Skip to content
Grounds publishedDecided 7 Jan 2026
Contents

High Court

Yang Hong v Commissioner of Police, Singapore Police Force (Tanglin Police Division)

Feedback & support

[2026] SGHCR 1Case no. Originating Application No 832 of 2025 (Summons No 2966 of 2025)39 paragraphs

What happened, in plain English

There is no plain-English summary of this judgment yet.

Ask about this judgment

Laws this judgment relies on

Grounds of decision

Official text from eLitigation

  1. Introduction

  2. [6] Mdm Yang has appealed against my decision. I now set out the grounds of my decision in full.

  3. Facts

  4. Parties

  5. [7] Mdm Yang is a People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) national. She resides in the PRC. A PRC company, Guangzhou Crown Trading Co Ltd (“Guangzhou Crown”) also features prominently in OA 832. Guangzhou Crown was placed in bankruptcy in the PRC on 18 December 2023. While Mdm Yang purported to represent Guangzhou Crown, the exact relationship between her and Guangzhou Crown was not made clear in OA 832. To illustrate, in legal proceedings commenced by Guangzhou Crown in India on 1 March 2023, Mdm Yang was described in court filings as Guangzhou Crown’s “authorised representative”, “legal representative” and “sales manager”. Mdm Yang was authorised by a board resolution of Guangzhou Crown signed by one of its directors. OA 832 was commenced by Mdm Yang in her own name and personal capacity. Despite the centrality of Guangzhou Crown’s role in the matters giving rise to OA 832, Mdm Yang was coy about her role in Guangzhou Crown, referring to Guangzhou Crown as “my [her] company” and “a company that I [she] operated”.

  6. [8] The named respondent in OA 832 is the Commissioner of Police of the Singapore Police Force (“SPF”). However, Mdm Yang’s intended application for judicial review is not targeted at decisions which were made by the Commissioner of Police personally, but rather, decisions made by the SPF as a collective entity, through various police officers.

  7. Background

  8. [9] The background facts are not entirely clear. This was squarely attributable to how Mdm Yang had presented them. Instead of setting out the facts and identifying the evidence supporting those facts, Mdm Yang inundated the Court with a mass of documents. Many of these documents were not in English. More importantly, there was little explanation on the relevance of these documents and how they supported her case, leaving the Court and the Respondent to decipher the facts. Even allowing Mdm Yang leeway on the ground that she was self-represented, this was plainly unsatisfactory.

  9. The Contract

  10. [10] The genesis of Mdm Yang’s claim lies in a sales contract (“Contract”) entered on 5 March 2020 by Guangzhou Crown and a Singapore registered company, Innoso Pte Ltd (“Innoso”). Under the Contract, Innoso agreed to sell to Guangzhou Crown 50 metric tons of a material known as “SSMMS” for the price of US$1,293,512.50. The shipper and supplier of the materials was an Indian company, Jindal Poly Films Limited (“Jindal”). The terms of the Contract provided that the materials were to have a bacterial filtration efficiency (“BFE”) of more than 99.995%. It will be noted that the Contract was entered into around the time the COVID-19 pandemic was becoming a global medical emergency. According to Mdm Yang, the materials were intended to be used to manufacture medical masks, although it is unclear if this was to be done by Guangzhou Crown’s customers whom the materials were sold to or whether Guangzhou Crown itself was involved in manufacturing medical masks. To be used to manufacture medical masks, the materials had to have a BFE of greater than 95%.

  11. The alleged fraud

  12. [11] Pursuant to the Contract, Guangzhou Crown paid Innoso US$700,000 for a part shipment of 35.6073 metric tons of the materials. 14.3927 metric tons of the materials were shipped by Jindal to Guangzhou Crown (“Delivered Materials”). However, Innoso was unable to fulfil the remaining shipment, leading Innoso to refund Guangzhou Crown the sum of US$327,657.25.

  13. [12] Mdm Yang claimed that Delivered Materials did not meet the contractual specifications because their BFE was between 62.79% and 73.15%, making them unfit for medical mask production. Mdm Yang claimed that Innoso had committed fraud, relying on the following strands of evidence: (a) WhatsApp messages showing that Innoso’s representatives knew that Jindal had forged a test report stating that the materials had a BFE of more than 99.995%; (b) Innoso was operating from a “fake” address in Singapore; (c) Innoso tampered with customs documents by falsely declaring the product type; (d) Innoso asked Guangzhou Crown to remove labels showing that the materials were actually “SMS” (which had a lower BFE than SSMMS); and (e) Innoso suggested that Guangzhou Crown bribe testing centres to produce false test reports. Mdm Yang claimed that Innoso’s fraud caused Guangzhou Crown to suffer huge losses, comprising the amount paid for the materials, air freight, import duties and compensation to its downstream customers who purchased the materials. Mdm Yang also claimed that she was made personally liable for Guangzhou Crown’s debts.

  14. The importation of the materials into Singapore

  15. [13] Relying on information obtained from a website, www.tradesparq.com, Mdm Yang further claimed that Innoso had imported 149 metric tons of the same materials into Singapore in August 2020 (“Imported Materials”), on the false premise that the materials were SSMMS when they were in fact SMS. Mdm Yang claimed that this posed an “imminent public health risk” as 149 metric tons of the materials could be used to produce 340 million medical masks. No evidence was adduced on what happened to these materials after they allegedly entered Singapore. In respect of the Imported Materials, Mdm Yang described herself as a “public health whistle-blower”.

  16. Criminal complaints in China and India

  17. [14] Mdm Yang claimed that she first made a criminal complaint against Innoso and Jindal in China in September 2020. However, the Chinese police could not take action as they had limited cross-border enforcement capabilities.

  18. [15] Mdm Yang claimed that in late 2022, she also made a criminal complainant against Innoso and Jindal in India. Mdm Yang claimed that this was futile because Innoso kept changing addresses and its registered address in Singapore was fake. Mdm Yang claimed that the Indian Courts had “already accepted a criminal case in December 2022”. However, this seems to be an overstatement. It would instead appear that the Indian authorities had decided not to commence a public prosecution and had informed Mdm Yang to bring a private prosecution instead. Mdm Yang was dissatisfied with that decision and filed a criminal revision in the Indian courts. That criminal revision remains pending.

  19. [16] On 8 October 2024, more than four years after the events in question, Mdm Yang filed a police report in Singapore (“Police Report”). A copy of the Police Report was not adduced in evidence. From the correspondence that ensued between Mdm Yang and the SPF, however, it appeared that the thrust of the Police Report pertained to the alleged fraud committed on Guangzhou Crown in relation to the Delivered Materials and the alleged public health risk posed by the Imported Materials.

  20. [17] On 9 October 2024, the SPF informed Mdm Yang that based on the known facts, they would not take further action in relation to the Police Report. However, the SPF said that their decision may be revised if there was a substantial change in circumstances or if new evidence came to light. Mdm Yang was dissatisfied with the SPF’s decision. This led to a lengthy exchange of emails between Mdm Yang and the SPF. I highlight the salient points:

  21. (a) Between 10 October and 30 December 2024, Mdm Yang provided further information and documents to the SPF.

  22. (b) On 30 December 2024, the SPF informed Mdm Yang that having considered the facts and circumstances, they maintained their decision to take no further action in relation to the Police Report.

  23. (c) Mdm Yang remained dissatisfied with the SPF’s decision. On 31 December 2024, Mdm Yang sent a lengthy email to the SPF, repeating the contents of her earlier emails, and asking for the detailed reasons for the SPF’s decision. The SPF responded on 7 January 2025, reiterating their decision to take no further action and informing Mdm Yang that she could take civil action.

  24. (d) On 13 January 2025, Mdm Yang sent another lengthy email to the SPF taking issue with their decision. In this email, Mdm Yang provided further evidence of a telephone conversation between her business partner and Innoso’s representative. Mdm Yang also demanded that the SPF provide her with the legal basis and reasons for their decision.

  25. (e) Between 13 and 15 January 2025, the SPF asked Mdm Yang for further information, which she provided. On 20 February 2025, the SPF informed Mdm Yang that they were investigating the Police Report and Mdm Yang would be updated of the outcome in due course.

  26. (f) The SPF’s decision to investigate the Police Report did not appease Mdm Yang. On 4 March 2025, Mdm Yang sent an email to the SPF demanding that she be provided with a “detailed summary of the investigation plan” within seven days, failing which she would initiate judicial review proceedings and file a complaint with the Ministry of Home Affairs.

  27. (g) On 15 and 16 April 2025, Mdm Yang sent the SPF emails accusing them of delay and breaches of statutory provisions and making various demands as to how the investigations should proceed. Among other things, Mdm Yang demanded that her case be transferred from Tanglin Police Division to the Commercial Affairs Department (“CAD”) for investigations. Mdm Yang threatened to commence judicial review proceedings and alert the media and international organisations if the SPF did not accede to her demands.

  28. (h) On 22 April 2025, the SPF informed Mdm Yang that they were unable to accede to her request for the case to be transferred to the CAD. The SPF also informed Mdm Yang that investigations were still ongoing. Mdm Yang was dissatisfied with the SPF’s position and responded on the same day to repeat her demand and threats to commence judicial review proceedings and alert the media and international organisations. On 25 April 2025, the SPF informed Mdm Yang that her case would not be transferred to the CAD and she would be updated on the outcome of the investigations in due course. The SPF also informed Mdm Yang that they could not accede to her requests for information on the investigations as this was confidential.

  29. (i) Separately, between 12 March and 29 April 2025, Mdm Yang sent various emails to the Health Sciences Authority (“HSA”), initially requesting that they investigate the Imported Materials, jointly with the CAD. This escalated to Mdm Yang demanding that the HSA take various steps, failing which she would commence judicial review proceedings against them and alert the media and other international organisations.

  30. (j) On 29 July 2025, the SPF informed Mdm Yang that having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, and having consulted with the Attorney-General’s Chambers, the SPF had decided to take no further action against Innoso for any criminal offences. The SPF said that all investigations and enquiries into the matter would cease, and the case would be closed.

  31. Mdm Yang files OA 498

  32. [18] On 14 May 2025, Mdm Yang filed Originating Application No 498 of 2025 (“OA 498”) against the Respondent. Mdm Yang applied for the following orders:

  33. (a) An order that the HSA conduct sampling and testing of the Imported Materials and submit the results to Court.

  34. (b) A declaration that the SPF breached s 15B and s 15(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (“CPC”) by failing to transfer the case to the CAD and delaying the process for seven months.

  35. (c) A quashing order in respect of the SPF’s decision not to transfer her case to the CAD.

  36. (d) An interim injunction impounding the Imported Materials.

  37. Mdm Yang files OA 832

  38. [19] On 6 August 2025, while OA 498 was pending, Mdm Yang filed OA 832 against the Respondent. Mdm Yang later amended the originating application twice. OA 832 was an application for permission to commence judicial review proceedings under O 24 r 5(3) of the ROC 2021. Mdm Yang applied for permission to seek the following orders:

  39. (a) A quashing order to nullify the SPF’s decision made on 29 July 2025 to take no further action against Innoso and to close the case (“NFA Decision”).

  40. (b) A mandatory order directing the Respondent to transfer the case to the CAD within 48 hours.

  41. (c) An interim preservation order maintaining the seizure of the Imported Materials, pending HSA testing, pursuant to O 13 r 2(1) of the ROC 2021.

  42. (d) Declarations that the NFA Decision and the SPF’s decision not to transfer the case to the CAD (“No Transfer Decision”) breached s 17(1)(a) and (3) of the CPC.

  43. (e) There be an expedited hearing due to the public health risk posed by the Imported Materials.

  44. Mdm Yang withdraws OA 498

  45. [20] There were clear overlaps in the reliefs sought by Mdm Yang in OA 498 and OA 832. The main difference was that in OA 832, Mdm Yang further sought to challenge the NFA Decision, which was made after OA 498 was commenced.

  46. [21] At a Registrar’s Case Conference (“RCC”) on 26 August 2025, Mdm Yang applied for, and was granted permission to withdraw OA 498 by SAR David Lee (“SAR Lee”). Mdm Yang sought permission to withdraw OA 498, to consolidate her entire case in OA 832.

  47. Respondent files SUM 2966

  48. Parties’ submissions

  49. [24] Broadly, the Respondent’s submissions in SUM 2966 were as follows:

  50. (a) The Cova principles should be applied in deciding whether security for costs should be ordered.

  51. (b) The Court’s discretion to order security for costs under O 9 r 12(1)(a) of the ROC 2021 was enlivened because Mdm Yang was ordinarily resident out of Singapore.

  52. (c) It was just to order security for costs because:

  53. (i) The Respondent would likely face significant difficulties in enforcing costs orders against Mdm Yang in the PRC.

  54. (ii) Mdm Yang’s claim in OA 832 had no reasonable prospect of success.

  55. (d) The quantum of security sought was fair.

  56. (e) Ordering security for costs was unlikely to stifle Mdm Yang’s claim.

  57. [25] Mdm Yang’s submissions were as follows:

  58. (a) A “modified approach” for ordering security for costs should apply due to the unique nature of judicial review proceedings.

  59. (b) Order 9 r 12(1)(a) of the ROC 2021 required not only proof that a claimant was ordinarily resident out of jurisdiction; but also, a substantial risk that costs orders would be unenforceable.

  60. (c) There was no substantial risk of costs orders made against her being unenforceable as she was willing and able to fulfil “legitimate costs obligations”.

  61. (d) Her claim in OA 832 had a “high prospect of success”.

  62. (e) She was facing financial difficulties (which she described as “a state of financial ruin” ) and was unable to furnish security for costs. Ordering security for costs would therefore stifle her claim.

  63. (f) There were unique circumstances making it inappropriate to order security for costs. These were that: (i) her impecuniosity was the direct result of the fraud which the SPF failed to investigate; and (ii) there was an overriding public interest which outweighed the need for security for costs.

  64. (g) The quantum of security sought was excessive. If the Court was minded to order that security for costs be furnished, the appropriate quantum was $1.

  65. Issues

  66. [26] The issues to be decided were as follows:

  67. (a) The applicable legal principles for deciding whether to order security for costs in judicial review proceedings.

  68. (b) Whether the Court’s discretion to order security for costs under O 9 r 12(1) of the ROC 2021 was enlivened.

  69. (c) Whether it was just to order that Mdm Yang furnish security for costs. This turned on whether: (i) the Respondent would face difficulties enforcing costs orders made against Mdm Yang; (ii) Mdm Yang’s claims had a reasonable prospect of success; (iii) ordering security for costs would stifle Mdm Yang’s claim; and (iv) there were other circumstances making it inappropriate to order security for costs.

  70. (d) If security for costs was to be ordered, the appropriate quantum of security.

  71. Decision

  72. General principles for ordering security for costs

  73. (a) A two-staged framework should be applied to determine whether to order security for costs. First, the court considers whether its discretion to order security for costs under O 9 r 12(1) of the ROC 2021 is enlivened. Second, the court considers whether it is just to order security for costs having regard to all the relevant circumstances: Cova at [16].

  74. (b) In deciding whether it is just to order security for costs, the court should have regard to the Ideals in O 3 r 1 of the ROC 2021 and consider all relevant circumstances. Non-exhaustive factors include: (i) whether the claimant has a bona fide claim or whether the claim has a reasonable prospect of success; (ii) the claimant’s financial standing; (iii) the ease of enforcing any judgment for costs against the claimant; (iv) the relative strengths of the parties’ cases; (v) whether the application for security for costs has been taken out oppressively to stifle the claimant’s action; and (vi) whether the claimant’s want of means has been brought about by the defendant: Cova at [18]–[19].

  75. (c) The non-exhaustive list of factors are properly rationalised through the purposes behind the provision of security for costs, namely: (i) to protect the defendant, who cannot avoid being sued, by enabling him to recover costs from the claimant out of a fund within the jurisdiction; (ii) to ensure, within the limits of protecting the defendant, that the claimant’s ability to pursue his claim is not stifled; and (iii) to maintain a sense of fair play between parties: Cova at [20].

  76. The Cova principles apply in deciding whether to order security for costs in judicial review proceedings

  77. (1) The case authorities supported applying the Cova principles

  78. (2) Principle and policy supported applying the Cova principles

  79. The Court’s jurisdiction to order security for costs was enlivened

  80. It was just to order security for costs having regard to all relevant circumstances

  81. (a) First, the Respondent would likely face significant difficulties in enforcing costs orders made against Mdm Yang.

  82. (b) Second, Mdm Yang’s claim in OA 832 did not have a reasonable prospect of success.

  83. (c) Third, ordering security for costs would not unfairly stifle Mdm Yang’s claim in OA 832.

  84. (d) Fourth, there were no other circumstances making it inappropriate to order security for costs.

  85. [48] I elaborate on each reason.

  86. The Respondent would likely face significant difficulties in enforcing costs orders made against Mdm Yang

  87. Mdm Yang’s claim in OA 832 did not have a reasonable prospect of success

  88. [59] I turn to explain why Mdm Yang’s claims in OA 832 did not have a reasonable prospect of success. I do so with reference to the three main reliefs Mdm Yang sought in OA 832, namely: (a) to quash the NFA Decision; (b) a mandatory order to transfer the case to the CAD; and (c) an interim preservation order in respect of the Imported Materials.

  89. (1) Mdm Yang had no basis to challenge the NFA Decision

  90. [60] As a preliminary matter, the Respondent submitted that the SPF made the NFA Decision in consultation with the Attorney-General’s Chambers. The Respondent submitted that the NFA Decision thus involved the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and could only be judicially reviewed if: (a) it was abused, that is, where it was exercised in bad faith for an extraneous purpose; or (b) its exercise contravened constitutional protections and rights: Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 (“Phyllis Tan”) at [149]. While Mdm Yang did not address this submission, it was at least arguable that the narrower scope of review in Phyllis Tan did not apply as the decision here was not made by the Public Prosecutor, but rather by the SPF, having consulted the Public Prosecutor (see [17(j)] above). I gave Mdm Yang the benefit of the doubt and assumed that she could avail herself of all possible grounds of judicial review. Even then, Mdm Yang’s attempt to quash the NFA Decision was plainly unsustainable.

  91. [61] Mdm Yang submitted that the NFA Decision was unreasonable, irrational and unlawful because the SPF had demonstrated a “wholesale disregard” for s 424B of the Penal Code 1871 (“PC”). I disagreed. Section 424B of the PC came into operation on 28 July 2023, long after the acts complained of in the Police Report occurred. Article 11(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed) prevents criminal laws from having retrospective effect. Hence, Innoso could not have committed an offence under s 424B of the PC and the SPF could not have committed a reviewable error by not investigating whether Innoso committed such an offence.

  92. [62] Mdm Yang submitted that the SPF had failed to take basic investigative steps before arriving at the NFA Decision and had abdicated its duty to investigate serious allegations of fraud. At the hearing of SUM 2966, Mdm Yang pitched her case at a high level, claiming no investigations were done. I disagreed. Having considered the evidence (summarised at [17] above), Mdm Yang had no basis to claim that no investigations were done. Moreover, it was not for Mdm Yang to dictate how SPF conducted its investigations or demand that she be provided with confidential information about the progress of the investigations. Mdm Yang may be dissatisfied with the outcome of the investigations, but that alone was not grounds for judicial review.

  93. [63] Mdm Yang submitted that the NFA Decision was made without affording her an opportunity to be heard, thereby violating natural justice. Related to this, Mdm Yang submitted that the SPF’s conduct of the investigations was dilatory, and they had disregarded critical evidence, making their decision unreasonable. I disagreed. Mdm Yang’s submissions were squarely contradicted by the evidence. The evidence (summarised at [17] above) showed that Mdm Yang was given multiple opportunities to provide further information and evidence, and the SPF had considered any new information provided to it. The SPF officers also responded to Mdm Yang’s queries within a reasonable time. The SPF was not Mdm Yang’s personal concierge. The SPF acts for the wider public and it was not for Mdm Yang to dictate how they carried out their work.

  94. [64] Mdm Yang also failed to show how the NFA Decision violated s 17(1)(a) or (3) of the CPC, which was her basis for seeking a quashing order in OA 832. Insofar as Mdm Yang’s case rested on the SPF’s alleged failure to investigate the Police Report, or the adequacy of the investigations conducted, I rejected it for the reasons given above.

  95. (2) Mdm Yang had no basis to challenge the No Transfer Decision

  96. [65] Mdm Yang’s grounds for challenging the No Transfer Decision were equally unmeritorious.

  97. [66] In her Statement (Amendment No 1) filed under O 24 r 5(3)(a) of the ROC 2021 on 18 September 2025, Mdm Yang asserted that the No Transfer Decision violated s 17(1)(a) and (3) of the CPC which imposed a “mandatory transfer obligation for transnational fraud cases”. When asked to explain how s 17(1)(a) and (3) of the CPC imposed such an obligation, Mdm Yang did not address the Court’s query and simply said that she sent her case documents to the CAD after learning that CAD was targeting cross-border criminal activities. Mdm Yang’s submissions were unmeritorious.

  98. [67] Sections 17 of the CPC reads:

  99. [68] Section 17 of the CPC clearly did not require a specific department of the SPF to investigate a case and there was nothing mandating the transfer of “transnational fraud cases” to the CAD.

  100. (3) Mdm Yang had no basis to seek an interim preservation order in relation to the Imported Material

  101. [69] The court’s power to make an interim preservation order is set out in O 13 r 2 of the ROC 2021. The provision reads:

  102. [70] In OA 832, Mdm Yang applied for an interim preservation order in respect of the Imported Materials. The interim preservation order sought to have the Respondent “maintain the seizure of the [Imported Materials]”. Mdm Yang applied for an interim preservation order on the purported basis that the Imported Materials were unfit to produce medical masks, posing a public health risk. Mdm Yang’s case was legally and factually unsustainable.

  103. [71] I agreed with the Respondent that Mdm Yang’s application was effectively an application for an injunction against the Government. In particular, it sought a mandatory injunction against the SPF to locate, seize and maintain the seizure in respect of the Imported Materials. The granting of such an injunction was prohibited under s 27(1)(a) read with s 27(2) of the Government Proceedings Act 1956, which provided:

  104. [72] Mdm Yang’s claim for an interim preservation order was also factually unsustainable. According to the authors of Singapore Civil Procedure 2025 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2025) (Cavinder Bull SC, general editor) at [13/3/8], the grant of an interim preservation order was governed by the principles in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 and the relevant questions were: (a) whether there was a serious question to be tried; and (b) whether the balance of convenience lay in favour of granting or refusing the interlocutory relief sought. Even taking Mdm Yang’s factual case at its highest, in that the Imported Materials did enter Singapore, and they were unfit to produce medical masks, the balance of convenience clearly did not support granting an interim preservation order. This was because there was no evidence that the Imported Materials remained in Singapore, let alone, that they were in the Respondent’s possession or control, such that the Respondent should be ordered to preserve them. This was perhaps to be expected since the Police Report was lodged more than four years after the fact.

  105. [73] Mdm Yang’s response was that her duties as a “whistle-blower” ended at reporting the entry of the Imported Materials and she had no duty to trace their present location. This was misconceived on two counts. First, Mdm Yang had conveniently ignored her glaring delay in making a Police Report in Singapore. If Mdm Yang was truly concerned about the public health risk posed by the Imported Materials in Singapore, it is unclear why she did not make a police report in Singapore earlier. Second, as the applicant in OA 832, Mdm Yang bears the burden of proof. Labelling herself a “whistle-blower” does not relieve her from that burden.

  106. Ordering security for costs would not unfairly stifle Mdm Yang’s claim

  107. [78] The third is that the court may consider the extent to which the claimant’s impecuniosity was caused by the defendant’s conduct which is the subject of the action: Cova at [43]. However, the claimant must prove that the defendant’s conduct had caused its impecuniosity, in that it was a material cause, and not merely a contributing factor: Cova at [44] and [45].

  108. [82] As Mdm Yang had not shown that she was impecunious, it was unnecessary for me to consider whether the Respondent had caused Mdm Yang’s impecuniosity. But for completeness, I did not accept Mdm Yang’s suggestion that the SPF had somehow caused or contributed to her alleged impecuniosity, insofar as she submitted that “[her] impecuniosity [was] a direct result of the very fraud the Respondent failed to investigate”. On Mdm Yang’s own case, her alleged impecuniosity could only have been caused by the alleged fraud which occurred more than four years before the SPF became involved.

  109. There were no other circumstances making it inappropriate to order security for costs

  110. [86] Mdm Yang’s first claim that her impecuniosity was the direct result of a fraud which the Respondent failed to investigate was untenable for the reasons at [82] above.

  111. $15,000 was a reasonable quantum of security

  112. Conclusion

  113. [96] For these reasons, I made the following orders:

  114. (a) Mdm Yang was to furnish security for the Respondent’s costs up to and including the disposal of the permission hearing in OA 832 in the sum of not less than $15,000 by depositing the said sum with the Supreme Court Registry or with the Accountant-General by no later than 25 November 2025, 4pm.

  115. (b) All proceedings in OA 832 against the Respondent would be stayed forthwith pending the provision of the aforementioned security for costs, save that Mdm Yang was not prevented from appealing against the decision in SUM 2966.