bank in Hong Kong to his own personal bank account without paying tax, and thereafter used the same money to pay for a building he bought in Jakarta.
(g) Between 2000 and 2006, Mustaq caused MMSCPL to incur substantial losses as a result of foreign exchange/stock/commodity trading. He failed to disclose this to the shareholders of MMSCPL, and instead raised the inventory level of MMSCPL artificially to cover up these losses.
(h) Mustaq wrongfully diverted MMSCPL’s revenue to Mustafa’s Pte Ltd (“MPL”) between 1998 and 2005 by installing credit card terminals in MMSCPL’s business premises and paying the monies collected at these terminals to MPL’s bank account instead of MMSCPL’s bank accounts. Mustaq is the registered shareholder and director of MPL.
(i) In their statement of claim, the Suit 780 plaintiffs had originally pleaded an incident whereby Mustaq awarded a contract for repair works to the MMSCPL premises to As Spec Technics Pte Ltd (“As Spec Technics”) without any tender process, because As Spec Technics was a company run by a close friend of his nephew. Mustaq allegedly failed to disclose this transaction to the other shareholders of MMSCPL. However, this allegation was withdrawn by Fayyaz under cross-examination and was not pursued in closing submissions.
(j) Mustaq and the other MMSCPL directors failed to ensure that employees who were family members did not extract value from MMSCPL. Specifically, from 1996 to 2006, Osama (Mustaq’s son) bought electronic goods in his own firm’s name and supplied the goods to MMSCPL at a profit.
(k) From 2005, Mustaq (either by himself or with Ishret, Shama Osama and/or Iqbal) procured, caused or allowed MMSCPL to enter into transactions with related parties, under which MMSCPL would provide goods to these companies on credit terms. These related parties were said to be BID, Shams Gems, Ruby Impex, MPL and/or Mustaq (the “Related Parties”). The Related Parties did not pay for the goods provided to them under these credit sales transactions; and a sum of $232,935,015 which was not captured in the audited financial statements of MMSCPL for 2005 to 2018 was wrongfully appropriated by Mustaq, Ishret, Shama, Osama and/or Iqbal.
Express trust
- [58]
[58] Over and above the claims of oppression of the Samsuddin estate’s minority rights as a shareholder of MMSCPL, the Suit 780 plaintiffs claimed that Mustaq held one-third of the Family Assets less the MMSCPL shares (ie the “Trust Assets”) on an express trust for the Samsuddin Estate. “Family Assets”, according to the Suit 780 plaintiffs, meant: (i) MMSCPL, (ii) all of Mustaq’s assets, and (iii) the Related Companies, referring to MPL, BID, Mustafa Air Travel Pte Ltd (“Mustafa Air Travel”), Mustafa Foreign Exchange Pte Ltd (“MFE”), Mustafa Holdings Pte Ltd (“MHPL”) and Mustafa Development Pte Ltd (“MDPL”).
The defendants’ case
- [60]
[60] Suit 1158 and Suit 780 concerned the same defendants, and there was some overlap in their defences in both suits. I first set out the common defences raised, before summarising the pleadings unique to each suit.
- [61]
[61] It should be noted that in both suits, the third to the fifth defendants Shama, Osama and Iqbal) filed brief defences stating that they adopted the defence pleaded by the first and the second defendants (Mustaq and Ishret). Central to Mustaq’s and Ishret’s defence to the claims of minority oppression was the assertion of a “common understanding” reached between Mustaq, Mustafa and Samsuddin in 1973 (“the 1973 Common Understanding”), and a similar “common understanding” reached between Mustaq and the Suit 1158 plaintiffs in 2001 (“the 2001 Common Understanding”), regarding the true beneficial ownership of the shares in MMSCPL. According to the defendants, it was agreed pursuant to the 1973 Common Understanding and the 2001 Common Understanding that MMSCPL was wholly owned by Mustaq, and that Mustaq could run the company as he saw fit.
Common aspects of the defendants’ case in Suit 1158 and Suit 780
(1) The 1973 Common Understanding
- [63]
[63] At that stage, although the business was operating under the name of the MMSC partnership, there was a common understanding between Mustaq, Mustafa and Samsuddin (the “1973 Common Understanding”) that:
(a) The business belonged solely to Mustaq;
(b) Mustaq would be the sole decision-maker in the business;
(c) Mustafa and Samsuddin would not need to contribute to or be responsible for the business’ finances or assume any risks/liabilities in respect of the business;
(d) Mustafa and Samsuddin would not receive any remuneration from the business: any payments made to them by Mustaq were purely out of goodwill and solely at Mustaq’s discretion, out of familial concern and respect;
(e) As partners of MMSC, Mustafa and Samsuddin would sign any and all documents Mustaq required them to sign.
- [64]
[64] All the subsequent actions in relation to MMSC and MMSCPL up till Mustafa’s death in 2001 were carried out pursuant to the 1973 Common Understanding. In particular, Mustaq paid for all the allotments of MMSCPL shares to Mustafa and Samsuddin, who provided no consideration for their shares. Mustaq also bore all of MMSCPL’s business expenses and assumed all risks for the business.
- [65]
[65] The defendants contended that Mustafa’s and Samsuddin’s conduct had always been consistent with the 1973 Common Understanding. As such, Mustafa and Samsuddin (and their respective estates) were estopped from relying on their strict legal rights in respect of their designations as MMSCPL shareholders. Instead, they (and their respective estates) were holding the MMSCPL shares in their names by way of a common intention constructive trust or, in the alternative, on a resulting trust, for the benefit of Mustaq; and Mustaq was the sole and beneficial owner of all MMSCPL shares held by the Mustafa Estate and Samsuddin Estate.
(2) The 2001 Common Understanding
- [66]
[66] A few days after Mustafa’s death on 17 July 2001, Mustaq held a meeting at his home in India with Asia, Khalida, Ishtiaq, and Ishret. In the defences filed in both Suit 1158 and Suit 780, Mustaq pleaded that at this meeting, he had actually offered Asia and her children two options as to how the Mustafa estate could be dealt with. One option was for him to effect a one-off payment to Asia and each of her children equivalent to the notional value of their respective portion of the Mustafa Estate, following which parties would consider all issues relating to the Mustafa Estate closed and would go their separate ways. Alternatively, parties could maintain the status quo, leave the Mustafa Estate intact and let Mustaq continue running MMSCPL in accordance with the 1973 Common Understanding.
- [67]
[67] Mustaq claimed that it was Khalida, Ishtiaq, and Asia who confirmed on behalf of all of Asia’s children that they all wanted the second option, ie, to maintain the status quo and to have Mustaq continue running the business the way he had been running it per the 1973 Common Understanding. Mustaq claimed that in so choosing, Asia and her children had accepted the 1973 Common Understanding as applying to them (the “2001 Common Understanding”); and that they were accordingly estopped from insisting on their strict legal rights.
(3) Alleged systematic misappropriation of funds
- [68]
[68] With regard to the plaintiffs’ allegations of the defendants’ systematic misappropriation of MMSCPL’s funds, the defendants’ position was as follows:
(a) The directors of MMSCPL, including Mustafa and Samsuddin, had a long-standing practice of taking personal loans from MMSCPL, and this was Mustaq’s way of providing for Mustafa, Samsuddin and their families.
(b) There were no sham invoices to BID and MMSCPL did not make any payments to BID in respect of these alleged sham invoices between 2000 to 2006.
(c) The defendants denied that there was any falsification of applications to MOM.
(d) The remaining allegations made by the Suit 780 plaintiffs (eg, payments by MMSCPL to Mustaq’s children, payments made without basis to Zero & One, diversion of revenue from MMSCPL to MPL, siphoning money to buy property in Cambodia, etc) were also denied by the defendants in their pleaded defence.
(e) As for the directors’ fees paid to Mustaq and Ishret, they claimed that Mustaq had full discretion to decide the quantum of the directors’ fees pursuant to the 1973 Common Understanding and the 2001 Common Understanding. After Samsuddin’s death on 19 April 2011 and until 2016, neither the Mustafa Estate nor the Samsuddin Estate had ever raised any objections as to Mustaq’s and Ishret’s directors’ fees and/or the issue of dividends.
(f) In respect of the express trust asserted on behalf of the Samsuddin estate in Suit 780, this was also denied by Mustaq in his defence.
(4) Improper collateral motive and defence of laches and/or acquiescence
- [69]
[69] The defendants further alleged in their defence that both sets of plaintiffs had an improper collateral motive in commencing the suits, and had brought the action in bad faith. They also pleaded the defence of laches and/or acquiescence.
(5) The first defendant’s counterclaims
Other aspects of the defendants’ cases in Suit 1158 and Suit 780
- [72]
[72] In the defence they filed in Suit 1158, the defendants alleged that the Suit 1158 plaintiffs had no locus standi to bring Suit 1158 as they themselves were not shareholders in MMSCPL; and further, that they were not in any event the proper plaintiffs to pursue the claims of minority oppression because the alleged oppressive acts – even if proven – constituted corporate wrongs.
- [73]
[73] As for Suit 780, the defendants similarly asserted that the Suit 780 plaintiffs had no standing to make any claim in relation to matters occurring during the lifetime of Samsuddin. The first defendant also denied holding one-third of the Trust Assets on an express trust for the Samsuddin estate, and denied fraudulently breaching his duties as executor and trustee of the Samsuddin estate.
Allegations of breach of duties as administrator and trustee in Suit 9
- [74]
[74] As for Suit 9, in claiming that Mustaq had breached his duties as administrator and trustee of the Mustafa estate, the plaintiffs relied on the same conduct which they had pleaded as oppressive conduct in Suit 1158 (ie, the dilution of the Mustafa estate’s shares via the 5 January 1995 Allotment and the 11 December 2001 Allotment, the taking of large unsecured and interest-free loans by Mustafa and other directors of MMSCPL, the payment of excessive directors’ fees to Mustaq and Ishret when no dividends were paid to the shareholders, etc). The plaintiffs contended that in breach of his duties as administrator and trustee of the Mustafa estate, Mustaq had failed to disclose to them all these matters and had also failed to take any steps to set things right. Up until 2016, he concealed the truth from the plaintiffs about his own and his family members’ wrongdoing so that the plaintiffs would not be able to take action to protect the Mustafa estate’s interests.
- [75]
[75] Mustaq was also alleged to have failed to distribute the assets of the Mustafa estate since the grant of the LA in January 2004 and/or to have taken steps to get the plaintiffs registered as the holders of the estate’s shares in MMSCPL. The plaintiffs asserted that MMSCPL owed the estate an amount of more than $1 million which the estate could have used to subscribe for more shares in MMSCPL during the 11 December 2001 Allotment. Despite Ayaz’s attempts to request information about the estate from around 2013 onwards (including information on the estate’s shares in MMSCPL), Mustaq wrongfully refused to provide such information.
- [76]
[76] In Suit 9, Mustaq essentially repeated the same matters pleaded in his defence in Suit 1158. In particular, he repeated the allegations pleaded in Suit 1158 regarding the 1973 Common Understanding and the 2001 Common Understanding. While Mustaq admitted that he had not distributed the assets of the Mustafa estate and that the plaintiffs had not been registered as the holders of the estate’s shares in MMSCPL, he claimed in his defence that this was because the plaintiffs themselves had “specifically requested” that the Mustafa estate not be dissolved and that he continue running MMSCPL as per the 1973 Common Understanding and the 2001 Common Understanding. In addition, he claimed in his defence that per the 2001 Common Understanding, the plaintiffs had asked him to (and were content to leave him to) handle the legal and administrative matters relating to the Mustafa estate, and that they had only started questioning him from around 2016 when he refused to accede to their (and in particular, Ayaz’s) unreasonable requests for excessive gratuitous benefits.
- [77]
[77] In his Suit 9 defence, Mustaq also pleaded that MMSCPL had paid estate duties on behalf of the Mustafa estate; that the payment of estate duties was used to offset the amount due from MMSCPL to the Mustafa estate; that MMSCPL had also paid the legal fees and disbursements on behalf of the estate; and that consequently, instead of MMSCPL owing any monies to the Mustafa estate, it was the estate that owed a net amount to MMSCPL.
- [78]
[78] Before I turn to my findings of fact in this case, I address a number of preliminary legal issues which surfaced in the course of the proceedings. I address these legal issues at this stage in my written grounds because the views I formed on these issues informed and provided context for the factual findings I made at the end of the trial.
Preliminary issues
Evidence in one suit applying to the other
- [79]
[79] In a pre-trial conference on 12 November 2018, the Senior Assistant Registrar (“SAR”) directed that all three cases – ie, Suit 1158, Suit 9 and Suit 780 – were to be heard by the same Judge and to be heard together or one after the other, immediately or otherwise, subject to the directions to be made by the trial judge. There was no express direction that the evidence adduced in one suit was to apply to the other.
- [84]
[84] In the present case, it was not disputed that the issue of the parties’ rightful shareholding in MMSCPL was central to both the Suit 1158 plaintiffs’ claims and the Suit 780 plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants. The defendants in both suits were the same. The defendants raised essentially the same defences in both suits. In particular, the first defendant Mustaq took the position in both suits that he was the sole beneficial owner of all the shares in MMSCPL; that Mustafa and Samsuddin (and subsequently their estates) held their shares in MMSCPL on his behalf on either a common intention constructive trust or a resulting trust; and that they had consented to his running the company at his sole discretion, based on what the defendants called the “1973 Common Understanding” and the “2001 Common Understanding”. Mustaq also brought the same counterclaims in Suit 1158 and Suit 780: in both suits, he sought the same reliefs, including declarations of his legal and beneficial ownership of all the shares in MMSCPL held by the Mustafa Estate and the Samsuddin Estate respectively and rectification of the share register to reflect his sole ownership of all these shares. As for Suit 9, as I noted earlier, the plaintiffs’ claim in this suit was based on the same factual allegations as those pleaded in Suit 1158, while Mustaq’s defence was again based on his complete beneficial ownership of MMSCPL and his right to run the company at his sole discretion per the 1973 Common Understanding and the 2001 Common Understanding.
- [86]
[86] Indeed, it appeared to me that all parties themselves recognised this. At the JPTC on 7 September 2020, I had directed that the three suits were to be heard together and that the common witnesses for all the suits should only take the stand once and be cross-examined at one go. The clear understanding underlying these directions was that evidence led in one suit would stand as evidence in the other suits. I was of the view that this must have been the understanding all parties had – despite the plaintiffs’ belated protestations to the contrary. Notably, prior to the trial, an agreement was reached that the parties in Suit 1158, Suit 780 and Suit 9 would be permitted to “use the documents in each Suit and the information therefrom in the other Suits”; that the parties in these suits would be released from the Riddick undertaking to this extent; that copies of all documents and other papers filed in each suit would be provided by the plaintiffs in one suit to the plaintiffs in the other Suits; and that nothing in this agreement would affect the parties’ “right to object to certain lines of cross-examination on the basis of evidentiary rules and trial procedure and practice”. This agreement was notified to me at the JPTC on 28 September 2020. That the parties came to this agreement, and in particular, agreed on the waiver of the Riddick undertakings, must indicate that the evidence adduced in one suit would be treated as evidence in the other suit – subject of course to the caveat that each party retained the right to object to “certain lines of cross-examination” which might contravene evidential or procedural rules.
- [87]
[87] In this connection, I had observed at the further hearing on 14 June 2021 that it was always open to the plaintiffs in Suit 1158 to apply for leave to cross-examine the plaintiffs in Suit 780 and their witnesses; and vice versa; and that their omission to make any such application was clearly a matter of choice. In their further submissions, the Suit 1158 plaintiffs argued that the law did not allow them to apply for leave to cross-examine the Suit 780 plaintiffs and their witnesses; and that had they attempted any such application it would have failed in limine. According to the Suit 1158 plaintiffs, since they were not joined as parties to Suit 780, any application by them to cross-examine witnesses called by the Suit 780 plaintiffs would have been “tantamount to a stranger to an action applying for permission to cross-examine a witness in that action for purposes other than the Court’s determination of the issues in the action in which he is not a party”.
- [91]
[91] I would add that while there is no equivalent of our s 139(2) of the Evidence Act in the UK, their courts have taken a similar approach to that as seen in Vijaya Versus Saraswathi and Tang Liang Hong: see, eg, the judgment of the English CA in Bristol & West Building Society v Bhadresa (t/a Bhadresa & Co) [1997] PNLR 329 (“Bhadresa”).
- [92]
[92] To sum up therefore, in assessing the evidence adduced in this trial, I was of the view that evidence led in one suit could and should be treated as evidence in the other suits. As an aside, I add that in forming this view, I did not have regard to the correspondence between the various counsel cited by the first and second defendants in their submissions, as this correspondence was not adduced in evidence before me during the trial.
- [93]
[93] I also highlighted to the parties that the above views did not equate with a conclusion that the plaintiffs in one suit would be able to obtain reliefs which adversely affected the interests of the plaintiffs in the other suits if the latter set of plaintiffs were not joined as parties in the first suit. The question of whether evidence led in one suit could stand as evidence in the other suits in a joint trial of multiple suits was a different question from that of whether (in such a joint trial) the parties in one suit could obtain reliefs which adversely affected the interests of parties in another suit without having joined the latter as parties. The first question was one of procedure; the second question was a question concerning parties’ substantive rights. I will elaborate on this later in these written grounds.
Locus standi of the Suit 1158 plaintiffs
- [94]
[94] The second preliminary legal issue concerned that of the Suit 1158 plaintiffs’ locus standi to bring these proceedings.
- [95]
[95] Having considered parties’ submissions, I was satisfied that the Suit 1158 plaintiffs had the necessary locus standi, based on what has been referred to as the Wong Moy exception (Wong Moy v Soo Ah Choy [1996] 3 SLR(R) 27, (“Wong Moy”)).
- [96]
[96] Generally, the proper party to obtain a remedy on behalf of and for an estate is the executor or administrator of the estate: Fung Wai Lyn Carolyn v Kao Chai-Chau Linda [2017] 4 SLR 1018 (at [7]). In Wong Moy, the CA held that while a beneficiary of an estate generally had no equitable or beneficial interest in any particular asset comprised in that estate which was yet unadministered, this did not mean that a beneficiary of an estate which was unadministered or under administration had no remedy: such a beneficiary may, if special circumstances are shown, institute proceedings qua beneficiary to recover assets of the estate.
- [97]
[97] In Wong Moy, the CA endorsed the judgment of the High Court in Omar Ali bin Mohd v Syed Jafaralsadeg bin Abdulkadir Alhadad [1995] 2 SLR(R) 407 (“Omar Ali”), where the High Court held that the beneficiaries of an estate had locus standi to bring an action qua beneficiaries, to protect the property of the estate and to prevent the sale of the property. In arriving at its decision, the High Court in Omar Ali cited with approval the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Re Atkinson [1971] VR 612, in which Gillard J held:
- [98]
[98] I have highlighted the above words in Gillard J’s judgment because as a statement of principle, there is nothing in these words which suggest that the beneficiary’s derivative action must be restricted to only certain causes of action. Indeed, the authorities make it clear that there is no such restriction. In Joseph Hayim Hayim v Citibank NA [1987] AC 730 (“Joseph Hayim”), for example, the Privy Council explained the beneficiary’s right in the following terms (at 748F–G):
- [99]
[99] In Chahwan v Euphoric Pty Ltd trading as Clay & Michael & anor [2009] NSWSC 805 (“Chahwan”), Brereton J (sitting in the New South Wales Supreme Court) noted (at [18]) that the beneficiary’s derivative action was “now available in respect of all causes of action which a trustee may have against third parties”. However, it must always be borne in mind –
- [100]
[100] In spite of the state of the authorities, the defendants sought to rely on the decision of the High Court in Sia Chin Sun v Yong Wai Poh [2018] SGHC 142 (“Sia Chin Sun”) in arguing that the Wong Moy exception must be limited to “proprietary claims”. This argument was chiefly based on the following statement by the High Court in Sia Chin Sun (at [27]):
- [101]
[101] As the Assistant Registrar (“AR”) who heard the defendants’ striking-out application in SUM 1582/2018 (“SUM 1582”) observed, however, the High Court in Sia Chin Sun did not actually lay down any definition of “proprietary claim” versus “purely pecuniary claim”. Nor were the defendants able to show me any authority in which these terms were specifically defined by the courts in the context of a derivative action by the beneficiary of an estate. As the AR astutely observed, it did not appear that the High Court in Sia Chin Sun – in using these terms – had in mind the distinction between claims in respect of a res (ie, title to property) and purely in personam claims, since the claims she found to be “proprietary claims” included claims which were clearly not claims concerning title to property (Ayaz Ahmed v Mustaq Ahmad [2018] SGHCR 10 at [43]).
- [103]
[103] Reading the High Court’s judgment in Sia Chin Sun in context, therefore, I agreed with the AR that what the High Court meant by its use of the term “proprietary claim” was any claim which had as its object the protection and preservation of the assets of the estate (Sia Chin Sun at [27]). On this basis, the Suit 1158 plaintiffs’ action for minority oppression under s 216 of the Companies Act would certainly be a claim which had as its object the protection and preservation of the assets of the estate – these assets being the estate’s shares in MMSCPL and the rights attached to those shares.
- [104]
[104] As for “special circumstances”, the CA in Wong Moy made it clear (at [24]) that this should not be given too constricted a meaning lest inflexibility should lead to injustice. All the circumstances of the case should be considered, including the nature of the assets, the position of the personal representatives and the reason for the personal representative’s default (at [28]). In the present case, as the Suit 1158 plaintiffs have pointed out, given the plaintiffs’ claims of oppressive conduct by Mustaq himself and his family members, there was plainly no prospect of Mustaq initiating legal action to pursue these claims on behalf of the Mustafa estate.
- [105]
[105] I add that I did not find the High Court’s decision in Lakshmi Anil Salgaocar v Vivek Sudarshan Khabya [2017] SGHC 120 (“Lakshmi Anil Salgaocar”) to be of any assistance to the defendants. The plaintiff in that case brought suit as the beneficiary of her late husband AVS’ estate for her own benefit and that of her children (the other beneficiaries). As the court noted in that case, the plaintiff framed her claim as being no more and no less than an action to recover, preserve and protect the assets of the estate, per the Wong Moy exception. However, the court held that the Wong Moy exception did not apply because the assets which she claimed to be seeking to recover and protect were in fact apartment units and rental income from these units which belonged to AVS’ company MDWL and its 22 subsidiaries. Title in these units and the rental income did not belong to AVS, nor did they vest in the estate following his death. Instead, the assets of the estate were only those assets which belonged to AVS prior to his death – namely, the shares in MDWL; and even on the grant of letters of administration, the administrator of the estate would not automatically gain title to the units and rental income but would instead gain title to the shares which, on distribution, would entitle the beneficiaries to participate in the company MDWL as shareholders – and from there, to gain control of (and eventually, title to) MDWL’s assets and income.
- [106]
[106] It was clear even from this brief recitation of the court’s decision in Lakshmi Anil Salgaocar that the Suit 1158 plaintiffs were in a very different position from Madam Salgaocar. The Suit 1158 plaintiffs were not seeking the recovery of the MMSCPL funds alleged to have been wrongfully misappropriated by the defendants. Insofar as they pleaded such wrongful misappropriation of company funds, it was clear that the defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct was relied on as evidence of how they disregarded the Suit 1158 plaintiffs’ interests as minority shareholders (Leong Chee Kin v Ideal Design Studio Pte Ltd & others [2017] SGHC 192 (“Ideal Design”) at [88]).
Corporate wrongs versus personal wrongs in the context of an oppression claim
- [107]
[107] In this connection, in evaluating the oppression claims in both Suit 1158 and Suit 780, I noted that while there are four grounds of oppression provided for under s 216 of the Companies Act, they are bound by the common thread of unfairness; and the touchstone for minority oppression is whether the conduct complained of is commercially unfair (Over and Over Ltd v Bonvests Holdings Ltd and another [2010] 2 SLR 776 at [77] and [81]). Commercial unfairness arises when there has been a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of the conditions of fair play which a shareholder is entitled to expect: per the CA in Ho Yew Kong v Sakae Holdings Ltd & others [2018] 2 SLR 333 (“Sakae (CA)”) at [81]. In this respect, a distinction must be drawn between unfairness and unlawfulness: a person may act within his legal rights and yet act in a manner which is commercially unfair; and conversely, conduct which is technically unlawful may not necessarily be commercially unfair. In other words, whether an act is commercially unfair depends on the context in which it took place; and this goes beyond the question of whether the act is lawful or regular (see Sakae (CA) at [82]); Ideal Design at [48]).
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